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English Abstract 
This dissertation explores the so-called too-much-choice effect, according to which an 
overabundance of options eventually leads to negative consequences, such as a 
diminished motivation to choose any option or a decreased satisfaction with the finally 
chosen alternative. While strong instances of this effect have been found in a small 
number of studies in the past, its theoretical underpinnings are still somewhat 
unspecific. Because the effect challenges basic axioms of rational choice theory and it 
also has important implications for applied fields such as marketing and public policy 
making, it is important to get a better understanding of the mechanisms that lead to the 
effect. As a starting point to test these mechanisms, an experimental paradigm is 
needed in which the effect reliably occurs. Therefore, I first strived to replicate 
previous experiments that reported large effect sizes. Yet in a series of three 
replications in the field and in the lab with a total of 850 participants, I did not find an 
effect of too much choice, suggesting that the effect is less robust than previously 
thought and that it depends on certain boundary conditions instead. To find out why 
the effect occurs and which specific conditions are necessary to reliably elicit it, I 
subsequently examined several boundary conditions that figure in previous research 
on decision making in psychology and related fields and then tested the conditions 
empirically in a series of six laboratory experiments. Based on the results of these 
experiments with a total of 595 participants, most of the tested boundary conditions 
could be ruled out as explanations of why and when the effect of too much choice 
occurs. The results of a meta-analysis of published and unpublished data including my 
own suggest that the effect of too much choice is smaller than previously thought and 
that the differences between the studies that found the effect and those that did not 
cannot be explained by mere chance. As a consequence, a further search for moderator 
variables in future research seems justified.  
 Deutsches Abstrakt 
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem so genannten „Effekt zu großer 
Auswahl“. Der Effekt besagt, dass ein Überangebot von Auswahlalternativen negative 
Konsequenzen hat, in dem es beispielsweise die Motivation verringert, überhaupt eine 
Entscheidung zu treffen oder in dem es die subjektive Zufriedenheit mit der letztlich 
gewählten Alternative verringert. Der Effekt wurde von einigen wenigen 
experimentellen Studien in der Vergangenheit empirisch nachgewiesen. Seine 
theoretische Erklärung sowie die zugrunde liegenden Entscheidungsmechanismen sind 
jedoch bisher nur unzureichend präzisiert. Der Effekt steht im Widerspruch zu 
Axiomen der klassischen rationalen Entscheidungstheorie. Ein sicherer Nachweis des 
Effektes hätte daher Konsequenzen für die Theorienbildung in der Psychologie. 
Außerdem hätte der Effekt praktische Relevanz in angewandten Bereichen wie zum 
Beispiel im Konsumgütermarketing oder in der Politik. Daher ist es wichtig, ein 
genaueres Verständnis der Mechanismen zu erlangen, die zur Entstehung des Effektes 
führen. Um diese Mechanismen zu untersuchen wird zunächst ein experimentelles 
Paradigma benötigt, in dem der Effekt reliabel auftritt. Aus diesem Grund wird in der 
vorliegenden Arbeit der Versuch unternommen, bereits publizierte Studien zu 
replizieren, in denen große Effektstärken gefunden wurden. In einer Serie von 
insgesamt drei Replikationen (Zwei Feldexperimente und ein Laborexperiment) mit 
insgesamt 850 Versuchsteilnehmern konnte ich jedoch den Effekt zu großer Auswahl 
nicht replizieren. In der Konsequenz dieser Ergebnisse ist davon auszugehen, dass der 
Effekt weit weniger generalisierbar ist als bisher angenommen und dass sein Auftreten 
wesentlich von spezifischen Randbedingungen abhängt. Ausgehend von dieser 
Tatsache untersuche ich im Weiteren die Frage wann, wieso und unter welchen 
Randbedingungen ein Effekt zu großer Auswahl zu erwarten ist. Dabei arbeite ich 
basierend auf etablierten empirischen und theoretischen Erkenntnissen in der 
Psychologie und in verwandten Forschungsfeldern eine Reihe potenzieller 
Randbedingungen heraus und teste diese in sechs weiteren Experimententen mit 
insgesamt 595 Teilnehmern.  Basierend auf den Ergebnissen dieser Experimente 
können die meisten der getesteten Randbedingungen als Erklärung für das Auftreten 
des Effektes ausgeschlossen werden. Die Ergebnisse einer sich daran anschließenden 
Meta-Analyse veröffentlichter und unveröffentlichter Daten zeigt jedoch, dass der 
Unterschied zwischen Studien die einen Effekt nachweisen und solchen, in denen kein 
Effekt auftritt, vermutlich nicht allein durch Zufallsprozesse erklärbar ist. Demnach ist 
eine Suche nach weiteren Randbedingungen in zukünftiger Forschung gerechtfertigt. 
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Chapter I:  
The effect of too much choice 
In today’s market democracies, people face an ever-increasing number of options to 
choose from. People may choose between careers, places to live, holiday destinations, 
or a seemingly infinite number of consumer products. As I will outline in more detail 
below, an increase in the number of choices has many advantages. But can there also 
be such a thing as too much choice? Does an increase in assortment sizes at some 
point lead to negative consequences? Lately, a growing number of scholars in 
psychology have suggested that when the number of choices increases beyond a 
certain point, people’s motivation to choose and their satisfaction with the chosen 
alternative decreases. But how reliable and robust is this so-called too-much-choice 
effect? Can it be generalized to many situations or does it depend on certain boundary 
conditions instead? What are the theoretical underpinnings and explanations of the 
effect and what does it tell us about the underlying cognitive processes and 
mechanisms? What consequences follow for applied research in public policy making 
and marketing and what implications does the effect have on theories of decision 
making and human reasoning?  
In this dissertation, I aim to answer these questions. In Chapter I, I will start 
by reviewing the main arguments—from several disciplines, including psychology, 
philosophy, economics, marketing, and biology—in favor of having many options. 
Building on this, I will give a more precise definition of the too-much-choice effect, 
discuss its theoretical underpinnings, and summarize the empirical evidence 
supporting its occurrence. I will further show that the theory behind the effect has 
some weaknesses. Based on a literature review and my own series of failed attempts at 
replicating the effect, in Chapter II, I will show that the effect is far less robust than 
previously thought and that it probably depends on certain boundary conditions 
instead. In Chapter III I will identify, discuss, and empirically test some potential 
boundary conditions, including individual differences and changes in environmental 
structure. To summarize and to provide a more coherent picture of the too-much-
choice effect, in Chapter IV I will present a meta-analysis designed to estimate the 
mean effect size across all available studies, including my own, and to determine 
whether a further search for moderator variables is justified. In Chapter V I will 
discuss and critically evaluate alternative theoretical accounts of why and when a too-
much-choice effect might occur that could be tested in future research. In the 
following, I will begin by providing some examples of the increasing number of 
choices in today’s market democracies.  
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The proliferation of choice 
In modern and affluent societies such as many found in Europe or North America, the 
number of choices is ever increasing across many domains of daily life. Horovitz 
(2004) provides a number of examples that illustrate this “variety revolution” (Postrel, 
2005): Dreyer’s, which offered 34 flavors of their ice cream in 1977, sold 250 in the 
year 2004. Arby’s sold one kind of roast beef sandwich when it was founded in 1964; 
in 2004 it sold 30 sandwiches. According to Horovitz, Starbucks has 19,000 ways it 
can serve a cup of coffee. He further reports that Tropicana, which had two kinds of 
orange juice a decade ago, now has 24. Frito-Lay started with two types of potato 
chips; now it offers 60. When Whole Foods opened in 1974, it sold two kinds of 
lettuce. Now according to Horovitz it sells 40 different kinds.  
Even more extreme figures can be obtained from the Internet. The online 
music store iTunes currently offers more than 5 million songs for 99 cent apiece. By 
May 2007, the online DVD rental company Netflix offered 75,000 different DVDs. At 
the same time, the German bookseller amazon.de offered 2,257,828 German books 
while its U.S. counterpart amazon.com offered a staggering 5,980,889 English books 
and even, among other products, 858 different jams.  
This wide proliferation of choices raises the question if having more options to 
choose from is an unambiguously good thing or if there can also be something like 
having too much choice. Below, I will summarize the literature on the effects of 
increasing assortment sizes, which can be roughly categorized into three categories: 
advantageous, harmful, or of little or no effect. As I will show, viewing an increase in 
choices as advantageous represents the traditional and somewhat established view of 
economics and psychology on human decision making. Considering many choices as 
harmful, and thus supporting the idea of too much choice, challenges this view. The 
third, no-effect category speaks in favor of humans as adaptive decision makers and 
provides yet another alternative account of human reasoning.  
More is better: Advantages of large assortments 
In the following, I will summarize some of the benefits that come with the increasing 
proliferation of choice in modern societies. 
Individual freedom 
Having options is commonly regarded as an important prerequisite of personal 
freedom as it allows an individual to live life according to his or her own agenda. 
Having options is what brings autonomy (Dowding, 1992). As pointed out by Postrel 
(2005), people are different in many ways and abundant choice accommodates this 
variation. On the other hand, in a world of few choices, whether of consumer goods, 
mates, or careers, individual differences may become a source of alienation and 
unhappiness. For example, imagine someone who loves opera but who lives in a rural 
Chapter I:  
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environment without an opera house nearby and without anyone to share the 
enjoyment. 
Motivation 
In a study by Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, and Deci (1978) in which students had 
to solve a puzzle, performance and motivation increased for students who could 
personally choose from among six different puzzles as compared to another group of 
students who got the same puzzles assigned to them by the experimenter. Along the 
same lines, Langer and Rodin (1976) found that inhabitants of a nursing home who 
could choose among seemingly trivial things like when to watch a movie or how to 
arrange their furniture enjoyed an increase in health and well-being. On the other 
hand, elimination of choice made people feel helpless and hopeless (see also Taylor, 
1979).  
Matching of preferences and search costs 
In a market context, a large variety increases the likelihood of satisfying diverse 
consumers and because it facilitates competition, it eventually drives price down and 
quality up. In view of this, the philosopher Gerald Dworkin (1982, p. 60) wrote:  
One of the ways in which increased choice contributes to the welfare of individuals 
is by increasing the probability that they will satisfy their desires. People want various 
things—goods and services, status, affection, power, health, security—and their chances 
of getting these things are often enhanced if they have more options to choose among. 
My chances of finding a shirt I like is greater if I have ten different shirts to choose 
among than if I have only two.  
There are also other reasons why people benefit from having many options. Choosing 
from a large assortment that is assembled at one place reduces the costs of search for 
more options and allows for more direct comparison between options. As a 
consequence, a large assortment makes it easier to get a sense of the overall quality 
distribution in the relevant domain, which leads to better-informed choice. It can also 
lead to more confidence because it is less likely that a potentially better alternative is 
missing.  
Desire for variety 
As has been summarized by Kahn (1995), if people select more than one 
option at a time (e.g. for future use) or if they repeatedly choose from the same 
assortment, there are several other ways that large assortments can be beneficial to 
individuals: An increased variety, for instance, meets a desire for change and novelty, 
as a result of satiation with the usual or mere curiosity (Ariely & Levav, 2000). Being 
allowed to choose from a variety of options and to diversify one’s portfolio also 
provides insurance against uncertainty or miscalculation of one’s own future 
preferences (see also Simonson, 1990).  
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In some cases, the benefits of choosing from large assortments seem to go 
beyond the maximization of one’s immediate enjoyment or satisfaction. For example, 
Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman (1999) ran a series of experiments that involved 
repeated choice of music. Individuals sometimes chose songs that led to lower 
satisfaction for the time being. The authors conjectured that memories for sequences 
that vary in quality are more positive than memories for sequences that have a low 
variance, even if in the latter case the mean quality is higher. If so, people who 
sometimes chose a less-preferred option might aim for favorable memories of the 
overall series rather than to maximize immediate enjoyment. But as a pre-requisite, a 
certain amount of variety is necessary. 
Advantages from a biological perspective 
As laid out in a review article by Hutchinson (2005), many aspects of choice are not 
unique to humans but can also be found among animals that choose a mate or forage 
for food. According to Hutchinson, there are several reasons why having more options 
to choose from may be beneficial for animals: For food choice, having many different 
alternatives buffers against potential harm from changes in the environment, such as 
seasonality or the presence of others competing for the same resources. 
In mate choice, potential partners attract more attention and are easier to find 
in the first place if they group in clusters (so-called leks). For animals that actively 
search for a mate (females for most species), leks reduce the travel time between 
potential (male) mates and thereby reduce energy consumption and predator risk for 
those who search. As an additional advantage due to the reduced travel time, in larger 
leks more mates can be inspected and/or they can be inspected for a longer period of 
time, which leads to greater accuracy and eventually to an increased expected reward. 
There also seems to be some evidence that low-quality mates avoid large leks because 
they compete less effectively there. In addition, having shorter intervals between 
potential mates reduces memory load because past encounters do not have to be 
remembered for too long. Hutchinson further reviews several studies showing that 
various animals like crickets or eagle owls prefer to compare potential mates relative 
to each other, which is easier if they group in leks. A small lek on the other hand 
comes with the risk of currently containing no acceptable mates at all.  
While the studies reviewed by Hutchinson are mainly concerned with animals, 
there are reasons to believe that these advantages also hold for humans. For example, 
in close resemblance to the forming of leks in animals, people also form clusters, as 
documented by a sound body of research in the social sciences on groups as diverse as 
antique dealers and prostitutes (Ashworth, White, & Winchester, 1988; Miller, 1996). 
Increased sales 
For manufacturers, large assortments have the additional advantage of taking up more 
space on the supermarket shelf, which attracts more attention from the customer and 
thus increases choice probability. According to Koelemeijer and Oppewal (1999) it is 
Chapter I:  
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well known among marketers that making people enter a store increases the 
probability of making a sale. If a store that offers a large assortment attracts more 
people, it should also sell more than a store that offers a small assortment.  
More is (subjectively) better: Preferences for large choice sets 
In line with these advantages, empirical evidence suggests that people as well as 
animals tend to prefer large assortments and large variety over smaller ones (Brown, 
Read, & Summers, 2003; Hutchinson, 2005) and that stores that offer a large variety 
have a competitive advantage over those that offer less (Anderson, 2006; Arnold, 
Oum, & Tigert, 1983; Craig, Gosh, & McLafferty, 1984; Mazursky & Jacoby, 1986). 
Preferences for niche products 
Especially on the Internet where distribution costs are low and a large number of 
potential consumers can easily be reached, retailers with large assortments are 
successful because they meet a demand for niche products and specialties. According 
to Anderson (2006), of the 16,000 albums that are offered on digital jukebox, a 
website that offers music downloads, 98% had at least one track purchased per 
quarter-year. Of the 1 million tracks that were offered by the online music store 
iTunes in 2005, every one sold at least once in a quarter.  
These examples reflect the diversity inherent in the population and they 
suggest that there is considerable demand for niche products, but this demand is only 
revealed once people are offered a large number of choices. While there is little doubt 
about the existence of this demand, scholars have interpreted it in different ways. 
Some see it as “egocasting,” the narrow pursuit of one’s personal taste (Rosen, 2005). 
Others praise it as mass customization and are glad that the tyranny of the lowest-
common-denominator fare and the times of poor supply-and-demand matching are 
coming to an end (Anderson, 2006).  
Inherited preference for choice 
The preference for large assortments over smaller ones has also been explained from 
an evolutionary perspective: Brown et al. (2003) conjectured that preference for 
choice may be a fundamental part of our natural endowment because it would be 
difficult to think of a natural environment in which there would be a zero, or even 
negative correlation between the amount of choice and the value of the outcome that is 
eventually chosen. The authors acknowledged, though, that this relationship might not 
hold for artificial environments that consumers typically face.  
Increased food consumption 
Human subjects who received a large quantity of three different flavors of yogurt 
consumed an average of 23% more yogurt compared to people who received the same 
quantity of yogurt of only one flavor (Rolls, Rowe, Rolls, Kingston, Megson, & 
Gunary, 1981). In a similar fashion, in a series of experiments, Kahn and Wansink 
(2004) showed that children as well as adults eat more candies if the number of 
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options increases. In their experiments, participants chose from assortments of jelly 
beans and M&Ms that consisted of either 6 or 24 different colors. What is remarkable 
about their results is that even though M&Ms differ in color, they all taste the same, 
which rules out the hypothesis of flavor-specific satiety as an explanation of the 
increased consumption. Instead, the authors suggested that consumption is controlled 
by the mere perception of variety. In line with this hypothesis, the authors found that 
participants’ consumption quantity is correlated with their perceived variety and that it 
is perceived variety rather than actual variety that eventually matters.  
As far as animal food consumption is concerned, animals that are not 
specialized in one particular food seem to consume more if diversity is large. This is 
probably because nutrients complement each other and, especially for folivores 
(herbivores that specialize in eating leaves), a varied diet helps the animal avoid over-
ingesting toxins that are specific to particular plants (Hutchinson, 2005). 
Perceived attractiveness and satisfaction 
In an experiment in which participants had to rate the attractiveness of cut flower 
assortments with sizes ranging from 1 to 12 flowers, Oppewal and Koelemeijer (2005) 
found that, at least within the range they tested, people rate the assortment as more 
attractive the larger it gets.  
Along the same lines, in a series of three studies in the laboratory and in the 
field involving choices among printed magazines and different types of coffee flavors, 
Mogliner, Rudnick, and Iyengar (2006) consistently found that satisfaction with the 
chosen option and also with the selection process itself increased with the amount of 
choice and variety people perceived. Interestingly, and in line with the results of Kahn 
and Wansink (2004), in their studies, the perceived variety did not depend on the 
objective number of options but rather on the number of categories into which the 
options were grouped, such that more categories led to an increase in the perceived 
variety.  
Less is more: The effect of having too much choice 
Given the wide proliferation of choice in modern societies and the numerous 
advantages that come with it, having many options to choose from seems to be an 
unambiguously good thing. Yet recently some scholars have started to ask if there can 
also be something like having too much choice. In the following, I will lay out reasons 
and empirical findings for this latter proposition, which stipulates that at some point, a 
further increase in the number of choices leads to negative consequences. I will start 
by summarizing the economic argument on the benefits of having fewer options and 
by defining what, exactly, is meant by the effect of too much choice. 
Economic limits to the number of options 
In classical economic theory it is a basic principle that expanding the choice set cannot 
make a consumer worse off (Benartzi & Thaler, 2001). From this perspective, the only 
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reason why the full demand for variety on the side of the consumers will commonly 
not be supplied is because producers have to balance variety against the lower unit 
production costs of fewer variants (Lancaster, 1990). If production costs are the only 
factor that limits assortment size, the amount of variety should increase if production 
costs decrease. According to Anderson (2006), this is exactly what happens. As an 
example, he points to the fact that the number of options to choose from is commonly 
much higher on the Internet because there, the costs to produce and stock a variety of 
goods that appeal to consumers is commonly much lower than in regular stores.   
Definition of the too-much-choice effect 
Recent empirical findings suggest that an overly large number of options can indeed 
lead to negative consequences such as dissatisfaction, regret, disappointment, 
decreased motivation to make a choice, or decreased consumption rates, all of which 
are manifestations of what has been termed the too-much-choice effect (Huberman, 
Iyengar, & Jiang, 2007; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), choice overload (Chernev, 2003a, 
2003b; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2005), or hyperchoice (Mick, Broniarczyk, & Haidt, 
2004). Thus, in the following, to refer to these negative consequences I will use the 
terms too much choice and choice overload interchangeably.  
When talking about choice overload, it is also important to define what is 
actually meant by the term “choice.” According to Dowding (1992), choice has three 
meanings. It describes the ability to select an option (“a person is capable of choice”), 
the alternative that a person actually selects (“this is my choice”), and a set of options 
(“a store offers a lot of choice”). This distinction is important because an increase in 
choice can mean different things for different types of choice. For example, one’s 
ability to make choices commonly increases with power, yet this is not what is usually 
meant when talking about choice overload. In the literature on choice overload, most 
often “choice” refers to a set of options. 
No definition of what constitutes “too much” 
Previous research has not provided an exact definition of what constitutes “too much” 
choice. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) described it as a “reasonably large, but not 
ecologically unusual, number of options” (p. 996). From this perspective, the size of 
an assortment can only be evaluated relative to the distribution of assortment sizes that 
would be expected within a certain environment.  
With regard to choices of animals, Hutchinson (2005) argued that choice 
overload effects are seldom found in animals because they are adapted to assortment 
sizes that naturally occur in their environment. If this holds true for humans as well, in 
contradiction of Iyengar and Lepper’s notion, it might be that too much choice looms 
in cases in which the assortment exceeds ecologically usual sizes. 
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Limited information capacity 
Scholars (e.g. Mogilner et al., 2006), have conjectured that too much choice occurs for 
assortment sizes that exceed George A. Miller’s magical number seven plus or minus 
two (Miller, 1956) because, so the argument goes, set sizes above that threshold are 
beyond humans’ capacity for processing information. Yet a closer look at Miller’s 
original publication renders this a rather ill-conceived definition. In Miller’s work, the 
“magical number seven” applies to two distinct psychological concepts: (1) the span 
of absolute judgments on one single dimension such as the loudness or frequencies of 
tones, the taste intensities of salt solutions, or the intensity of a vibrator on the chest 
region; and (2) the span of immediate or short-term memory. In the following, I will 
lay out both concepts in more detail. 
With regard to the first concept, Miller argued that even though judgments of 
one-dimensional stimuli are severely limited in the first place, this limitation only 
holds for absolute judgments and not for relative comparisons of stimuli. Also, most 
relevant stimuli in real-world environments are not one-dimensional but multi-
dimensional, and every additional dimension increases the ability to discriminate. As 
an example, Miller presented data from experiments in which participants were asked 
to identify different frequencies of tones by assigning numerals to them. In such a 
task, apparently most humans can only judge about six different classes without error. 
Yet, when tones also differ on an additional dimension, such as loudness, the number 
of correct assignments increases. If tones differ on six independent dimensions, for 
example, duration or rate of interruption, Miller reported experimental data showing 
that participants could identify about 150 categories without error—the more 
dimensions added, the more categories that can be identified. As a consequence, 
Miller stated that “everyday experience teaches us that we can identify accurately any 
one of several hundred faces, any one of several thousand words, any one of several 
thousand objects, etc.” (p.87), and for real-world situations, “the limit is probably in 
the thousands, if indeed there is a limit” (p.91). Thus, what initially looks like a severe 
limitation in fact provides little grounds to define choice overload. 
For the second concept, the capacity of short-term memory, Miller also found 
the limit to be around seven initially. Here, Miller explicitly referred to a limit in the 
number of items, or chunks, as he called them. Yet drawing on the results of several 
experiments, Miller concluded that memory span seems to be almost independent of 
the amount of information per item, and that humans in their daily life constantly 
group and recode information and thus manage to break the informational bottleneck 
of memory span. As an example, Miller described the process of learning 
radiotelegraphic code: In the beginning one hears dit and dah as separate chunks, but 
as learning proceeds, these sounds will be organized into letters, and what used to be 
one-sound-per-chunk then becomes one-word-per-chunk. In Miller’s terms, this 
recoding process shows how a person can increase the capacity of his or her short-
term memory by increasing the amount of information per chunk, and Miller 
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conjectured that in one form or another we constantly engage in this kind of recoding 
in daily life. As a consequence, short-term memory hardly provides a guideline for 
defining choice overload.  
Empirical findings of having too much choice 
In the year 2000, Iyengar and Lepper published a widely cited paper in which they 
argued that an overabundance of options decreases satisfaction and the motivation to 
choose. Their research attracted a lot of attention from inside and outside psychology. 
An analysis of the number of citations the paper has received since its publication 
suggests that interest in the topic is still growing (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Number of citations for the Iyengar and Lepper (2000) paper according to 
the Web of Science Citation Report 
 
Iyengar and Lepper, 2000 
In their paper, Iyengar and Lepper reported results from a series of three studies that 
they conducted in the field and in the laboratory. In the field study, data was collected 
on the sales floor of an upscale grocery store in Stanford, California. At the entrance 
to the store, the researchers set up a tasting booth with one brand of exotic jam 
(Wilkin & Sons) on two consecutive Saturdays. The booth displayed either a small 
assortment of 6 jams or a large assortment of 24 jams. The two different assortments 
were shifted on an hourly basis. While the large assortment contained all but the most 
common jam flavors of that brand, the jams in the small assortment consisted of the 
most, least, and medium attractive flavors. The attractiveness was determined by a 
pretest in which students rated the attractiveness of the flavors based on their names. 
On the days of the experiment, every consumer who approached the booth received a 
coupon to get 1 dollar off any jam of that brand. The coupons looked slightly different 
for the two experimental conditions. Therefore, by counting the number of redeemed 
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coupons at the cashiers’ registers the researchers knew the percentage of customers 
who purchased a jam within each condition. 
In line with the idea that people are attracted by large assortments, the authors 
found that more consumers approached the tasting booth when it showed the large 
assortment as compared to the small assortment. Yet, when it came to actual purchase, 
30% of all consumers who saw the small assortment of 6 jams at the tasting display 
actually bought one of the jams (with a coupon), while in the comparison group that 
could taste from a large assortment of 24 jams, only 3% of the people redeemed a 
coupon for a jam. The authors interpreted this finding as an effect of too much choice 
such that too many options decreased the motivation to make a choice. 
In the lab study, Iyengar and Lepper let two groups of participants choose one 
piece of chocolate to taste from an array of exotic Godiva chocolates (a Belgian 
chocolate brand). One group chose from 30 different Godiva chocolates (large 
assortment size), the other group from 6 different chocolates (small assortment size). 
As in the jam study, the 6 chocolate flavors in the small assortment were a subset of 
those in the large set. In extension to the jam study, the chocolate flavors from the 
large set were split into five small sets of 6 pieces each. These small sets were rotated 
between subjects so that at some point during the experiment each chocolate from the 
large set was also present in the small set.  
In this study, participants who chose from the large assortment reported higher 
enjoyment of the decision than the participants who chose from the small assortment 
(6 vs. 4.7 on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 [not at all] to 7 [extreme]). But at 
the same time, participants who chose from the large assortment reported higher 
difficulties (4.5 vs. 3.3) and more frustration (3.1 vs. 2.2) in making the decision and 
less satisfaction with the chocolate they finally chose (5.5 vs. 6.3). At the end of the 
experiment they were also less likely to accept a box of Godiva chocolate instead of 
money as compensation for their participation (12% vs. 48%, Cohen’s d=0.88). 
Iyengar and Lepper also found an effect of choice overload in a third study in which 
the quality of written essays decreased if the number of topics to choose from 
increased.  
Chernev, 2003b 
When people choose from different types of chocolate, Chernev (2003b) found that 
they are less confident with their decision when choosing from a large set of 16 
chocolates as compared to a small set of 4 chocolates. In a series of two experiments, 
participants first had to choose a piece of chocolate and then were asked if they would 
like to switch to another piece that was recommended to them by the experimenter. 
Participants who chose from the set of 16 chocolates were more likely to switch 
compared to participants who chose from the set of 4 chocolates (82% vs. 74% in the 
first study; 75% vs. 69% in the second study; Cohen’s d=0.23 and 0.22, respectively). 
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Insofar as switching indicates preference strength, these results can be interpreted as 
weaker preferences for options chosen from large assortments.  
Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang, 2007 
Huberman et al. (2007) found that the more retirement plans people have to choose 
from, the lower their probability of investing their money in any one of them. In their 
study, they analyzed archival data from 647 companies that offered their employees (a 
total of 793,794) the opportunity to invest part of their income in defined pension 
plans, so-called 401(k) plans. A 401(k) plan consists of a finite number of investment 
options, and participation requires choosing among them. In Huberman et al.’s data 
set, the number of investment options within each company ranged from 2 to 59 and 
the median number per plan was 13. The percentage of employees participating in the 
pension plan with 5 options to choose from was 72%, whereas for 35 options, 
participation dropped to 67.5%.  
It should be noted, however, that these are cross-sectional data that do not 
allow for any causal interpretation. While the authors statistically controlled for 
influences of gender, age, tenure, neighborhood wealth, and annual compensation, 
there are still other factors that might explain these differences. For example, the 
reasons why companies offer varying number of options remain unknown and so do 
the reasons people have for (not) participating in the plan.  
Reutskaja and Hogarth, 2005 
In another study on choice overload, Reutskaja and Hogarth (2005) looked at how 
much people’s satisfaction with a hypothetical choice between gift boxes depends on 
the number of boxes being offered to them. In their experiments, participants saw 
either 5, 10, 15, or 30 gift boxes sketched on a computer screen in a between-subjects 
design. The boxes differed in shape and color. Participants were asked to examine the 
boxes and to state which one they would hypothetically buy to package a present for a 
friend. Next, participants were asked to rate their satisfaction with the choice process, 
the hypothetically chosen box, and the difficulty they experienced when making their 
decision. The items were similar to those used in Iyengar and Lepper’s (2000) 
chocolate experiment outlined above. To explore potential differences between 
Western and Eastern Europe, participants were recruited in Spain, Ukraine, and 
Belarus. What Reutskaja and Hogarth found was that satisfaction with the chosen box 
followed an inverted U-shape: Satisfaction was highest for the 10- (Spanish sample) 
and the 15-option (Eastern European sample) sets. For smaller and, more importantly, 
also for larger set sizes, mean satisfaction ratings decreased. In both samples, the 
gradients for the satisfaction with the decision-making process followed a similar 
inverted U-shape form while the difficulty of making the choice monotonically 
increased with the size of the assortment. 
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Shah and Wolford, 2007 
In the most recent study on the effect of too much choice, Shah and Wolford (2007) 
also found a curvilinear relationship between assortment size and the motivation to 
purchase. In their experiment, they offered participants the opportunity to purchase a 
black pen for a reduced price. The number of different pens to choose among was 
varied from 2 to 20 in increments of 2 pens. What they found was that for the lowest 
three assortment sizes of 2 to 6 pens, 46% of the participants purchased a pen. For the 
largest three sets between 16 and 20 pens, 33% purchased, while for the middle-sized 
assortments of 8–14 pens, the percentage of participants who purchased peaked at 
70%.  
Tendency to avoid large assortments 
Along the same lines, a study by Lenton, Fasolo, and Todd (2005) suggests that in 
mate search, decision makers avoid overly large assortments and by this might protect 
themselves from having too much choice. In their study, decision makers were asked 
to imagine that they were presented with a list of potential mates to choose from, as in 
online dating. They were further asked to rate which of 10 different lists that ranged in 
size between one and 5,000 options they preferred. Most of the participants expressed 
a preference for lists that offered between 20 and 50 options. The lists that exceeded 
this size became increasingly unattractive, apparently because of higher expected 
choice difficulties.  
Too much choice in animals 
In his review, Hutchinson (2005) concluded that there is almost no evidence for choice 
overload in animals, which seems partly due to the fact that biologists have not 
explored this hypothesis so far. However, Hutchinson pointed out that according to 
Bernays (1999), some insects produce fewer eggs when presented with three different 
host plants as compared to only one. As a potential explanation, Bernays conjectured 
that in the presence of three plants, the animal was stimulated to move too often. 
A brief history of choice overload 
Even though it is rarely addressed in current publications, the idea of too much choice 
can be traced back to Aristotle, who asked how a dog faced with the choice of two 
equally tempting meals could rationally choose between them. In the 14th century, the 
French philosopher Jean Buridan took up this question and concluded that in such a 
situation a rational decision maker would delay the choice to further assess the 
possible outcomes. His idea is often exemplified as an ass between two hay stacks that 
starves to death because it cannot decide which one to approach (Zupko, 2003). 
Appetence conflicts 
In psychology, it was Kurt Lewin (1951) who argued that so-called appetence–
appetence conflicts between equally attractive options may lead to procrastination and 
decision avoidance. Choosing between several options has also been seen as difficult 
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because most options then have to be forgone, which induces conflicting cognitions 
(Festinger, 1957). Building on this back in the early 1970s, the psychiatrist Zbigniew 
Lipowski (1970) extended the idea of choice conflict to more than two options. In 
what he called “the theory of attractive stimulus overload” he argued that the “massive 
output and variety of available material objects promoted by aggressive advertising” 
(p. 276) constitutes a situation in which decision makers are overwhelmed with 
attractive options. Lipowski argued that this situation would be specific to affluent 
industrial societies where individuals are confronted with a multitude of possible 
choices of career opportunities, living environments, styles of life, and modes of 
leisure. He further proposed that withdrawal from choice can be seen as a way to cope 
with the conflict arising from an overabundance of attractive alternatives and that this 
withdrawal can eventually lead to “passive pleasures of drug-induced altered states of 
consciousness” (p. 277). 
Cognitive dissonance 
In the 1960s, Anderson, Taylor, and Holloway (1966) showed experimentally that 
when the number of options increases from two to five, decision makers consider 
fewer attributes per item and are more likely to choose an alternative that others have 
chosen before, even if it does not suit them very well. In a second experiment, 
Anderson et al. provided empirical evidence that post-decisional dissonance increases 
with the number of available options. Here, dissonance refers to the perceived 
incompatibility of two or more attitudes or behaviors. In this second study, dissonance 
was operationalized as an increase in the desirability rating for the selected product 
after the choice had been made—an effect also known as postdecisional spreading of 
alternatives. Dissonance was especially high in cases in which all four options were 
initially rated as about equally desirable. Anderson et al. further argued that 
dissonance can be taken as a proxy for increased discomfort and displeasure.  
Early notions of too much choice 
Interestingly, in their 1966 article, Anderson et al. pointed to even earlier evidence for 
the attractiveness of large assortments. Alderson and Sessions (1957, cited in 
Anderson et al., 1966) found that “women shoppers are attracted to stores carrying a 
wide assortment of merchandise” (Anderson et al., p. 62). And as an early example of 
having too much choice, Anderson et al. also mentioned the department store Macy’s 
in Manhattan, which in those days offered 129 styles of men’s white dress shirts while 
Korvette, a competing chain, only offered 351.  
It is interesting to note that according to Anderson (2006), back in 1897 the 
Sears mail-order catalog listed 200,000 items including 67 different types of tea and 
29 different types of cocoa. Thus, even though assortment sizes in many domains are 
                                                     
1 Perhaps tellingly, in 2007 Marcy’s is still prospering while Korvette went out of business in 
1980. 
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with no doubt bigger today than they were in the past, the phenomenon of large 
assortment sizes itself is hardly a new one. 
Theoretical explanations of the too-much-choice effect 
Despite the growing body of empirical evidence in favor of the too-much-choice 
effect, its theoretical explanation is still sparse and thus far, promoters of the effect 
have put little effort into developing a coherent framework that explains when and 
why an increase in the number of options leads to negative consequences. This lack of 
theory is in sharp contrast to the numerous explanations for the opposite effect—in 
which decision makers benefit from an increase in assortment size—outlined above.  
Preference uncertainty 
According to Huberman et al. (2007), an increased number of options exacerbates a 
chooser’s preference uncertainty. Yet unfortunately the authors did not elaborate on 
this statement. And as they did not explain what they meant by preference uncertainty, 
their explanation cannot be scrutinized or tested. Consequently, it cannot be ruled out 
that the concept of preference uncertainty is a mere redescription of the too-much-
choice effect.  
Anticipated regret 
Besides decreased satisfaction and a decreased motivation to choose, the experience of 
regret, as well as the negative emotions that go along with it, is commonly seen as one 
indicator of having too much choice. The concepts of satisfaction and regret are akin. 
Regret and the closely related concept of counterfactual thinking (thoughts of what 
might have been) influence people’s satisfaction with an outcome. For example, 
despite their objectively better outcome, Olympic athletes who win a silver medal 
seem to be less happy than athletes who win a bronze medal (Medvec, Madey, & 
Gilovich, 1995). Medvec et al. reckoned that this is due to the ease with which 
counterfactual alternatives can be generated such that silver medalists are more likely 
to compare their outcome to the missed gold medal whereas bronze medalists are 
more likely to engage in downward comparison. 
According to regret theory (Bell, 1982), disappointment theory (Loomes & 
Sugden, 1982), and also dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), decisions will often be 
made so as to minimize the anticipated feeling of post-choice regret and 
disappointment (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). Building on 
this, scholars have argued that the decreased motivation to choose due to choice 
overload can be explained by anticipated feelings of regret for the expected decision 
outcome (Botti & Iyengar, 2006; Schwartz, 2004). The line of argumentation goes as 
follows:   
When choosing from an assortment, the number of options that will not be 
chosen increases with the size of the assortment. Furthermore, the more options that 
will be forgone, the higher the probability of missing a better option, which is likely to 
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increase anticipated regret (cf. Festinger, 1957). Empirical evidence suggest that the 
subjective feeling of loss increases when the number of forgone options increases 
from one to two (Carmon, Wertebroch, & Zeelenberg, 2003). Ayton (2000) 
envisioned one possible manifestation of this phenomenon: people with cable TV who 
spend all evening channel hopping because they are afraid they might be missing 
something. 
As Schwartz (2004) has pointed out, one way to prevent regret is by choosing 
the best possible option. Yet this goal becomes harder with an increase in assortment 
size, because the more options there are, the more search will be necessary to find the 
best option. Another way to prevent anticipated regret and disappointment in a given 
decision situation might be to avoid making the decision at all (Beattie, Baron, 
Hershey, & Spranca, 1994; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002).  
However, as with preference uncertainty, the explanation of too much choice 
based on regret contains the danger of being circular: If satisfaction and regret are two 
sides of the same coin and satisfaction is the measure with which the effect of choice 
overload is diagnosed, little insight is gained by explaining overload with regret. 
Prevention of preference matching 
Another explanation of the too-much-choice effect is that an increased number of 
options hinders choosers’ ability to identify the option that matches their preferences 
(Huberman et al., 2007). However, this explanation assumes that the decision maker 
already has preferences prior to choice. As will be outlined in more detail in the 
following section, this explanation contradicts a basic assumption of most research on 
choice overload, including the work of Iyengar and Lepper (2000), which is that in 
order to elicit the effect of too much choice, one needs a situation in which decision 
makers do not have well-defined prior preferences. 
Lack of prior preferences as a necessary precondition 
All the studies outlined above were based on situations and options that participants 
were not familiar with. In line with this, an important precondition of the too-much-
choice effect seems to be the lack of clear goals or preferences prior to choice.  
Empirical evidence for the importance of prior preferences 
Roy O. Disney, cofounder of The Walt Disney Company, once said that “it's not hard 
to make decisions when you know what your values are.” Likewise, previous research 
has shown that having prior preferences and predefined goals makes it easier and more 
satisfactory to choose from complex environments, provided that people’s preferences 
can be matched. And the probability that these prior preferences can indeed be 
matched rises with the number of available options (Kahn, 1995).  
Chernev (2003a) showed in a series of experiments that for people with 
preferences prior to choice (or “ideal points” as he terms them), the probability of 
choosing and satisfaction with the choice increase with assortment size. The author 
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suggested that when people have a certain idea of what they want, they benefit from a 
large assortment because it makes it more likely they will find what they have in mind. 
For people without prior preferences, he found the opposite effect. In his experiments, 
prior to choice all participants were informed about the assortment structure and the 
relevant attributes. Prior preferences were experimentally induced by instructing some 
of the participants to think about and articulate which combination of attributes they 
liked best.  
Likewise, in an experiment by Huffman and Kahn (1998) participants saw 
descriptions of either hotels or sofas that were described on many attributes. While 
people in one condition were instructed to familiarize themselves with the attributes 
and the different attribute levels, people in the other condtion were instructed to think 
about their preferred level within each attribute. In a subsequent (hypothetical) choice, 
people in the latter group were more satisfied with the outcome of their decisions.  
Similar results were also obtained by Mogilner et al. (2006, Experiment 2). In 
their study, participants chose from an assortment of 144 different magazines. Half of 
the participants were instructed to choose a magazine they regularly read, which 
corresponds to the case of predefined goals in Huffman and Kahn’s study. The other 
half were instructed to choose a magazine that they did not regularly read, to prevent 
prior preferences. When asked about their satisfaction with the choice, the latter group 
without prior preferences was less satisfied. However, this result is not that surprising 
because it seems reasonable to assume that people regularly read those magazines that 
they like most.  
Critical evaluation of prior preferences as an explanation for choice overload 
Despite the shortcomings of some of the empirical studies outlined above, from a 
conceptual perspective, it seems reasonable that without clear goals on hand, 
individual preferences first have to be constructed by relying on information offered 
by the choice context. Also, in this case options need to be compared relative to each 
other, whereas decision makers with a clearly defined preference already have a 
reference point at hand that they could use. With regard to the search strategy, Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson (1992) conjectured that prior preferences lead to a very 
selective search in which people look for an option that matches their needs, terminate 
the search as soon as the desired option is found, and neglect the remaining 
assortment. 
Taken together, there are convincing arguments that prior preferences can 
prevent choice overload. Also, it seems reasonable that choosing without any prior 
preferences requires additional effort because decision makers first might want to 
learn about the distribution of a given assortment and construct their preferences 
before they make a choice (Fischhoff, 1991). As the choice process becomes more 
difficult, uncertainty might increase, which in turn might decrease satisfaction and/or 
the motivation to choose.  
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However, even if satisfaction decreases due to a lack of prior preferences, this 
does not necessarily imply that it decreases even further with a growing assortment 
size. As a consequence, even though the lack of prior preferences is a necessary 
condition for the too-much-choice effect, this is not sufficient to explain the effect. 
Maybe learning about a distribution or the construction of preferences becomes harder 
or less accurate with more options to learn about. If this drives the effect, it would 
imply that individuals will not be able to shield themselves from additional 
information about options, and some scholars argue that individuals indeed cannot 
elide additional options (Schwartz, 2004). 
Even though explaining choice overload through the lack of prior preferences 
requires several auxiliary assumptions, compared to studies that merely look at the 
effect of assortment size, the research on ideal points and prior preferences is a 
conceptual advancement because it explicitly addresses individual differences as well 
as aspects of the underlying search and decision strategies. According to Brunswik 
(1955) and Simon (1955), a mere focus on the environment only provides an 
insufficient picture of most if not all psychological phenomena, while looking at the 
interaction between environment on the one hand and the individual that acts within 
that environment on the other is a much more fruitful approach. I will elaborate on the 
interaction between environment and decision strategies in more detail in the General 
Discussion in Chapter V.  
Conflict and trade-off aversion 
Another attempt to find a theoretical explanation for the effect of too much choice is 
to link it to the well-established finding showing that decision makers tend to avoid 
decisions that involve trade-offs due to conflicting attributes between options. 
Empirical evidence of trade-off aversion 
In a seminal paper on the effect of conflict on choice, Tversky and Shafir (1992) found 
that when deciding between two options people were more likely to defer choice when 
trade-offs had to be made as compared to a situation where one option dominated the 
other (such that one option was superior in every aspect). In their experiment, one 
group of participants were offered a hypothetical choice between buying a low-quality 
Sony CD player for $99 and buying nothing. A second group of participants were 
given a choice between the same low-quality Sony CD player for $99, a high-quality 
Aiwa CD player for $159, and nothing. They found that 34% of the participants chose 
nothing in the first group whereas in the second group, 46% of the participants chose 
nothing. The only difference between the two groups was the presence of an additional 
option (the Aiwa CD player), which presumably led to a conflict situation such that 
participants in the second group had to trade off quality against price; as a 
consequence, the motivation to choose any of the options was diminished. As an 
alternative explanation, it could be that the second option informed the participants 
that there was a wider range to choose from and that further search would be 
worthwhile.  
 
P a g e  | 28 
 
This latter explanation does not really fit with the results of a second study by 
Tversky and Shafir. Participants in this study received $1.50 as compensation for their 
participation in a previous, unrelated study. Subsequently, one group of participants 
got an offer to exchange the money for a metal pen; the other group got an offer to 
exchange the money for the same metal pen or for a plastic pen that was similar in 
quality. Similar to the results of the first study, participants in the latter group were 
more likely to keep their money (53%) compared to participants in the first group, 
where only 25% kept their money.  
Tversky and Shafir’s findings of trade-off aversion were successfully 
replicated in other choice situations including medical decision making (Redelmeier & 
Shafir, 1995), consumer decisions for such things as light bulbs, CD changers, or 
cordless phones (Hsee & Leclerc, 1998), as well as choices among lotteries (Roe, 
Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001).  
In a series of experiments, Dhar (1997) found that the number of pre-choice 
thoughts people reported in a think-aloud protocol was much larger when two options 
were conflicting as compared to a situation in which one option dominated the other. 
Also, in his experiments there was no increase in deferral when participants could 
avoid the trade-off by choosing both options rather than only one.  
From the perspective of the coping literature, these examples of omission and 
deferral outlined above could also be understood as a defensive-avoidant coping 
strategy to escape difficult situations (Janis & Mann, 1977; Lazarus, 1966). In line 
with this interpretation, the tendency to defer choice is pronounced in cases in which 
sacred or highly consequential outcomes have to be traded off against each other, such 
as the desire for environmental friendliness and safety when purchasing a car (Luce, 
Bettman, & Payne, 1999).  
Trade-offs and choice overload 
Taken together, these results suggest that an increase in conflict or trade-offs can 
increase the tendency to avoid making a choice. While the studies on trade-off 
aversion are commonly based on choices between two options, supporters of the too-
much-choice hypothesis have also argued that, similar to the notion of regret, when 
the number of options within a choice set increases, so do the number of trade-offs 
within that set (Shanteau & Thomas, 2000), and as I will outline below, numerous 
experimental results indicate that the tendency to avoid choice can increase with the 
addition of alternatives due to trade-offs. But before I outline the nature of this 
relationship in more detail, I will elaborate on what is commonly meant by the term 
trade-offs and the closely related concept of conflict. 
The concepts of trade-off and conflict  
Conflict does not have a standard formal definition (Tversky & Shafir, 1992; Dhar, 
1997). Yet it is generally assumed that a conflict between two options arises if 
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choosing between them implies that some advantageous aspects will eventually be 
forsaken. This would be the case if one option is better or more desirable on one 
attribute (e.g. price) while the other option is better on another attribute (e.g. quality) 
or if both of them hold unique and attractive features. Conflict implies that when 
making a choice in such a situation, trade-offs between attributes or attribute values 
are an unavoidable necessity, which is why the terms trade-off and conflict are often 
used interchangeably in the literature.  
Conflict and negative correlation 
One way to formally express conflict is by calculating correlation coefficients between 
two attributes across all options within an assortment (e.g. Bettman, Johnson, Luce, & 
Payne, 1993). Yet correlations are just an approximate measure of conflict and the 
coefficients are difficult to interpret. If the correlation is negative, at least some 
options must conflict. Still, as long as the correlation is not r=-1.0 (i.e. perfect 
negative correlation), there can be some options that dominate others such that they 
are better on both attributes. In theory, even if the overall correlation is negative, one 
option could still dominate all the others, rendering the decision easy (Figure 2A). 
Also, at least with regard to Pearson’s correlation coefficients, it can be the case that 
there are no dominant options even though the correlation is not “perfect” (|r|≠1; 
Figure 2B). Similarly, if the correlation is positive, at least some dominated options 
must exist. Yet, as long as the positive correlation is not perfect (if it does not equal 
1.0), it can still be the case that there is no option that dominates all others (Figure 
2C).  
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(A)   
(B)  
(C)  
Figure 2: Relationships between options on two attributes.  
r = ‐ 0.33
r = ‐ 0.94
r = + 0.98
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Alternative ways to measure conflict 
To overcome these measurement problems, one could calculate Goodman and 
Kruskal’s gamma between pairs of options (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). To calculate 
gamma, all possible pairs of attributes on which the options conflict are summed up 
and designated as D. Likewise, the number of pairs that are in concordance are 
summed up and designated as C. A pair of attributes is said to conflict if each option is 
better than the other on one attribute. Concordances occur if one option is better on 
both attributes and thus locally dominates the other. The total number of pairs can be 
calculated as 
( )
2
1−⋅ aa
 (1-1) 
where a is the number of different attributes. The difference between the two measures 
is then divided by the sum of both measures:  
( )
( )DC
DC
+
−=γ  (1-2) 
Thus, cases in which two options have similar attribute values are not taken into 
account. This measure can be interpreted as the degree to which one option dominates 
the other. For perfect dominance, gamma would equal 1, and the higher the conflict, 
the lower the gamma coefficient.  
For attributes that are nominal rather than ordinal, van Herpen and Pieters 
(2002) calculated lambda coefficients between two attributes (Goodman & Kruskal, 
1954). The lambda coefficient denotes the proportion by which the error in predicting 
one attribute is reduced when the other attribute is known, compared to a situation 
where the other attribute is unknown. A lambda of zero indicates that there is no 
relationship between two attributes whereas a lambda of one indicates a perfect 
association.  
Yet another way to measure conflict is to calculate the fraction of options that 
are nondominated. For an option to be nondominated, no other option can be found 
that is superior on every aspect or attribute (Fasolo, McClelland, & Todd, 2007). For 
example, in Figure 2A, only one option is nondominated, which indicates zero 
conflict, whereas in Figure 2B, all of the options are nondominated, indicating high 
conflict.  
Critical evaluation of trade-off aversion as an explanation for choice overload 
Taken together, it seems plausible that conflict and trade-offs between options are a 
necessary precondition for the too-much-choice effect. Yet this is not to say that the 
number of trade-offs necessarily increases with the number of options. For example, if 
dominated options are added that are worse than at least one other option in every 
attribute, the number of trade-offs will not change because the dominated alternative 
need not be considered anyhow. Likewise, if a dominant option is added that is better 
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than all the other options in every attribute, no trade-offs have to be made when 
choosing the dominant option. Furthermore, even if conflict leads to deferral and 
avoidance of choice, it does not follow that more conflict leads to more deferral and 
avoidance of choice, yet this would be necessary for the too-much-choice effect to 
occur.  
To test if the number of conflicts matters, Dhar (1997) conducted two 
experiments in which he manipulated the number of conflicting attributes between two 
consumer products. What he found was that choice deferral did not increase with the 
number of trade-offs and that having to make a single attribute trade-off is already 
sufficient to decrease the motivation to choose. While these results question the idea 
that an increase in the number of trade-offs can account for the too-much-choice 
effect, one study might not be enough to draw a firm conclusion. Also, it is likely that 
it is not the number of trade-offs per se that matters but also the magnitude of the 
difference and the importance of the conflicting attributes, making it difficult to draw 
any final conclusions.  
Difficulty discriminating between options 
Another explanation of the too-much-choice effect by Iyengar and Jiang (2004) is 
based on the notion that options get more similar with an increase in assortment size, 
which makes it harder to distinguish between them. Because of this, the authors argue 
that the “fear of not being able to choose optimally” (p. 4) will increase. While not 
explicitly stated, this explanation seems to imply that decision makers seek to identify 
the optimal option according to some predefined standard. As I will outline in more 
detail below, the idea that people strive to find the optimum is at odds with several 
psychological concepts that are empirically and theoretically well established, 
including Simon’s (1955) notion of “satisficing”, the concept of adaptive decision 
making (Payne et al., 1992), and the framework of fast and frugal heuristics 
(Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). In short, all three concepts 
suggest that decision makers adapt to changes in the environment by making use of 
fast and frugal heuristics. As a consequence, they are expected to remain fully capable 
of acting under a wide range of different situations, including an increase in the 
number of options to choose from.  
Failure to adapt the decision strategy 
Botti and Iyengar argued that in contrast to the idea that decision strategies are adapted 
to the environment in which they are applied, simple heuristics “may incorrectly 
eliminate valuable options,” which in turn would lead to “suboptimal decisions and 
subsequent dissatisfying outcomes” (2006, p. 13). If so, the effect of too much choice 
would result from a specific interaction between the decision strategy on one side and 
the environmental structure, including the number of options to choose from, on the 
other. As mentioned above, there is a considerable body of literature that explicitly 
addresses this relationship.  
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Hence, in order to evaluate Botti and Iyengar’s claim, I will review the 
literature on adaptive decision making with a special emphasis on the number of 
options. As I will outline in more detail below, I found little empirical or conceptual 
evidence to support Botti and Iyengar’s claim.  
Too much choice and the notion of adaptive decision heuristics 
According to the notion of humans as adaptive decision makers, people in daily life 
are well adapted to proliferating choices. For example, Postrel (2005) suggested that 
abundant choice does not force us to look for the absolute best of everything but 
allows us to find the extremes in those things we really care about. As an example, she 
pointed out that even 20 years after phone deregulation, 60% of all U.S. consumers 
were with AT&T, the former monopolist. This inertia to change the service despite a 
multitude of different options could be due to the fact that most people are simply 
satisfied with their status quo, an instance of Herbert Simon’s idea of satisficing.  
Satisficing 
The notion of satisficing (Simon, 1955, 1956) suggests that in most cases, assortment 
size will hardly have any effect on either satisfaction or motivation and thus no choice 
overload should occur because “an organism may make its choice within a set of 
alternatives more limited than the whole range objectively available to it” (Simon, 
1955, p. 102). Satisficing, in contrast to optimizing, assumes that humans only possess 
limited information and limited computational facilities. Because of these constraints, 
optimizing is unfeasible and the rational thing to do is to find solutions that are 
satisfactory in that they exceed a certain aspiration level. (Simon, 1955). The 
aspiration level is formed based on experience of how good a solution one might 
reasonably achieve (Simon, 1990). Simon (1956) hypothesized that decision-making 
agents find these solutions by making use of cues, or “clues” as Simon (1956) called 
them, and other structural characteristics of the environment in which they operate. 
Satisficing further assumes that options are evaluated sequentially and that the first 
option that exceeds the aspiration threshold will be chosen. As a consequence, usually 
only a few options are considered before a choice is made and no trade-offs between 
advantages and disadvantages are made. Simon (1990) stated that “picking the first 
satisfactory alternative solves the problem of making a choice whenever an enormous, 
or even potentially infinite, number of alternatives are to be compared” (p. 9). 
On the other hand, a decision maker who aims to optimize would consider as 
many options as possible before making a final decision. Satisficing also implies that 
each option is evaluated relative to some aspiration level while optimizing would 
require a relative comparison between the options. 
According to Janis and Mann (1977), the notion of satisficing can also 
describe the situation in which a decision maker considers only a few, albeit important 
attributes. In contrast, an optimizing strategy would typically be based on a weighted 
 
P a g e  | 34 
 
additive model in which the magnitude and importance of each dimension is taken 
into account and possible trade-offs need to be considered.  
In line with the notion of satisficing, research on consumer behavior has found 
that people in shops often buy products “on impulse”: A consumer notices something 
she finds attractive and if its price is within a reasonable range she immediately 
decides to buy it (Rook, 1987). Taken together, if Simon is correct in that his theory is 
descriptive of human decision making, people would usually follow a satisficing 
strategy that should shield them from being overloaded.   
Adaptive decision making 
The research on adaptive decision making (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne et al., 1992) 
also suggests that people are capable of reasonable choices even if the number of 
options and the amount of information gets large. As an example, one would expect 
that decision makers become pickier when the assortment is large and lower their 
expectations when choices are few. Consequently, the probability of making a choice 
would remain constant and no too-much-choice effect would be found with respect to 
choice.  
From this perspective, the empirical findings of choice overload could be 
interpreted as a failure to adapt the decision strategy to the current situation. If people 
do not have a strategy to handle the situation they face, deferring the choice might be 
more likely. In extension to this, if human decision makers have (evolved or learned) 
heuristics available that protect them from experiencing choice overload for common 
everyday assortment sizes, it might be a necessary precondition for the too-much-
choice effect that, unlike the definition of Iyengar and Lepper (2000), the assortment 
exceeds ecologically usual sizes so that people face situations in which they cannot 
make use of their evolved simple heuristics. Such an interpretation would also be in 
line with Simon, who conjectured that “conflict of choice may often be equivalent to 
an absence of a choice mechanism in the given situation” (1956, p. 137) but that the 
organism seldom encounters such situations in its natural environment (see also 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999).  
It should be noted here that this latter explanation of too much choice is 
essentially different from Botti and Iyengar’s hypothesis above. While according to 
Botti and Iyengar the effect occurs due to the utilization of a simple heuristic, from the 
perspective of humans as adaptive decision makers, the effect would occur due to a 
lack thereof.  
Further empirical evidence on the too-much-choice effect 
In line with the notion of humans as adaptive decision makers, there are a few studies 
that did not find any effect of the number of options on either satisfaction or the 
motivation to make a choice. Given that finding no effect on the number of options is 
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commonly not regarded as a very surprising result, the data outlined below is often 
hidden behind other findings and main effects. 
Lenton, Fasolo, and Todd, 2005 
Lenton et al. (2005) did not find any difference between choosing from a small 
assortment and choosing from a large assortment with regard to the difficulty of 
choosing, the satisfaction with the chosen option, and the experience of post-choice 
regret. In their experiment, students were asked to browse through a mock dating 
website that consisted of either 4 or 20 profiles in a between-subjects design. After 
looking at all the profiles, participants were asked to select the mate they preferred 
most. Their results are in line with the idea that participants had a strategy available 
that shielded them from being overloaded with too many options. However, in their 
study the authors did not explicitly test the use of strategies. 
Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar, 2006 
Likewise, for people choosing among different numbers of printed magazines in a 
supermarket, Mogilner et al. (2006, Study 1) did not find any effect of actual (vs. 
perceived) assortment size on satisfaction with the shopping experience. In their study, 
they administered questionnaires to regular customers at different branches of a high-
end supermarket chain that offered various numbers of magazines. At each store, 
consumers rated how satisfied they were while shopping for a magazine and they also 
rated the amount of choice they subjectively perceived. What they found was that the 
perceived amount of choice was a good predictor of choice satisfaction, such that 
more perceived choice led to more satisfaction while the actual number of magazines 
offered by the store did not affect consumers’ satisfaction. It should be noted, 
however, that the number of magazines was not experimentally controlled but pre-
determined by the store management. While this makes it more ecologically valid, the 
study follows a correlational design that does not allow for any causal interpretations. 
In a more controlled experimental design (Mogilner et al., 2006, Study 3), the 
researchers still did not find an effect of the number of options on satisfaction with the 
chosen options. Participants in this experiment chose a cup of coffee from one of two 
menus in a between-subjects design. One menu listed 5 different coffee flavors while 
the other listed 50 different flavors. After their choice, participants received a cup of 
coffee and subsequently rated the taste of the coffee and their satisfaction with their 
choice. In this experiment, people were deceived into believing that they received the 
flavor of their choice, whereas in fact everyone got the same type of coffee. Besides 
the fact that the authors do not disclose if they informed participants about the 
deception at the end of the experiment, scholars have argued that deception might 
actually impair internal and external experimental validity (Ortmann & Hertwig, 
2002).  
Despite these methodological concerns and the lack of a main effect, Mogilner 
et al. (2006) did find an effect of too much choice in parts of their sample data: For 
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people who described themselves as having relatively little knowledge about coffee, 
the satisfaction with a choice from the small assortment was slightly higher compared 
to a choice from the large assortment. On the other hand, people who were relatively 
knowledgeable and usually drank a lot of coffee were largely unaffected by the 
number of options. This finding is in line with the findings outlined above saying that 
a lack of prior preferences is a necessary precondition for the effect to occur. 
Notwithstanding the results, it seems surprising that alleged coffee experts did not 
recognize that they got served a different coffee than the one they chose. Yet, the 
study outlined next indicates that even for a task that people usually do not face every 
day and for which they might not have specific expertise, the effect of too much 
choice is not always found.  
Haynes and Olson, 2007 
Participants in a study by Haynes and Olson (2007, Study 1) were asked to imagine 
that they won a lottery and that they could choose among different prizes. The number 
of prizes to choose from was subject to experimental manipulation. What they found 
was that participants who chose from 10 options found the task more enjoyable but 
also more difficult and more frustrating than participants who chose from 3 options. 
There was also a small effect of assortment size on satisfaction with the finally chosen 
hypothetical option (Cohen’s d = 0.44). However, in a follow-up study with a small 
assortment of 5 options and a large assortment of 20 options (Haynes & Olson, 2007, 
Study 2), the effect of assortment size on satisfaction disappeared (Cohen’s d = −0.2). 
While it is not clear what caused these differences in the results, it can at least be 
concluded that even though participants faced a decision that was rather exotic, the 
effect was not always found.  
Theoretical implications of the too-much-choice effect 
From a theoretical point of view, a possible effect of choice overload is important for 
our understanding of human rationality and the concept of liberty as the freedom of 
choice.  
Violation of regularity 
The too-much-choice effect challenges the assumptions of rational choice theory 
(Savage, 1954) in that it violates regularity. The regularity axiom does not claim that 
large assortments are necessarily better than small ones but dictates that increasing 
variety should never lead to less choice. More precisely, it states that the preference 
for (and hence potential choice share of) a given product cannot be increased by 
including an alternative product in the choice set. Expressed formally, let p(z│{z,x}) 
be the probability of choosing option z from the set {z,x} and let p(z│{z,x,y}) be the 
probability of choosing option z from the set {z,y,x}. According to regularity, 
p(z│{z,x,y}) cannot exceed p(z│{z,x}). The violation becomes obvious if z represents 
“choose nothing” and y represents a large number of alternative options: The 
probability of choosing nothing if presented with many options, p(z│{z,x,y}), cannot, 
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according to regularity, be greater than the probability of choosing nothing rather than 
x alone, p(z│{z,x})—and yet the too-much-choice effect says sometimes it is.  
Cognitive models of choice 
The effect of too much choice challenges many cognitive models of preferential 
choice for at least two reasons: First, most of the models assume that one option will 
eventually be chosen. For these models, predicting “no-choice” would require 
specifying the no-choice option as one explicit alternative among many. For example, 
to incorporate no-choice into a weighted additive model, one would need to know 
precise attribute values for the no-choice option, which in most cases seems 
unfeasible. Process models of preferential choice, such as the elimination-by-aspects 
model (Tversky, 1972), that, similar to the notion of satisficing outlined above, 
assume a step-wise information search in which options are sequentially screened and 
subsequently eliminated if they do not exceed certain thresholds can predict no-choice 
for cases in which none of the options meets the necessary criteria. Yet for the latter 
class of models, the probability that all necessary criteria are met will usually 
increases with the number of options. I will come back to the relationship between 
choice models and too much choice in further detail in the General Discussion in 
Chapter V. 
Violation of Pareto efficiency 
By adding options, for instance, by widening the range of consumer products within a 
certain category, it can be expected that some people will eventually be better off 
because their preferences can be satisfied to a higher degree. If at the same time, no 
one is worse off, Schwartz (2007) laid out that a larger assortment of options is Pareto 
efficient. The too-much-choice effect challenges the Pareto efficiency of large 
assortments because it predicts a decrease in the motivation to choose and thus makes 
some people worse off when the number of options increases.  
Finally, insofar as individual freedom is defined as the ability to choose 
unconstrained by external or internal forces, adding options should remove constraints 
and thus increase freedom. But because it leads to decreased choice motivation and 
satisfaction, the too-much-choice effect suggests an antagonism between amount of 
choice and its constraining influences that reaches into philosophical debates on the 
understanding of freedom. 
Too much choice and freedom of choice 
It is commonly agreed that humans have a desire for personal control and self-
determination. At least in the United States, “free choice” ranks among the highest 
values (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989; Schwartz, Markus, & Snibbe, 2006). In order 
for a choice to be free, it is a necessary condition that a person could have done 
otherwise. As a consequence, having more than one alternative is required for a free 
choice. This is not to say that having more alternatives would further increase 
individual freedom. Yet this latter proposition could be deduced from the writings of 
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the philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1969), according to whom freedom derives from the 
wish to be self-directed, such that decisions depend on oneself rather than on external 
forces of whatever kind. From this perspective, having many options to choose from 
could be seen as an increase in individual freedom because the more options there are, 
the fewer external forces one has to deal with. Accordingly, some philosophers 
explicitly conflate the number of options to choose from on one hand and individual 
freedom on the other (Steiner, 1975, cited in Dowding, 1992). Yet according to the 
effect of too much choice, having too many options decreases the motivation to 
choose and thus eventually constrains people’s ability to make a decision. From this 
perspective, a further increase in the number of options would decrease individual 
freedom, calling into question the concept of individual freedom outlined above. 
The coalescence of freedom and choice has been questioned by other 
philosophers who argue that the range of physical possibilities from which a person 
can choose at a given moment has no direct relevance to freedom (Hayek, 1960). As 
an example, Hayek described a rock climber who sees only one way out to save his 
life and thus is unquestionably free even though he has hardly any choice. Likewise, 
Milton Friedman (1990) described a situation in which an armed robber offers a 
victim the choice between money and life as an example of a situation in which people 
are not free despite multiple options to choose from. Dowding concluded that it is not 
the number of options per se that increases a person’s freedom. Rather, it is getting 
what one wants. From this perspective, a mere increase in the number of options does 
not increase freedom in the first place, and as a consequence, any opposition between 
freedom and choice overload would be dissolved. 
Alternative views on the concept of freedom 
Schwartz (2000) conceptualized freedom of choice as a two-edged sword with 
liberation on one side and chaos on the other. In Schwartz’s terms, freedom is chaos 
when it is unconstrained, resulting in tyranny and anxiety.  
Building on this dichotomy, Schwartz et al., (2006) reported evidence that 
especially students from working-class families associated the word “choice” with the 
concepts of “fear,” “doubt,” and “difficulty,” while students whose parents had a 
college degree were more likely to associate “choice” with “freedom,” “action,” and 
“control.” In another series of studies, Schwartz et al. (2006) reported evidence that 
middle-class Americans were more satisfied with a pen or a music CD if they chose it 
themselves than if someone else chose it for them. For working-class Americans, 
satisfaction was independent of who made the choice. Schwartz et al. argued that these 
data reflect divergent conceptions of freedom, such that for the middle-class 
Americans, freedom was the freedom to make a free choice, whereas for the working-
class Americans, it was the freedom from having to make a choice. From this 
perspective, not to make a choice when facing many options would be a liberating act 
itself, as it frees a person from making a decision. In the long run, it is questionable, 
though, how much freedom from choosing will be appreciated. At least it is hard to 
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imagine that a person who is patronized such that all choices are made on his behalf 
would actually feel free.  
Practical and applied implications 
In addition to examining its theoretical implications, exploring the extent of the too-
much-choice effect is important because of its practical implications for public policy 
making and related fields. Free choice is one of the hallmarks of free market 
economies. For example, since the 1990s, the World Bank (1994) has advocated a 
libertarian policy in which government-provided age pensions are supplemented by 
private retirement savings to face the challenges of an aging population. In countries 
that changed their retirement system accordingly, including Germany, Australia, and 
Sweden, to name only a few, people can choose from a plenitude of financial products 
(Gallery & Gallery, 2005; Hedesström, Svedsäter, & Gärling, 2007). Likewise, as 
governments turn to privatization and liberalism, a similar development holds true for 
health insurance and utilities such as electricity and gas. While the rationale of these 
measures is to increase competition and participation, the effect of too much choice 
suggests that an overabundance of alternatives will lead to the opposite effect. 
As mentioned above, the results of Huberman et al. (2007) suggest that too 
many investment options to choose from in a 401(k) plan might decrease participation 
in these programs, which in turn would lead to a decrease in the quality of life after 
retirement. Also, many important decisions are made in interaction with an expert who 
controls the number of options being offered. In these situations, a better 
understanding of the too-much-choice effect will help the expert—be it a doctor 
presenting different medical treatments or a used-car dealer who wants to increase 
sales—guide people to making better decisions. 
The question of whether limiting choice can increase social welfare was also 
raised by Hanoch and Rice (2006). They hypothesized that especially for elderly 
citizens in the United States, where health insurance is somewhat discretionary, an 
increase in the number of health plans leads to a lower participation rate and/or 
insufficient coverage. Hanoch and Rice further conjectured that the recent attempts of 
public policy makers to increase participation of the elderly in prescription drug 
discount plans (an insurance that partly covers the costs of prescribed drugs) mainly 
failed because the number of available plans might have been too high and therefore 
too confusing. To overcome these problems to the authors suggested following the 
advice of Sunstein and Thaler (2003), who raised the possibility of “libertarian 
paternalism.” Often seen as an oxymoron, libertarian paternalists, according to 
Sunstein and Thaler, should attempt to steer people’s choice in welfare-promoting 
directions while also respecting their freedom of choice. Among other measures, they 
suggest that one way to do this would be to restrict the choice being offered. Yet as 
pointed out by Berg and Gigerenzer (2007), links between psychological theories and 
arguments concerning paternalism (including libertarian paternalism) rest on a 
 
P a g e  | 40 
 
selective account of the psychological literature and rely on a definition of rationality 
that most likely is too narrow.  
In extension to the debate on public policy making, other social scientists 
recently connected the increase in choices within modern market democracies directly 
to a decrease in well being. In his book on the loss of happiness in market democracies 
(which is dedicated to all unhappy people, wherever they may be), the political 
scientist Robert Lane (2000) regards the overabundance of options in consumer 
markets as one reason for the decline in mean happiness in the United States. 
According to Lane, “choices proliferate beyond our pleasure in choosing and our 
capacity to handle the choices” (p. 181). It should be noted, however, that this 
reasoning is somewhat reminiscent of the line of argumentation by Lipowski (1970), 
outlined above, and from the perspective of choice proponents such as Anderson 
(2006) or Postrel (2005), it might be interpreted as a post-hoc rationalization of a 
general scepticism toward societal trends of modernization and diversification.  
General Discussion 
The effect of too much choice challenges many theoretical models of choice and has 
important practical and theoretical implications. At the same time, there is an apparent 
lack of compelling theory and no model that explains when and why the effect will 
occur. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will argue that a more precise theoretical 
model is needed that predicts when and why the effect of too much choice will occur. 
Furthermore, the mixed empirical evidence for and against the too-much-choice effect 
means that a replication of the effect is required as a basis for theory building.  
Chapter II:  
Testing the generalizability of the choice overload hypothesis P a g e  | 41 
Chapter II:  
Testing the generalizability of the choice overload 
hypothesis 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the effect of too much choice has important 
practical and theoretical implications, yet its theoretical underpinnings are debated. 
Likewise, even though its empirical foundation is growing, there are also a number of 
divergent findings. These conceptual shortcomings are in contrast with the increasing 
amount of attention the effect has received from both inside and outside psychology 
(Botti & Iyengar, 2006; Kuksov & Villas-Boas, 2005; Lane, 2000; Mick et al., 2004; 
Schwartz, 2004). 
Need for a model  
Clearly, a precise and testable model of the underlying psychological processes and 
mechanisms would be highly desirable. Yet, before starting to build such a model, it is 
important to ensure that the effect of too much choice is robust and replicable. This is 
especially important given that, as mentioned in Chapter I, there is a considerable 
body of empirical evidence backed by sound theoretical arguments that speak in favor 
of large assortments.  
Need for replication 
According to the statistician Ronald Fisher, “no isolated experiment, however 
significant in itself, can suffice for the experimental demonstration of any natural 
phenomenon” (Fisher, 1971, p. 13). Along the same lines, Levin (1998) proposed that 
“instead of measuring the quality of research by the level of significance, it would be 
better judged by its consistency of results in repeated experiments” (p. 92). Similarly, 
other scholars argue that scientific findings rest upon replication and they recommend 
skepticism about nonreplicated results (Evanschitzky, Baumgarth, Hubbard, & 
Armstrong, 2007). Following these calls, I will subsequently describe a series of three 
studies that were intended to empirically test the replicability of the effect of too much 
choice across different contexts and choice situations in the lab and in the field.  
Jam study 
Introduction 
To test the generalizability of the too-much-choice effect across different contexts, I 
first sought a situation in which the a priori probability of finding the effect would be 
high. In the jam study reported by Iyengar and Lepper (2000), 3% of people exposed 
to the large assortment made a purchase versus 30% of those exposed to the small 
assortment. The corresponding effect size is d=0.77, which Cohen (1977) 
operationally defines as a large effect. Therefore, I strived to replicate that study as 
closely as possible. 
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Method 
Experimental setup  
My experimental setup closely followed the one described by Iyengar and Lepper 
(2000, Study 1).The study took place on two consecutive Saturdays on the sales floor 
of an upscale grocery store in Berlin that is famous for its extraordinary assortment 
size. At the entrance to the store a table was placed on which a variable number of 
jams in jars were displayed. To reduce the chances of participants having strong prior 
preferences, I chose a brand of high-quality jam (Lafayette Confiture) that offers many 
different exotic flavors and that was only sold at that particular store. The jars were 
lined up in random order. The name of the flavor was written on the jar and on a paper 
tag in front of it. A sign above the table invited customers to stop and taste the jams. 
Each customer who stopped at the table received a coupon, valid for one week, to 
purchase any Lafayette Confiture for a reduced price. Jams for purchase were found 
on a shelf elsewhere in the store. On each Saturday, the table was operated by two 
female assistants recruited from a local university. The assistants were paid a regular 
hourly wage. Although they knew that the data would be used for scientific purposes, 
they were unaware of the specific hypotheses of the study. Every customer who 
approached the tasting table received a coupon from one of the assistants and was 
counted as a participant in the study, even if he or she decided not to taste any jam.  
Dependent and independent variables 
The numbers of jams displayed as well as the value of the coupon were both subject to 
experimental manipulation and thus depict the two main independent variables. The 
value of the coupon used was fixed to 1.0 euro on the first Saturday and 0.50 euro on 
the second Saturday. The regular price of Lafayette Confiture was 3.90 euros for all 
flavors. The number of jams on the table was either 6 (small assortment) or 24 (large 
assortment). The two assortment sizes were switched on an hourly basis. on each of 
the two Saturdays the study was run for 8 hours, so each assortment size was on 
display for 4 hours. The number of redeemed coupons represents the main dependent 
variable and was taken as a measure of purchase motivation. By using a small 
differentiating mark on the coupons handed out, the number of redeemed coupons 
could be counted separately for each condition and for each gender.  
Large assortment 
As the total number of different flavors of Lafayette Confiture is 24, the large 
assortment consisted of all available flavors of the brand. In contrast to Iyengar and 
Lepper, I deemed it unnecessary to take out the most common flavors because all the 
flavors of Lafayette Confiture are very exotic. In fact, the brand was tailor-made for 
the store to complement their regular jam assortment with flavors that are not offered 
by any other manufacturer. During the whole time of the study, all 24 flavors of 
Lafayette Confiture were constantly available on the jam shelves in the store.  
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Small assortment 
The jams that made up the small assortment were chosen based on a pretest similar to 
the one used by Iyengar and Lepper: In the pretest, 42 students from a local university 
were given a list with the names of all 24 flavors of Lafayette Confiture. Out of that 
list, each student had to indicate the four “best-sounding” flavors, four “good- but not 
excellent-sounding” flavors, and four “worst-sounding” flavors. In exchange for their 
participation, students received a chocolate bar. Based on the aggregated data, the two 
most attractive, two least attractive and two medium attractive flavors were selected 
for the first small set (ss1). This procedure was chosen to exactly replicate Iyengar and 
Lepper’s study, but, it proved rather imprecise due to overlap in the classification of 
jams (e.g. some flavors ranked equally high in attractiveness and unattractiveness). To 
counteract this imprecision, a second, alternative set of six jams was randomly 
selected (ss2). Within the 4 hours that the small assortment was on display each day, 
sets ss1 and ss2 were displayed for 2 hours each.  
Additional measures 
In extension to the experimental setup used by Iyengar and Lepper, I numbered all 
coupons consecutively. Because the numbering was hidden within a pseudo barcode 
printed on each coupon, it could hardly be noticed by the consumers. Based on the 
numbering, the assistants at the table discreetly recorded the jam flavor(s) that each 
consumer tasted. The cashiers at the store’s exit noted the flavor of each purchased 
jam on the back of the coupon that was used for this purchase. While the vast majority 
of participants did not take notice of these recordings, the few that did were told what 
type of data was recorded and that it would be used for the purpose of market 
research. 
Results 
Participants 
In total, 504 customers (297 female, 207 male) were included in the study: 193 on the 
first Saturday and 311 on the second Saturday. Across both Saturdays, 239 
participants saw the large assortment, 128 saw the small assortment ss1 and 137 saw 
the ss2 assortment. Across all conditions, 33% of all participants redeemed their 
coupon and 60 participants (12%) did not taste any jam. Those who did tasted 1.7 
jams on average and 74% of all participants tasted between one and two jams.  
There were almost no differences between the two small assortments ss1 and 
ss2 in terms of gender of tasters, number of jams tasted, and percentage of redeemed 
coupons. Therefore, the data of the two sets was collapsed for subsequent analyses 
into one “small assortment.” 
Effect of coupon value 
There was a main effect of coupon value: 46% of all participants redeemed a coupon 
that was worth 1.0 euro while this percentage dropped to 24% when the coupon value 
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was 0.50, t(504)=5.07; p<.001. However, as the coupon value is confounded with the 
day of the study (first vs. second Saturday), the effect can also be due to the higher 
number of participants on the second Saturday. On the second Saturday, participants 
tasted less jam (an average of 1.3 jams compared to 1.9 during the first Saturday), 
t(502)=6.75; p<.001, which could be due to the lower coupon value but also to the 
higher number of people at the tasting table, which might have prompted people to 
give others a chance to taste. Nonetheless, no effect of assortment size was seen in the 
second session either (Figure 3).  
Effect of assortment size 
Across both Saturdays, participants who saw the large assortment tasted slightly more 
jams than participants who saw the small assortment (1.6 vs. 1.4 jams), t(502)=2.37; 
p=.018. However, there was no effect of assortment size on the number of redeemed 
coupons (32% in the large condition vs. 33% in the small condition), t(504)=0.19; 
p=.853; Cohen’s d=0.03. There was no interaction effect between the number of 
redeemed coupons and coupon value or taster’s gender. Independent of assortment 
size there was a small positive relationship between the number of jams tasted and the 
probability of redeeming a coupon (r=.26).  
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of assortment size and coupon value on the percentage of redeemed 
coupons compared to the findings of Iyengar and Lepper (2000) 
 
Match between the flavors tasted and flavors purchased 
In the large condition with all 24 jams on display, 77 participants redeemed coupons. 
Of these, 26 participants (34%) purchased a jam that they had actually tasted at the 
booth and the other 66% of the participants purchased a jam they had not tasted but 
error bars = SE(mean) 
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which was displayed at the table. Of the 80 participants who redeemed a coupon in the 
small conditions, 31 (39%) bought a jam that they had tasted and 34 (43%) bought a 
jam that was displayed at the booth but that they did not taste. The remaining 15 
participants (19%) bought a jam that was not on display at the booth but only on the 
shelf of the store.  
Discussion 
Despite the fact that the study closely followed the setup used by Iyengar and Lepper, 
I did not find a relationship between assortment size and motivation to purchase. The 
relationship between purchases and coupon value suggests that the experimental 
manipulation was successful, yet the effect size of the set-size manipulation (Cohen’s 
d=0.03) is in sharp contrast to the strong effect reported by Iyengar and Lepper (30% 
vs. 3%, d=0.77). Under the assumption that Iyengar and Lepper’s findings depict the 
actual population effect size, and assuming an alpha of 0.05 (one-sided), the power 
(1-ß) of my experiment would be greater than 0.995. In other words, in my study the 
probability of finding an effect of Iyengar and Lepper’s magnitude and by this 
correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis was very high. In fact, even under the 
assumption of a small effect of d=0.3, the power of my experiment would have been 
about 0.95, which is still far higher than the convention of 0.8 proposed by Cohen 
(1977).  
This prior analysis of statistical power shows that the different findings are 
probably not due to random variation in the data or mere chance, which leads to the 
question of what might have been the reason for the divergent results. 
Different types of jam  
It could be that the very type of jam made a difference. Whereas Iyengar and Lepper 
used Wilkin and Sons jam, I used Lafayette Confiture. While both brands are of high 
quality and almost equal in price, Lafayette Confiture comprises more exotic flavors 
than Wilkin and Sons. But given that unfamiliarity with the available options is seen 
as a prerequisite of the too-much-choice effect because it circumvents preference 
matching, this should have boosted rather than diminished the effect in my study.  
Differences in the small assortment 
One important factor that may contribute to the presence or absence of the too-much-
choice effect is the composition of the small choice set determined by the name-rating 
pretest. The rationale behind that pretest was to create a small assortment that had a 
wide range with regard to perceived attractiveness of flavors. Whereas the pretest 
relied solely on names, the participants in the store could see (and maybe also smell) 
the jams. This could have changed the perception of attractiveness and it brings the 
validity of the pretest into question. With the data on hand, attractiveness can be 
operationalized in different ways, for instance, based on the number of times a jam on 
the table was tasted (visual attractiveness) or based on the number of times a jam was 
purchased (purchase attractiveness). Across all jams, visual attractiveness and 
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purchase attractiveness are positively correlated with r=.66 but the attractiveness 
ratings of the pretest do not match up with these in-store attractiveness measures. The 
two jams rated as least attractive in the pretest were in the top quartile of jams that 
were tasted and bought most often in the store. Of the six jams in the small set, the 
most attractive jam according to the pretest turned out to be the jam tasted least often 
at the booth. Nevertheless, in the present study both small sets of jam (ss1 and ss2) 
still turned out to be widely varied in terms of both purchase and visual attractiveness, 
but this is largely due to lucky chance given the low validity of the pretest ratings.  
These findings have a straightforward implication: If Iyengar and Lepper’s 
pretest was as invalid as mine, it could have been that by mere chance, they ended up 
with a small set that consisted of the most attractive jams (in terms of visual—or 
purchase—attractiveness) in the assortment. In this case, the probability of purchase 
from the small set could have been artificially increased in their study, which would 
then be interpreted as a too-much-choice effect. As the pretest data from Iyengar and 
Lepper is not available, I tested the influence of the attractiveness of the small set in 
two separate experiments by using restaurants and charity organizations as options to 
choose from. Both experiments will be outlined in Chapter III below. 
Presentation of the jams on the table 
In the present study, the jam jars on the tasting table were lined up in an orderly 
fashion. This setup made it easy for customers to get an overview of the assortment 
even in the large choice condition. In contrast, in the study by Iyengar and Lepper, the 
jam jars were displayed in a rather disordered and messy way (Iyengar, personal 
communication). These differences may have led to two different effects that 
potentially reduced the choice overload in my study. 
First, it can be argued that it is not the objective assortment size that matters 
but how it is perceived by the decision maker. As mentioned in Chapter I, Kahn and 
Wansink (2004) showed experimentally that an unstructured display can increase the 
perception of variety. Thus, the unordered setup used by Iyengar and Lepper might 
have induced the participants to perceive the choice set as even larger than it was. 
However, although this difference might explain a quantitative difference in the effect 
sizes between the studies, it is not sufficient to explain why I did not find any effect at 
all. 
Second, as already mentioned by Iyengar and Lepper, “the display of 24 jams 
may have aroused the curiosity of otherwise uninterested passers-by” (p. 998). 
Because at my tasting booth the presentation was in a rather orderly fashion, even the 
large assortment condition could hardly be mistaken for anything other than a tasting 
table of jam. Thus, Iyengar and Lepper might be right in their conjecture that the 
effect in their study was not unique to the number of options but rather occurred 
because customers were attracted to the tasting booth for very different reasons in the 
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small condition as compared to the large condition, and that consumers who 
approached the large assortment never intended to make a purchase.  
Different expectations of the participants 
Both studies were conducted on the sales floor of upscale grocery stores that were 
comparable in their assortment structure. Draeger’s, the store used by Iyengar and 
Lepper, at the time offered about 314 different jams while at the Berlin site, 280 jams 
were available. However, the store I used was located in the very center of Berlin, 
where, especially on a Saturday, it is visited by a lot of tourists. Draeger’s, on the 
other hand, is probably more frequented by local people doing their weekly shopping. 
As a consequence, the participants in the present study might have been much more 
interested in having a lot of choice and also might have perceived the assortment as 
exciting and motivating. The participants in Iyengar and Lepper’s study might have 
had a different motivation, that is, to get through their shopping list and proceed to the 
exit as soon as possible. It could be that in the latter case, a large assortment would be 
demotivating, because it takes relatively longer to browse through all the options. I 
addressed this hypothesis in a follow-up study on the sales floor of a regular day-to-
day grocery store in a residential neighborhood that will be outlined in full detail next. 
Wine study 
Introduction 
Even though I tried to replicate the original Iyengar and Lepper jam study as closely 
as possible, there are still a number of differences that could explain why I did not find 
a too-much-choice effect as they did. To account for the possibility that this was 
because of special features of my experimental site (e.g. tourists as customers), I 
conducted a follow-up experiment at an organic grocery store in a residential area 
where people did their daily grocery shopping. Instead of jams, I used wine because 
even in small shops, wine assortments can be very large, which makes wine an 
appropriate stimulus for this type of study. Like jam, wine is also a common product, 
so to reduce the chance that people had strong prior preferences among the 
experimental assortment, I used exotic varieties, namely, organically grown Spanish 
red wines.  
Method 
Small and large assortments 
The large assortment consisted of all 12 organically grown Spanish red wines 
available at the store. The wines were from different regions in Spain and all were 
within a price range of 4 to 7 euros (approx. $4.80 to $8.40). The wines were in dark-
colored bottles that only slightly differed in shape, but each had a different label. 
Eleven of the bottles had a volume of 0.75 liters and one bottle contained one liter of 
wine. 
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Three wines were selected for the small assortment based on a pretest 
conducted at my institute. There, the 12 bottles of the large assortment were placed on 
a table next to the entrance of the institute’s canteen. Just as in the main study to 
come, the name of the vineyard as well as the price for one bottle was printed on a 
small tag and put in front of each bottle. The first 50 people who passed by the table 
(mostly researchers and administrative staff) were asked which wine looked most 
appealing to them. Based on the resulting attractiveness ranking, the most attractive, 
the least attractive, and one medium-attractive wine were chosen for the small 
assortment. 
Experimental setting 
The setup of the main wine study closely followed the setup of the previous jam study. 
The study was conducted on the sales floor of a large organic grocery store on two 
consecutive weekends (Friday and Saturday) from 4 pm to 8 pm (a total of 16 hours). 
A tasting table with the wine was set up just inside the entrance to the store. A sign in 
front of the table informed customers that there would be a wine tasting on that day. 
On all 4 days, the tasting was run by a female assistant who was aware of my 
hypothesis. The assistant handed out the wine in small disposable plastic cups in 
servings of about 20 milliliters. People were invited to taste as many wines as they 
wanted and everyone who tasted was asked if he or she wanted to taste another sample 
of wine. On each of the 4 days, the large and small assortments of wines were rotated 
on an hourly basis (with the small assortment displayed at 5–6 pm and 7–8 pm). 
Everyone who stopped at the tasting table received a coupon to get 1.0 euro 
off any organically grown Spanish red wine. Each coupon had a unique number and 
was valid for 1 week. As in the jam study, consumers who decided to purchase a wine 
had to pick it up from a regular wine shelf at the very end of the store. To make it 
easier for the customers to remember what they had tasted, the name of the tasted 
wine(s) was marked on the back of the coupon. The number of redeemed coupons 
within each condition was taken as a measurement of purchase motivation. 
The assistant at the tasting booth recorded which wines were tasted by each 
participant. For each redeemed coupon, the shop cashier recorded the name of the 
wine that was bought with that coupon. 
Results 
In total, during the four afternoons of the study, 280 customers stopped at the tasting 
table and received a coupon (141 for the large assortment and 139 for the small 
assortment). Everyone who stopped and received a coupon was counted as a 
participant in my study. Of the participants, 168 were women. Six participants 
shopped with a partner; the others were on their own. Out of the 280 participants 
across both conditions, 172 (61%) tasted a wine and 102 (36%) purchased a bottle. Of 
the participants who saw the large assortment, 83 (59%) tasted at least one wine and 
so did 89 (64%) of those participants who saw the small assortment. Among those 
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who tasted, the mean number of tasted wines was 2.1 and in total, 93% of all 
participants who stopped tasted between one and three different wines. The average 
number of wines tasted in the large assortment was 2.4 as compared to 1.9 in the small 
assortment, t(170)= 3.4; p=.001; Cohen’s d=0.4.  
With regard to the main dependent variable, the number of redeemed coupons, 
there was hardly any difference between the small and the large assortment. In the 
large assortment, 54 participants (38%) redeemed a coupon while in the small 
assortment, 48 (35%) did so, t(278)=0.55; p=.579; d=−0.10.  
Discussion 
As in the previous study, no too-much-choice effect could be found. With the sample 
size on hand and alpha set at 0.05 (one-sided), the statistical power of finding an effect 
of d=0.77 (the magnitude in Iyengar and Lepper’s jam study) is >.995. For a small 
effect size of d=0.3, the statistical power would still be about 0.8. This relatively high 
power makes it unlikely that the null hypothesis was accepted by mistake.  
The diverging results occurred despite the fact that the experimental site was a 
busy store where people did their daily grocery shopping and presumably did not enter 
for the sake of experiencing a large assortment. This questions possible explanations 
for the lack of effect in my first study that relate to special consumer expectations and 
the shop environment. However, with a total of 12 bottles, the large assortment might 
have been yet too small. Also, even though I used an exotic wine, people might still 
have had prior preferences that enabled them to engage in preference matching. To 
rule out these explanations, it would be advantageous to assess the degree of prior 
preferences independently from the choice. Also, as already mentioned, it might be the 
perception of variety that eventually matters rather than the absolute number of 
options. To collect this kind of data, a more controlled experiment would be 
necessary.  
Both the wine study and the jam study were set up such that customers always 
had to go to the shelf elsewhere in the store if they wanted to make a purchase. Thus, 
even the participants in the small condition were eventually confronted with a large 
assortment. This raises the question of why customers should be affected by the large 
assortment at the tasting booth but not at the shelf (i.e. why customers making a 
choice at the small-assortment tasting would not be scared off from selecting their 
purchase when they had to get it from the usual large-assortment store shelf). To 
maintain the logic of the experiment, it has to be assumed that the participants decided 
whether to purchase while at the tasting table and that those who decided to purchase 
would not reconsider that decision at the shelf.  
Yet in the wine study, of the 48 participants in the small assortment who 
bought a wine, 30 (60%) bought one that was not displayed on the tasting table. In the 
jam study, this percentage was 19%. This indicates that in both experiments a fair 
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number of participants must have made the final decision in front of the shelf. It can 
be conjectured that similar data would have been found in Iyengar and Lepper’s jam 
study, yet as they did not collect data on the exact jams being purchased, it could not 
be measured.  
Jelly bean study 
Introduction 
A field experiment like the one outlined above does not allow for strict variable 
control. To make sure the failed replication was not due to some third variable and to 
explicitly control for prior preferences and differences in the subjective perception of 
variety, I switched to laboratory experiments. As outlined in Chapter I, Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000) also found the effect of too much choice in a well-controlled 
experiment based on choices for exotic chocolates. In that study, people were less 
satisfied when choosing from a large assortment as compared to a small one. Also, 
people who chose from a large assortment were less likely to accept chocolate rather 
than money as compensation. For both of these dependent variables the effect sizes 
were high; therefore I next aimed to replicate that study. My experimental setup 
resembled the study conducted by Iyengar and Lepper. The main difference between 
their experiment and mine was that I used Jelly Belly® jelly beans instead of 
chocolate.  
Method 
Similar to the original experiment, the task in my study was to choose, eat, and rate 
one jelly bean out of an assortment of 6 or 30 different flavored jelly beans (between 
participants). The beans were presented on a tray that was divided into small sections 
of equal size. Each section contained one bean and a label with the name of the flavor. 
For the large assortment, a large tray was used (5 rows of 6 beans in 60 × 60 
centimeters) while the small assortment was presented on a small tray (1 row of 6 
beans in 60 × 12 centimeters). Five small assortments were used, and each was a 
subset of the large assortment such that each bean in the large assortment was equally 
often presented (across participants) in the small assortments. This setup closely 
resembles that of Iyengar and Lepper.  
The task of the participants was to select one of the jelly beans, eat it, and rate 
it. To explicitly control for prior preferences, before the actual choice participants 
were asked if they had ever heard of jelly beans and how often they had eaten them 
before. As mentioned in the Introduction, what eventually matters might be the 
perception of variety rather than the number of options per se (Kahn & Wansink, 
2004). Therefore, as a manipulation check to test if the two assortments were 
perceived as different in size, participants also rated the assortment size they saw on a 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (too few jelly beans) to 9 (too many jelly beans). 
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In between choosing and tasting, participants were asked to rate the difficulty, 
frustration, and enjoyment of the choice process and to anticipate their satisfaction 
with the taste of the selected jelly bean. After tasting, participants rated the satisfaction 
with their choice and the degree of regret they experienced. They were also asked to 
rate how likely it was that there was an even better jelly bean on the table that they did 
not taste and how good the whole assortment of jelly beans that they saw would taste 
overall. All ratings were made on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very 
much). As an additional measure of attractiveness beyond the satisfaction rating of the 
taste, participants were asked what they would be willing to pay for “a box of 50 jelly 
beans like the ones you just saw on the table” (in euros).  
After completion of the study, each participant received a coupon that could 
be exchanged for a small box of jelly beans at a secretary’s office that was three floors 
up and in another wing of the building. Making the effort to redeem the coupon was 
taken as a proxy to measure motivation. The study was conducted by a skilled 
experimenter who was unaware of my too-much-choice hypothesis. The experiment 
took place subsequent to another, unrelated study and participants were paid for the 
whole time they spent in the lab.  
Results 
Participants 
In total, 66 people participated in the study (33 in each condition; 34 women, 32 men 
evenly split over conditions). Most were students at a local university, and  no one was 
on a diet. The average age of participants in both conditions was 25 years (SD=3.6 
years). Of the 66 participants, 23 had never heard of jelly beans prior to the study and 
of the remaining 43 participants, 24 had never eaten one before. None of the 
participants ate jelly beans on a regular basis; 19 ate them occasionally. None of the 
subsequent analyses yielded considerable or statistically significant differences 
between participants who had eaten jelly beans before and those who had not.  
Manipulation check 
When asked to rate the perceived size of the assortment in front of them, participants 
in the large choice condition on average perceived the assortment as larger than those 
in the small choice condition (5.6 in the large condition vs. 4.2 in the small condition, 
t(64)=3.14; p=.003. However, given that a 5 denotes the middle of the scale, neither 
assortment was perceived as being extreme. In comparison to the similar manipulation 
check in the chocolate study by Iyengar and Lepper based on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from “too few” (1) to “too many” (7), the mean value in the large condition 
was 4.9 as compared to 3.6 in the small condition. While an average of 4.9 on a 7-
point scale is also not very extreme, a comparison with my data based on standardized 
z-values (SD=1 and mean=0) shows that the large assortment in Iyengar and Lepper’s 
study was perceived as slightly larger than in my study (z=.7 vs. z=.3). 
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Choice process 
Choosing from the large set of jelly beans was perceived as more difficult (6.3 in the 
large set vs. 3.5 in the small set), t(64)=5.32; p<.001; more frustrating (2.7 vs. 1.5), 
t(64)=3.45; p=.001; but also as more enjoyable (6.3 vs. 4.8), t(64)=2.78; p=.007, 
which matches the results reported by Iyengar and Lepper for choices between 
chocolates outlined in Chapter I.  
Enjoyment, Satisfaction, and Regret  
Participants who chose from a large assortment anticipated a slightly higher 
satisfaction with their chosen bean than participants who chose from the small set. 
With an alpha set at 0.05, the difference is not statistically significant, though (6.6 in 
the large set vs. 6.0 in the small set), t(64)=1.27; p=.210. If anything, the slightly 
higher expectations in the case of the large assortment should make it more likely to 
find a too-much-choice effect because it increases the chances that the actual 
experience will fall short of these expectations. However, my data does not show this. 
Contrary to the predictions of choice overload and in difference to the findings 
reported by Iyengar and Lepper, participants in the large choice condition did not 
differ significantly in their actual satisfaction with their chosen jelly bean. If anything, 
they were slightly more satisfied than participants in the small choice condition (6.7 
vs. 6.2), t(64)=0.91; p=.366 (see Figure 4). Participants in the large condition also 
experienced less regret (1.9 vs. 2.3 in the small condition), t(64)=.897; p=.37. This is 
despite the fact that participants in the large choice condition held a stronger belief 
that there were better options available that they did not choose (5.3 vs. 4.1), 
t(64)=1.94; p=.056. Also, in the large choice condition, participants evaluated the 
whole assortment as better tasting overall (5.6 vs. 4.6), t(64)=2.09 p=.04.  
Motivation to redeem a coupon and willingness to pay 
Participants were willing to pay almost the same amount for a small box of jelly beans 
in the two conditions (1.70 euros in the large set vs. 1.60 euros in the small set), 
t(64)=1.2; p=.65. The same holds for the number of redeemed coupons. In the small 
choice condition, 21 coupons were redeemed while in the large choice condition 26 
participants redeemed their coupon in the secretary’s office. t(64)=−1.1; p=0.28; 
Cohen’s d =−0.27). Figure 4 gives an overview of the main results. 
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Figure 4: Effect of assortment size on satisfaction and percentage of redeemed 
coupons 
 
Discussion 
Despite the fact that my controlled laboratory experiment closely resembles Iyengar 
and Lepper’s study, participants in the large choice condition were as motivated to 
redeem a coupon and as satisfied with their chosen option as the participants in the 
small choice condition.  
Iyengar and Lepper’s main dependent variables, satisfaction with the choice 
and probability of taking a box of candy as compensation, had an effect size of d=1.0 
and d=0.88, respectively. With these effect sizes, the power to reject a false null 
hypothesis in the present experiment (N=66, alpha[one-sided]=0.05) was 0.82 and 
0.95, respectively, which implies that the probability of obtaining a significant result 
was high. The fact that nevertheless I did not find the effect suggests that either the 
actual effect size is much smaller or that there were other variables that either 
diminished the effect in my study or boosted it in Iyengar and Lepper’s experiment. 
Insofar as trade-off aversion drives the effect of too much choice, Dhar (1997) 
argued that for trivial and repeated decisions, an increase in choice omission due to 
too many options might rarely be found because individuals might simply choose 
more than one option or they may choose something else at the next occasion. Thus, 
maybe more than a jelly bean needs to be at stake in order for choice overload to 
loom. On the other hand, choosing a chocolate praline is hardly consequential and 
therefore this explanation does not resolve the difference between the two studies. 
error bars = SE(mean) 
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Prior preferences 
Given that there were no considerable differences between participants who had eaten 
jelly beans before and those who had not, it seems unlikely that prior preferences can 
explain why I did not find an effect of too much choice. As I laid out in Chapter I, the 
existence of prior preferences might explain why one would not find a too-much-
choice effect but it is not obvious why the lack thereof should lead to the effect.  
Distinction between subjective and behavioral measures 
While the results of the jelly bean study do not support the idea of a too-much-choice 
effect, they point out the importance of having a clear distinction between subjective 
and behavioral measurements. Based on subjectively perceived difficulty and 
frustration, one could argue for a too-much-choice effect. However, these emotions 
did not translate into manifest behavior. The fact that an increasing number of options 
simultaneously led to more frustration and to more joy makes it difficult to interpret 
these self-reports on emotional states as dependent measures.  
General discussion  
In their original experiments, which I strove to replicate, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) 
found strong effects of assortment size on the motivation to redeem a coupon and also 
on the satisfaction with the chosen option. In the face of moderate procedural variation 
within the three studies that I conducted, the effect did not prove robust. On a general 
theoretical level, there are at two different explanations for the differences between the 
results: First, it could be that the effect of too much choice was actually much smaller 
than the effects found in previous studies outlined in chapter I and that the different 
results in my studies as compared to those that found the effect are solely due to 
unsystematic sampling or random error. Second, it could be that there are systematic 
differences between the studies that are responsible for the diverging results. In the 
first case, a meta-analytic integration of the studies would yield a more reliable 
estimate of the real magnitude of the effect. In the latter case, there should be a 
systematic and theory-driven search for potential boundary conditions and systematic 
differences between the studies that have been overlooked so far.  
Random variation or moderator variables? 
To find out which of the two interpretations is more plausible, one needs to know how 
likely it is that the differences between the effect sizes are due to mere sampling error. 
If the differences between the studies are simply due to random variation around a true 
population effect size, there is nothing left for moderator variables to explain (Hunter 
& Schmidt, 1990). To statistically test the homogeneity of the effect sizes, one needs 
to relate the variance between the studies to the error variance within the studies in a 
Q-test (Cochran, 1954). The Q-test can be calculated as 
Chapter II:  
Testing the generalizability of the choice overload hypothesis P a g e  | 55 
( ) ( )
( )∑
∑∑
=
=
=
⋅
−⋅= m
i
i
m
i
iim
i
ii
w
dw
dwQ
1
1
2
1
2  (2-1) 
with di being the effect size of study i, m being the total number of studies, and wi 
being a weight that is calculated as the inverse of the standard error of d (Shadish & 
Haddock, 1994): 
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with n1 being the sample size of the group that chose from the small assortment and n2 
being the sample size of the group that chose from the large assortment.  
For the data on hand, the Q-value obtained from Equation 2-1 is 38. The Q-
value follows a chi-square distribution with m-1 degrees of freedom. With m=5 and an 
alpha-value set at 0.05, the critical Q-value is 9.5. As this is smaller that the obtained 
Q-value of 38, it can be concluded that the distribution of effect sizes is not 
homogenous and thus the differences between the studies cannot be explained by mere 
sampling error or random variance. As a consequence, according to Hedges and Olkin 
(1985), the further exploration of potential moderator variables seems worthwhile. In 
the next chapter, I will lay out a series of experiments in which I strived to 
systematically identify some of the most promising moderator variables. 
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Chapter III:  
Testing potential moderators and mediators 
As outlined in the Discussion of Chapter II, the diverging results could not be 
attributed to random error across the experiments. Therefore, one needs to look for 
systematical sources of variance. Proceeding from a mere estimation of the effect size 
to a more detailed analysis of explanatory third variables will also lead to a deeper 
understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying the effect of too much 
choice and it will provide a necessary basis for establishing a process model that will 
allow us to predict when and why the effect will occur. As a first step toward this goal 
I will start by introducing a conceptual differentiation of third variables into moderator 
and mediator variables.  
Difference between moderators and mediators 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a moderator is a third variable that affects the 
direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent and a dependent 
variable. With regard to the effect of too much choice, a moderator would be a 
variable that specifies the appropriate conditions or boundaries in which the number of 
options within an assortment (=independent variable) affects the motivation to choose 
and/or satisfaction with the chosen option (=dependent variable). As such, there need 
not be a direct influence of the moderator on the dependent variable; only the effect of 
the interaction between the independent variable and the moderator matters. Besides 
this, no assumptions about the underlying processes or mechanisms are made. This is 
conceptually different from the notion of a mediator variable, which tabs directly into 
the intervening entities or processes. In the latter case, the independent variable is 
assumed to cause the dependent variable through the mediator and therefore the 
mediator needs to be related to both the independent and the dependent variable.  
Searching for mediators explicitly aims to flesh out underlying psychological 
processes. Therefore, the approach seems to be generally more appropriate for the goal 
of testing and developing theories. Yet, as pointed out by Baron and Kenny, search for 
mediation is best done in the case of a strong relation between the independent and the 
dependent variable. If this relationship is weak or inconsistent, a search for moderators 
is recommended. Once moderators are identified that help to establish a consistent 
relationship between independent and dependent variables, the ground is prepared for 
testing intervening mediators.  
Outline of the subsequent studies 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will systematically identify potential moderator and 
mediator variables that might help to explain why some studies, including my own, 
did not find any effect of too much choice while others reported strong effect sizes. I 
will then strive to test some of the most promising of these moderators and mediators 
in a series of controlled choice experiments. In these experiments, I will specifically 
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focus on the influence of option complexity, the number of options in the large choice 
condition, the average attractiveness of the small assortment, cultural differences, and 
individual differences in personality, expertise, and search behavior, all of which will 
be outlined in more detail below. 
Restaurant study 
Introduction 
This study was designed to test the influence of three variables, namely, the 
moderating effect of option complexity, the moderating effect of option attractiveness, 
and the perceived variety as a mediator.  
Option complexity  
As mentioned above, scholars have argued that choice overload might not occur for 
trivial decisions among very simple options (Dhar, 1997). With regard to the 
difference between Iyengar and Lepper’s (2000) chocolate study and the jelly bean 
study, I argued that a choice between a piece of chocolate and a jelly bean is of equal 
(un)importance. However, one could conjecture that the stimuli at least differed 
slightly in complexity. Jelly beans only differ in color and taste, whereas Godiva 
chocolates also differ in texture, shape, and filling. The higher option complexity of 
the chocolates is also reflected in their names. While the chocolates had rather long 
names (e.g. “Grand Marnier Truffle”), the jelly beans could sufficiently be described 
with one or two words (e.g. “Strawberry”).  
To test the possibility that option complexity is indeed a moderator of too 
much choice, the present study explored the possibility that the options have to exceed 
a certain level of complexity and that they have to vary on several possibly conflicting 
attributes in order to elicit choice overload. A potential moderating role of option and 
assortment complexity would link choice overload to previous research on the related 
concept of information overload. I will come back to this relationship in more detail in 
the general discussion in Chapter V. 
Option attractiveness 
In the present study I also tested the hypothesis that a too-much-choice effect is more 
likely to be found if the average attractiveness of the large set is lower than the 
average attractiveness of the small set, which can happen if the small set only consists 
of very attractive options. I raised this possibility earlier in Chapter II when discussing 
the composition of the small assortment in the jam study. There, I conjectured that 
Iyengar and Lepper might have found the effect because by chance they ended up with 
a sub-sample of very attractive jams in the small assortment.  
Perceived variety 
In an extension to the work of Kahn and Wansink (2004), who found that it is the 
perception of variety rather than the mere number of options, Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and 
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McAllister (1998) found that the perception of variety mainly depends on how much 
physical space an assortment takes up on the shelf of a store and not so much on the 
actual number of different options. As a consequence, in a series of studies in the lab 
and in the field, the removal of up to 25% of the options (they used microwave 
popcorn as stimuli) did go unnoticed as long as shelf space was held constant and the 
most popular brand was available. Broniarczyk et al.’s results again show that the 
perception of variety does not solely depend on the mere number of different options 
but also on other, maybe less obvious characteristic of the environment as well as the 
expectations and prior experiences of the individual decision maker. As such, the 
results stress the need to control for perceived assortment size as a potential mediator 
of choice overload.  
In line with this, Huffman and Kahn (1998) argued that perceptions of high 
variety do not necessarily depend on the structure of assortment but can also be 
determined by how selective people are in their perceptions. As an example, one 
might think of an expert who, within his or her field of expertise, can process more 
options than a layperson (Chase & Simon, 1973). 
Method 
To test for the influence of option complexity, in the experiment on hand, participants 
had to choose among options that were described on several attributes and thus 
constituted a more multifaceted selection than, for example, jelly beans or jams. 
Furthermore, in the experimental design on hand subjective perception of variety was 
controlled for and, as I will outline in more detail below, the setup also allowed me to 
test if the effect depends on the attractiveness of the small choice set. 
The decision task 
Participants were asked to browse through a list of restaurant descriptions. For each 
restaurant, participants were asked if they knew the place and if they had eaten there 
before. Next, participants were entered into a lottery with a 1 in 40 chance to win. 
They were instructed that they had to choose whether they would want to receive 30 
euros in cash ($36 at that time) or a restaurant coupon worth 40 euros ($48) if they 
won. Participants were further told that those who chose the coupon had to pick one 
restaurant from the list, for which the coupon would be issued. The percentage of 
participants choosing the restaurant coupon over the cash was used as a measure of 
motivation. 
Stimuli 
The main independent variable was the number of restaurants presented to the 
participants. In the large choice condition, 30 restaurants were presented, spread 
equally over the following five cuisines: Italian, Asian, German, French, and 
International. The small choice set consisted of 5 restaurants, one of each cuisine type. 
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The restaurant descriptions were taken from a recent restaurant guide for the 
city of Berlin (Marcellino’s Restaurant Report 2005). Only restaurants in the district 
Berlin Mitte, which marks the center of Berlin, were selected. The average price for a 
dish in all restaurants ranged between 10 and 20 euros ($12–24). As Marcellino’s 
Restaurant Report often lists more than five restaurants per cuisine type for this 
district, restaurants were chosen to ensure an equal distribution of food prices among 
the different cuisines.  
To ensure a certain complexity of the options, each restaurant was described 
on a small sheet of paper using a short narrative description and a numerical rating for 
the quality of food, drinks, service, and atmosphere, all taken from the restaurant 
guide. The participants were also told the name, address, and type of cuisine for each 
restaurant. The descriptions were assembled in booklets in two different random 
orders, together with a cover sheet reading “Restaurant Descriptions.”  
To test whether choice overload is more likely if the small set consists of very 
attractive options, I ran the large choice condition first to find out which restaurants 
were chosen most often (and thus were most attractive). The small choice set was then 
constructed from the most attractive restaurant for each cuisine. Thus, it had a total of 
five presumably attractive restaurants to choose from. Given that in my previous 
studies I did not find any too-much-choice effect, I hoped that these manipulations 
would increase my chances of finding the effect.  
Additional measures 
To control for perceived variety, participants were asked to judge the assortment size 
of the offered restaurants on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“very little choice”) to 7 
(“a lot of choice”). The middle of the scale was described as “average number of 
choices.” Participants who preferred a restaurant coupon over a cash coupon were also 
asked how difficult it was to choose their one restaurant on a scale of 1 (“very easy”) 
to 7 (“very difficult”). 
To control for the factor that the attractiveness of the restaurant coupon might 
decrease the further people lived from the center of Berlin, participants were asked in 
which part of the city they lived and in which part they worked or studied.  
Results 
Participants 
In total, 80 people participated in the restaurant study, 40 in each choice-set-size 
condition; most of them were students from a local university. The mean age was 25 
years, ranging from 19 to 33 years with no significant differences between the two 
experimental conditions. Within both conditions, half of the participants were male 
and half were female.  
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Manipulation check 
The size of the large assortment was perceived as rather high (4.9 on a scale from 1 to 
7; SD=1.4) and larger than the size of the small assortment (4.9 vs. 3.1), t(78)=5.61; 
p<0.01. Thus, the experimental manipulation was successful in terms of perceived set 
size. Participants who chose from the large assortment also reported slightly more 
difficulty in making that choice (3.5 vs. 2.4 in the small assortment), t(78)=1.9; 
p=.066.  
Familiarity with the choice sets 
Because I used descriptions from real restaurants, I wanted to know how familiar 
participants were with my stimuli: In the large choice condition, the participants had 
never heard of 80% of the restaurants on average (24 out of 30; SD = 4.2) and had 
never eaten at 95% of the restaurants (28.5 out of 30; SD = 2.9). In the small choice 
condition, on average participants had never heard of 75% of the restaurants (3.7 out 
of 5; SD = 1.2) and had never eaten at 86% of the restaurants (4.3 out of 5; SD = 0.8). 
However, the number of recognized restaurants (the familiarity with the 
choice set) was not related to the probability of choosing a restaurant coupon, nor 
correlated with the difficulty of choice or the perceived assortment size. And so the 
familiarity with the choice set did not seem to have an influence on the dependent 
variable.  
Effect of assortment size 
For the main dependent variable, the number of people who preferred a restaurant 
coupon over a cash coupon, there was hardly any difference between the large and the 
small choice set: From the large set, 14 out of 40 participants (35%) chose a restaurant 
coupon while from the small set 12 out of 40 (30%) chose a restaurant coupon. Thus, 
if anything, people were more likely to choose a coupon from the large assortment. 
According to Cohen (1977), the difference between these proportions corresponds to 
an effect size of d=−.14.  
Across both set sizes, participants who chose a cash coupon did not perceive 
the assortment of restaurants as larger compared to those who chose a restaurant 
coupon (3.9 vs. 4.3), t(78)=1.02; p=0.31. This indicates that the subjective perception 
of variety also did not seem to influence people’s propensity to make a choice. 
Discussion 
As in the experiments reported in Chapter II, I did not find any effect of too much 
choice on the likelihood of making a choice. The result is especially surprising as this 
time the setting was well controlled, the set-size manipulation was successful, the 
options were complex, the decision was not trivial, and the small set was highly 
attractive—all measures that should have increased the chances of finding the effect. 
Again, the question arises as to what distinguishes my experiment from those where 
an effect was found.  
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The data on hand indicates that the restaurants I used in my experiments were 
mostly unknown and the familiarity with the choice set did not influence the effect. 
Nevertheless, choosing a restaurant is not that uncommon in daily life and therefore 
participants might still have had specific prior preferences on what types of restaurants 
or cuisines they like in general. As mentioned above, it could be that these prior 
preferences enabled them to engage in a decision process in which they simply 
matched their preferences. Also, it could be that the lottery at the end introduced an 
additional source of error due to individual differences in risk-taking behavior. 
Finally, as mentioned above, thus far there is no definition of what constitutes too 
much choice and as a consequence it could be that 5 different options in the small set 
were already sufficient to induce choice overload or that 30 different restaurants are 
not enough. To rule out these explanations, I conducted a series of experiments that 
involved concrete choices among a wider range of options that are less common in 
everyday life, namely, public charity organizations.  
Charity study I 
Introduction 
The present study marks the first in a series of three experiments that aimed to 
rigorously test the effect of varying assortment sizes on the motivation to make a 
choice. All experiments involved real choices in which participants could either 
donate a certain amount of money to a charity organization or keep the money for 
themselves. In contrast to the selection of a restaurant, choices among different charity 
organizations are much less common. To further control for the moderating effect of 
clear preferences or evaluation standards prior to choice, the awareness level of the 
charity organizations within the choice set was subject to experimental manipulation.  
Method 
Stimuli 
To make the choice real, participants who had come to our lab to participate in other 
experiments received a 1-euro coin and a sheet with charity organizations listed in 
alphabetical order. Participants could choose if they wanted to donate the money to 
one of the organizations on the list or keep the money themselves. If they decided to 
make a donation they had to check the name of the organization that the money should 
go to. To make the choice reasonable and to ensure a certain degree of complexity, 
each organization on the list was described by its name and a list of keywords 
indicating its mission. The charities were sampled from the population of all 180 
German organizations that complied with the standards of the German charity seal 
(Deutsches Spendensiegel), an association that certifies trustworthy charities. From 
this set, I created the large-assortment list from the 30 leading (and presumably most 
well known) charities according to the amount of money they collected in 2004. To 
ensure that the small-assortment list would be small enough to prevent overload, it 
consisted of just the 2 biggest charity organizations. To further control for prior 
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preferences and to alternate the set sizes, I created an additional large list that 
consisted of the 40 smallest (and presumably least known) charity organizations and a 
corresponding small list consisting of the 5 smallest organizations.  
Choice task 
To rule out demand effects, participants made their decision anonymously. Anonymity 
was ensured by putting the instructions and the list of charities into an envelope. 
Participants in the experiment were asked to open the envelope and to follow the 
instructions in a separate booth that was set up in a corner of the lab. After completion 
(including indicating their sex and student status), they were instructed to put the list, 
and if they had made a donation also the euro coin, back into the envelope, seal it, and 
throw it into a “ballot box” within the booth. The envelopes with the different lists 
were mixed and indistinguishable from the outside so that the experimenter who gave 
out the envelopes was blind toward the experimental condition. At the end of the 
study, I transferred the money donated by the participants to the charities that they had 
indicated. 
Results 
In total, 120 people participated in the study, 30 in each of the four conditions (with 
three sheets not filled out completely). There were 68 women and 49 men and a total 
of 90 participants (78%) were enrolled as students.  
In the conditions based on the lists of leading charities, 28 out of 30 
participants who saw the large-assortment list (30 charities) chose to donate (93%). 
Out of the 30 participants who saw the small-assortment list (2 charities), 25 chose to 
donate (83%). With an alpha level set at 0.05, the comparison of the two proportions 
revealed no statistically significant difference, t(58)=-1.2; p=.235; Cohen’s d=-0.53.  
In the conditions based on the least known charities, 20 out of 28 participants 
who saw the large assortment list of 40 charities chose to donate (68%). Out of the 29 
participants who saw the small assortment list of 5 charities, 19 chose to donate 
(66%). As in the previous conditions, the comparison of the two proportions revealed 
no statistically significant difference, t(55)=-0.18; p=.855; Cohen’s d=-0.17. If 
anything, in both sets of charities, participants were more likely to donate when facing 
the large assortment. There was an effect of the type of charity such that well-known 
charities received more money (88%, vs. 68% for the low-profile charities), 
t(115)=2.7; p=0.08. Figure 5 gives an overview of the main results. 
To test if participants simply ignored the charity organizations at the end of 
the list, thus effectively shielding themselves from having too much choice, I 
correlated the position of the organization on the list with the number of donations it 
received. A positive correlation would indicate that charities on the top of the list 
would have a higher probability of receiving money. Yet for both the long list with 
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well-known charities and the long list with least-known charities, the correlation was 
virtually zero.  
 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of participants who gave to charity depending on assortment 
size 
 
Discussion 
The experimental design on hand ruled out demand effects and it involved real choices 
among authentic and fairly complex options. Also, it was not an everyday choice, the 
number of options varied widely, and at least for the condition with least-known 
charities it was unlikely that participants had prior preferences. Despite all these 
measures, again I did not find any effect of assortment size on choice motivation. That 
there was an effect of the type of charity such that more people decided to give to 
leading charities suggests that people did not choose randomly and that the decision 
task was reasonable. Given the vague definition of what constitutes too much choice, 
it could still be the case that when it comes to choices between charities 40 options are 
not sufficient to elicit the effect. To test for the possibility that the number of options 
needs to be increased even further, I conducted another charity study in which I 
doubled the number of options in the large assortment.  
Charity study II (Bloomington, Indiana)  
Introduction 
The purpose of the study on hand was twofold. First, following up on the discussion of 
the charity study above, there is a necessity to explore even larger assortment sizes. 
This is because, as mentioned in Chapter I, there is no clear definition of what 
constitutes extensive choice and how many options are needed to elicit the effect. 
error bars = SE(mean) 
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Because of this, the second charity study circumvents this problem by exploring a 
wider range of assortment sizes. Second, I aimed to test if the effect of too much 
choice depends on cultural differences between Germany and the United States. As I 
will outline in more detail below, there are a number of differences between the two 
countries with regard to choice and the perception of assortments that might mediate 
the effect. 
Number of options  
As mentioned in Chapter I, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) defined extensive-choice 
conditions as “reasonably large, but not ecologically unusual” (p. 996). These terms 
are difficult to pin down: How does one define “ecologically usual” for cases that are 
seldom encountered in everyday life? The same difficulty holds true for the vague 
term “reasonably large.” In any case, it can be assumed that the usual sizes widely 
differ depending on the context.  
Cultural differences as a moderator 
Almost all studies that report an effect of too much choice were conducted in the 
United States, whereas all my studies reported so far were conducted in Germany. 
Both countries are highly developed market democracies, but there are also a number 
of differences between them that might explain the diverging results.  
The only scholars who found an effect of too much choice outside the United 
States were Reutskaja and Hogarth (2005). As outlined in Chapter I, they studied 
hypothetical choices among different numbers of gift boxes that were displayed on a 
computer screen. What is noticeable about their study is that they collected data in 
Spain but also in two countries in Eastern Europe, namely, Belarus and Ukraine. Due 
to the difficult economical situations, consumer choice in these countries is noticeably 
smaller than in Western Europe and in the decades prior to 1990, choices were even 
more scarce. What Reutskaja and Hogarth found was that on average, more options 
were needed to elicit choice overload in the Eastern European sample as compared to 
the Western European sample. This suggest that in environments in which choice is 
scarce, people might be more excited to have large assortments, while in environments 
in which variety is extensive, people might become less and less attracted, saturated, 
and maybe even irritated by large assortments.  
On the other hand, a recent study on how people evaluate variety (Rozin, 
Fischler, Shields, & Masson, 2006) suggests that at least in the comparison between 
the United States and Germany it might be the other way around. In that study, a 
representative sample of 1,450 participants in the United States and 851 participants in 
Germany were asked whether they would prefer an ice cream parlor with 10 different 
flavors or 50. The results showed that 56% of the Americans would rather go to the 
parlor with 50 ice creams, as compared to only 33% of the German sample. When 
asked about their expectations of the selection of dishes at a top-class restaurant, 36% 
of the Americans answered that they would expect a large choice with numerous 
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different dishes rather than a small number of suggestions from the chef. Among the 
Germans, the percentage of people expecting a large choice was only 22%. Based on 
their results, Rozin and colleagues conjectured that at least in the food domain, there is 
a preference for quantity over quality in the United States, while in Germany it might 
be the other way around.  
Again, it is not obvious how these findings translate into different motivations 
with regard to too much choice. On the surface, one would rather expect that 
Americans, who seem to value large assortments, would be more likely to make a 
choice from a large assortment.  
To further explore the potential moderating effect of cultural differences on 
the effect of too much choice, I also ran an experiment in the United States. To allow 
for a straight comparison to the results in Germany, the U.S. experimental setting 
closely resembled that of the charity study conducted in Berlin.  
Method 
As in Germany, the U.S. study was administered following other, unrelated 
psychological experiments ranging in duration from 15 minutes to 1 hour. Similar to 
the German study, participants received an envelope containing instructions, a list of 
charities, and a 1-dollar bill. Participants could either donate the dollar to one of the 
charities on the list or keep the money for themselves. The decision was made in 
private, and after completion participants dropped the envelope into a sealed box. The 
list of charities contained either 5, 40, or 792 different organizations.  
Stimuli 
The organizations on the list were sampled from the U.S. website 
charitynavigator.com, a nonprofit organization similar to the German Charity Seal that 
lists and evaluates U.S.-based charities that have operated for at least 4 years, that 
have been granted tax-exempt status, and that make their accounting information 
publicly available. At the time I conducted the study, charitynavigator.com listed a 
total of 204 organizations that had a national scope of work related to either animal, 
educational, or environmental issues. From this sub-set, I drew a stratified sample of 
80 organizations (27 environmental, 27 educational, and 26 animal charities). From 
this large sample I then drew random sub-samples for the 5- and the 40-option 
condition such that the proportions of environment, educational, and animal charities 
were equal. As in the German study, the charities were listed alphabetically. Besides 
their name, they were also described by one sentence about their mission.  
                                                     
2 Initially, I planned to have 80 organizations in the large set but due to a mistake in the layout, 
the name of one educational charity did not appear on the large-set questionnaire. 
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Results 
A total of 112 envelopes were administered, 36 in the 5-option condition, 37 in the 40-
option condition, and 39 in the 79-option condition. Of the participants, 58 were male, 
51 were female, and 3 did not indicate their gender. Participants’ mean age was 20 
years, ranging from 18 to 28 years. From the total number of 112 participants, 95 
(85%) decided to give to charity. Of those who made a donation, 14 (15%) indicated 
that they had heard the name of the organization of their choice before, which suggests 
that the vast majority of participants were indeed unfamiliar with the choice set and 
thus could not engage in preference matching.  
In the 5-option condition, 29 participants (81%) gave to charity, in the 40-
option condition, 32 participants (87%) donated, and in the 79-option condition, 34 
(87%) gave to charity. Thus, if anything, an increase in the assortment led to more 
choice. For the comparison between 5 and 40 charities, the effect size is Cohen’s 
d=-0.16. For the comparison between 5 and 79 charities, the effect size is Cohen’s 
d=-0.18.  
The probability of choosing a certain charity did not depend on the position of 
the charity in the list. The correlation between the number of donations a charity 
received and its position on the list was virtually zero for the lists of 40 and 79 
options.  
Discussion 
The results closely resemble those found for the first charity study that was conducted 
in Germany. Again no effect of assortment size on choice motivation was found, and 
if anything, the propensity to choose increased with assortment size. Also, charities 
that were at the beginning of the list were not more likely to receive a donation than 
charities at the end. This suggests that participants indeed looked through the whole 
list and deliberately selected an option. These data provide some preliminary evidence 
against the idea that participants sequentially went down the list and chose the first 
satisfactory option that they came across, as a satisficing decision strategy would 
suggest. As outlined in Chapter I, applying a fast and frugal heuristic such as 
satisficing should shield people from being overloaded with choice. If anything, not 
using such a satisficing heuristic should increase the vulnerability to choice overload. 
Perhaps if the list had been even longer, such a search strategy might eventually have 
been observed. 
Participants in the present study were undergraduate students at a U.S. 
university and thus presumably similar to the participants in most of the previous 
studies outlined in Chapter I that successfully found an effect of too much choice. 
Given that I did not find an effect in such a sample, the role of culture or population 
differences as a moderator is called into question.  
Chapter III:  
Testing potential moderators and mediators P a g e  | 67 
Charity study III (Berlin) 
Introduction 
Based on the charity paradigm outlined above, the present study was designed to 
further increase the power of finding the effect by asking people to justify their choice. 
Furthermore, to allow for a direct comparison to the U.S. data, the experiment on hand 
also includes an extended set size of 80 charities.  
Justification of the choice as a mediator 
From a social perspective, active choices are often more difficult to justify than 
omissions (Ritov & Barron, 1990). As a consequence, decisions may at times be 
avoided due to an anticipation of blame. It seems likely that an increasing number of 
alternatives also increases the difficulty of justification because the decision made has 
to be defended against more alternatives. Furthermore, Fasolo, Huber, Hertwig, and 
Ludwig (2007), examining real-world assortments in actual stores, showed that 
options get more similar to each other as the assortment size increases. It is possible 
that any justification of choosing a single option would become even more difficult 
because it is more likely to apply to more than one alternative and thus will not be 
sufficient to single out one solitary option. At the same time, the difficulty to justify 
no choice or the choice of a default option remains the same.  
For example, in a choice between a red and a green apple, red color would 
serve as a distinctive reason to choose one apple over the other. As the number of 
apple types increases there will eventually be two red apple varieties and one would 
need a more sophisticated reason to justify the choice. On the other hand, the 
justification of no choice would be unaffected by an increase in assortment size (e.g. 
one could always argue that one prefers oranges, irrespective of the number of apples). 
Taken together, people might be more likely to resign from the choice if they know 
that that they will be asked to justify their choice, which should increase the chances 
of finding the too-much-choice effect.  
Method 
The experimental design closely resembled that of the former charity studies. As 
before, participants received an envelope with a list of charity organizations in 
alphabetical order and were asked if they wanted to donate 1 euro to one of the 
organizations on the list. Again, charities were sampled from the German charity-seal-
approved set. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three different conditions 
with either 5, 40, or 80 of the smallest-sized and presumably least-known charity 
organizations listed by Deutsches Spendensiegel.  
To include a justification of choice, participants who gave to charity were 
asked to write down a short statement explaining the reason why they chose this 
organization in particular and not another one. To make the choice even more real, the 
study was attached to an unrelated experiment on Bayesian reasoning for which 
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participants received 26, euros as compensation. After receiving the money, the 
envelope that contained the instructions and the charity list was handed to them. If 
participants decided to give 1 euro to charity, they had to take it from what they 
earned in the previous experiment. Likewise, making no donation maintained the 
status-quo of keeping the money and can be reasonably interpreted as no choice. 
Results 
A total of 119 people participated in the study, 67 male, 47 female, and 5 who did not 
indicate their gender. In total, 72% of all participants were students. Of the 42 
participants who saw the 5-option assortment, 37 (88%) gave 1 euro to charity. In the 
40-option condition, 28 of 39 participants (72%) donated, and in the 80-option 
condition, 28 out of 38 participants (74%) donated. The difference in proportions 
between the small assortment of 5 and the large assortment of 40 options is 16% 
(88%-72%). Between the small assortment of 5 and the large assortment of 80 the 
difference is 14% (88%-74%). Under the null-hypothesis that no too-much-choice 
effect exists, the probability of finding differences of this magnitude or higher is 
p=.033 (z=1.8; Cohen’s d=0.4) for the comparison with the 40-option condition and 
p=.05 (z=1.7; Cohen’s d=0.37) for the comparison with the 80-option condition. Thus, 
for both comparisons there seems to be a small yet statistically significant (p<.05) 
effect of too much choice. As in the previous studies, the correlation between the 
number of donations a charity received and its position on the questionnaire was 
virtually zero in both large choice conditions.  
Discussion 
The fact that an effect of too much choice occurred if participants had to give a reason 
for their choice supports the hypothesis outlined above that justification becomes more 
difficult when options become more similar and/or harder to distinguish from each 
other. In line with this interpretation, for those participants who gave a justification, 
the numbers of characters used to justify the decision were larger in the 40- and 80-
option conditions as compared to the 5-option condition.  
Of the 37 participants in the 5-option condition who gave to charity, 33 wrote 
down a reason for why they chose that particular organization. The mean number of 
characters used in these 33 justifications was 74 (SD=45). In the 40-option condition, 
25 of the 28 participants wrote down a reason. Of these justifications, the mean length 
was 100 characters (SD=45). In the 80-option condition 24 of the 28 participants who 
donated wrote down a reason. Here, the mean length of all statements was 96 
characters (SD=51). An analysis of variance with alpha set at 0.05 indicated that 
overall the differences are not statistically significant, F(79,2)=2.6; p=0.08, yet a post-
hoc comparison of the small set with the two large sets indicates a statistically 
significant difference, t(80)=2.3; p=0.03. 
Of course, the number of characters only provides a proximate measure of the 
difficulty of justification. Besides, even if the need for justification led to an effect of 
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too much choice here, it is not obvious how this would explain the results of the 
studies by other researchers that did find the effect. In any case, none of these previous 
experiments asked participants for a reason or justification for their choice. 
With regard to the moderate effect size of the main effect on choice 
probability, the positive result of the present study should be interpreted with caution. 
Given that I did not find an effect in any of the previous studies, the actual size of the 
too-much-choice effect in general—if it exists at all—might well be low. If so, the 
effect found in the present study might simply be due to random variation and the 
result would suggest a mediator that is in fact nonexistent. Figure 6 provides an 
overview of the results obtained in the Bloomington and the second Berlin study.  
 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of participants who gave to charity depending on assortment 
size in Bloomington and Berlin 
Taken together, the series of charity studies allowed for high experimental 
control and provided a realistic choice scenario, yet the data only reveal limited insight 
into the psychological processes underlying the choice. Apart from their age, we know 
little about participants’ personality traits, attitudes, and motives and it remains 
unknown how participants perceived the assortment, and how they derived their 
decision. As I will outline in more detail below, there is good reason to believe that 
these individual differences play an important role with regard to the effect of too 
much choice. To get a more detailed picture of the process and the decision makers 
themselves, I conducted another study that aimed to flesh out these variables.  
error bars = SE(mean) 
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Music study 
Introduction 
The current study arose from the need for an experimental design that allowed for a 
more precise test of potential moderator and mediator variables on the effect of too 
much choice. Analogous to the previous studies, the main dependent variables in the 
study on hand were the degree of post-choice satisfaction, post-choice regret, and the 
motivation to choose. 
Foreshadowing the difficulty of replicating the effect of too much choice, 
scholars in the past argued that the effect of choice overload is moderated by inter-
individual differences in how people perceive a situation and how they go about 
making the choice. Among the most prominent of these personality constructs are the 
concepts of maximizing versus satisficing (Schwartz et al., 2002), and the need for 
cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), both of which I will outline in more detail 
below.  
Need for cognition as a moderator 
The importance of individual differences with regard to the too-much-choice effect 
received empirical support in a recent study by Lin and Wu (2006), who found that 
participants with a low need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1984) were less confident 
about their decision when choosing from a large set of 16 options as compared to a 
small set of 6 options. In close resemblance to the study by Chernev (2003b) outlined 
above, in Lin and Wu’s between-subjects experiment, participants got to choose 
between different types of chocolate. Confidence, or preference strength as Chernev 
called it, was measured by participants’ propensity to switch their choice to another 
option that was recommended by the experimenters at the end of the study. 
Interestingly, people with a high need for cognition were less confident when 
choosing from the small set as compared to a large set. As a consequence, besides the 
interaction of need for cognition and assortment size, there was no main effect of 
assortment size on confidence. This suggests that in total across all participants, Lin 
and Wu did not find an effect of too much choice.  
Lin and Wu explained the interaction effect between need for cognition and 
choice overload with differences in the way people adapt their decision strategy to the 
choice environment. They argued that people with a high need for cognition examine 
the options more thoroughly while people with a low need for cognition only do this if 
the assortment is small. For large assortments they expected the latter group to switch 
to a heuristic decision strategy such that less information is processed per option. They 
further argued that the heuristic leads to more uncertainty and hence a lower 
confidence.  
However, this theory cannot fully account for their data as it does not explain 
why people with a high need for cognition were less confident when choosing from 
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the small set as compared to a large set. A closely related but slightly more elaborate 
construct that has been connected to the effect of too much choice is the tendency to 
maximize or satisfice.  
Maximizing as a moderator 
As mentioned in Chapter I, and in contrast to the hypothesis of Lin and Wu (2006), no 
effect of too much choice would be expected when people apply a fast and frugal 
satisficing heuristic (Simon, 1955) because in these cases, people would simply search 
for something that is good enough and the search would stop once an option is found 
that exceeds their level of aspiration. On the other hand, optimizing, the aim to find 
the best option, gets more difficult and involves more effort as the number of options 
increases. At the same time, the second-best, not-chosen option will be more similar to 
the chosen option, which implies relatively higher opportunity costs. The concept of 
opportunity costs originated from economic theory and describes the benefits that 
could have been received from choosing the most valuable forgone alternative. 
According to Schwartz (2000, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2002), an increase in opportunity 
costs will lead to increased feelings of regret as well as a decrease in satisfaction and 
the motivation to choose.  
Schwartz proposed that decision strategies can be described on a continuum 
ranging from satisficing to optimizing (or “maximizing” as Schwartz calls it). He 
further assumed that decision makers differ in the degree to which they engage in one 
of the strategies and that this propensity is moderately stable across situations.  
The maximization scale 
To measure people’s propensity to maximize, Schwartz et al. developed a 13-item 
scale that includes statements such as “I never settle for second best,” “When 
shopping, I have a hard time finding clothes that I really like,” or “Renting videos is 
really difficult. I’m always struggling to pick the best one.” All the statements have to 
be rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Based on a total 
sample of N=1,747 that included diverse sub-samples of first year psychology 
students, nurses, and a convenience sample at a train station, Schwartz et al. reported 
scale reliabilities of Cronbach’s α = 0.71 for the maximization scale, ranging from 
0.60 to 0.73 across different sub-samples. In a validation study, Schwartz et al. found 
that maximizers, defined as having a mean score above the middle of the scale, are 
more likely to engage in social comparisons than satisficers. They further found 
positive correlations between maximization, regret, and depression and they 
hypothesized that this relationship would be mediated by the presence of an 
overwhelming array of options. In a consumer context maximizers self-reported less 
positive feelings toward purchases and said they considered more products compared 
to satisficers.  
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Empirical evidence for maximization as a moderator 
Supporting the idea that the propensity to maximize moderates the effect of too much 
choice, Haynes and Olson (2007, Study 1) found that maximizers experienced more 
difficulties and more frustration with the decision process when the choice set 
increased from 3 to 10, whereas for satisficers they did not find a difference. Likewise, 
maximizers experienced more dissatisfaction and regret when choosing from the large 
assortment of ten options as compared to the small assortment of three. For satisficers 
it was the other way around. Satisficers were less satisfied with the option chosen 
from the small assortment as compared to the choice from the large assortment. In the 
Haynes and Olson study, maximization was measured based on Schwartz’s 
maximization scale. Maximizers and satisficers were defined relative to the sample 
mean. Everyone above one standard deviation from the mean was denoted a 
maximizer and likewise a satisficer for scores below one standard deviation from the 
mean. The differences in satisfaction and regret for maximizers confirm Schwartz’s 
prediction. Yet the finding that satisficers were less satisfied when choosing from the 
small set runs somewhat counter to the prediction according to which satisficers 
should not be affected by the number of options. Also, with a Cronbach’s α of 0.54 the 
reliability of the maximization scale was rather poor. 
In a recent study on job search, Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz (2006) found 
that senior college students who described themselves as maximizers on a 
questionnaire made a greater effort to search for job offers and were able to get better 
paid jobs after graduation, but at the same time they were less satisfied with their 
choices as compared to satisficers. While in their study the reliability of the 
maximization scale was also rather low (Cronbach’s α = 0.6), the results suggest that 
even though on an objective scale maximizers might make better choices, they are 
subjectively less satisfied with them. As an explanation, the authors suggested that 
decision makers determine their satisfaction by trading-off the “cost” of search against 
the benefits of the job they found and that for maximizers this trade-off is less 
advantageous. What speaks against this interpretation is that once a job is found, 
search costs are fixed, whereas the benefits of the job continue for the time it lasts. 
Thus, as long as a decision maker does not quit, the benefits should eventually 
outweigh the costs. On the other hand, at the time Iyengar et al. measured people’s 
satisfaction, they had just stated their new jobs and might not have had many benefits 
yet. I will discuss the relationship between search costs and the effect of too much 
choice in more detail in the General Discussion in Chapter V.  
An alternative process interpretation  
An alternative explanation for Iyengar et al.’s results would be that maximizers set 
their aspiration level much higher than satisficers do. If so, maximizers would search 
longer because they also satisfice but while trying to match a higher aspiration. The 
better job would then simply be a consequence of the extended search and the 
relatively lower satisfaction could be explained by the fact that maximizers were still 
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less likely to match their aspiration. This interpretation would also be closer to 
Simon’s (1956) original conception of satisficing as a search and decision rule by 
which an individual looks up information and chooses according to a predetermined 
aspiration level.  
It should be noted here that this latter interpretation of maximizing as the 
propensity for high aspirations would not necessarily predict a too-much-choice effect. 
It would predict that maximizers will search longer, but as a consequence of the 
prolonged search they should be relatively more satisfied when choosing from a large 
assortment as compared to a small assortment. This is because the large assortment 
provides a higher chance to achieve (or at least get closer to) their aspiration.  
Context dependencies  
Personality traits that relate to decision making, such as the tendency to avoid 
decisions or to seek risks, have been shown to be highly context dependent (Beattie et 
al., 1994; Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006). Thus, the individual tendency to 
maximize might also depend on the situation. As an example, one might think of a 
person who tries to maximize outcomes within a job-related context but less so in 
private matters. Therefore, a test of the impact of maximizing on the too-much-choice 
effect should also incorporate a context-specific way to measure that trait.  
Consideration set size and search process  
Further building upon Simon’s (1956) and Schwartz’s (2004) notions of satisficing, it 
seems to be a necessary precondition of the too-much-choice effect that decision 
makers actually take the additional options in the large assortment into account. One 
reason why I did not find an effect in previous studies could be that people simply 
ignored the excess and by this shielded themselves from being overloaded with 
choice, a strategy that resembles the concept of a satisficing.  
However, given that in the series of charity studies, organizations at the end of 
the list had the same probability of being selected as organizations at the top of the 
list, the selection process might have looked somewhat different. A concept that would 
be in accordance with the data from the charity studies and that relates to the notion of 
satisficing is the idea that decision makers use a two-stage process such that they first 
screen options to form a consideration set (sometimes referred to as an evoked or 
relevant set) from which they then choose (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Reilly, 1985). 
From this perspective, what eventually matters is not the total number of options 
available but rather the number of options that are seriously considered for the final 
decision. If so, it can be conjectured that the effect of too much choice is mediated by 
the size of that sub-set, and assessing the size of that sub-set could help to explain the 
previously divergent findings. 
 
P a g e  | 74 
 
Cultural differences 
Testing for cultural differences between Germany and the United States as a 
moderator ideally builds upon a study design that can be used in the same manner in 
both countries. While the charity paradigm outlined above was a first step in this 
direction, its results cannot be compared directly because in each country different 
charity organizations had to be used. To obtain a more precise comparison between 
Germany and the United States, a study design in which the exact same stimuli could 
be used in both countries would be preferable.  
Method 
To empirically test the effect of too much choice and the influence of the moderators 
and mediators outlined above, I implemented a computer experiment in which 
participants repeatedly listened to samples of classical music that they had chosen 
from different assortments beforehand. Because classical music is equally enjoyed 
across many cultures, the exact same choice sets could be used in Germany and in the 
United States with the only difference being the translation of the instructions. In 
Germany, the experiment was conducted at the Max Planck Institute for Human 
Development in Berlin, and in the United States participants were recruited at Indiana 
University in Bloomington.  
Within-subject design to increase statistical power 
So far, all experiments on too much choice, including my own, have adopted a 
between-subjects design such that the group of people facing the small assortment was 
different from the group facing the large assortment. Yet the results of my previous 
studies suggest that if anything, the size of the too-much-choice effect is probably 
much smaller than previously thought. To be able to even detect such small effects, a 
within-subject design in which each individual faces both a small and a large 
assortment is preferable because it comes with a larger power due to a decreased 
measurement error (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). As laid out by Hunter and Schmidt, a 
classical between-subjects design assumes that the independent variable (the number 
of options in the present case) affects all participants equally such that there is no 
interaction between the independent variable and the individual. Yet, it could be that 
half the participants would show a too-much-choice effect while the other half would 
show the reverse effect. In a between-subjects design, these differences would go 
unnoticed and the conclusion would be that there is no effect—a conclusion that 
would be completely invalid. To circumvent these problems, the study on hand 
employs a within-subject design in which the same participant consecutively chooses 
from both a small and a large assortment.  
Choice set 
To allow for choices among identical options in both countries, participants in the 
experiments got to choose among recently released CDs of classical music from the 
record label Deutsche Grammophon, an internationally renowned label that specializes 
in high-quality recordings of classical music. For the purpose of the study, I compiled 
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two large sets of 30 CDs each from the most recent releases of Deutsche 
Grammophon: one set with vocal music and one set with orchestra music. From each 
of these two large sets, I then randomly selected one sub-sample with 6 CDs. Thus, 
there were four different sets of CDs that can be described based on the two 
orthogonal factors music style (orchestra vs. vocal) and assortment size (small vs. 
large).  
The CD assortments were displayed on a 17-inch computer screen as a 
collection of thumbnails (36×36 pixels each) that showed the miniaturized pictures of 
the CD covers in a random order. The last name of the composer and the abbreviated 
CD title was displayed underneath each thumbnail. A detailed description of each CD 
could be retrieved by clicking on the thumbnails with the left mouse button. The 
detailed description consisted of a full-size picture of the cover, the full CD title, and 
the full names of the composer, the conductor, the orchestra, and the choir (for vocal 
music only). 
Participants could browse through one of the assortments at a time and they 
could look up as many details about the available CDs as they wished. Finally they 
were asked to choose one single CD from each of the assortments. From this CD they 
got to hear a sound sample on their headphones that lasted for 2 minutes. The samples 
actually were the first two minutes of the first track of each CD that I had downloaded 
from iTunes and embedded into the experimental software prior to the actual 
experiment. To control for differences in the volume of the recordings, the volume of 
each track was normalized and participants got a slider on the screen to control the 
volume according to their own preferences. 
Experimental design 
Participants in front of the computer screen consecutively chose from one small and 
one large assortment. To control for potential order effects such that the experience of 
choosing from the first set influences the choice in the second set, participants saw the 
assortments in one of two different sequences. Half the participants first chose from a 
small assortment followed by a large assortment; the other half first chose from a large 
assortment followed by a small assortment. To motivate a repeated choice, one of the 
assortments consisted of classical orchestra music and one assortment consisted of 
classical vocal music. The order in which participants saw the type of music was 
counterbalanced with the order of the assortment size which resulted in four different 
experimental groups A-D (Table 1). 
Participants in group A first chose from a small assortment of orchestra music 
followed by a choice from a large assortment of vocal music. Participants in group B 
first chose from a small assortment of vocal music followed by a large assortment of 
orchestra music. Group C first chose from a large assortment of orchestra music 
followed by a small assortment of vocal music and group D first chose from a large 
assortment of vocal music followed by a small assortment of orchestra music. To get 
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familiar with the experimental setting, all participants first chose a CD from a 
“training set” of 14 CDs with Deutsche Grammophon piano recordings. The piano 
CDs were compiled and displayed in the same way as the orchestra and the vocal CDs.  
 
Table 1: Experimental Design 
Experimental 
groups 
Sequence of choice sets 
1st set 2nd set 3rd set 
A piano (14) vocal (30) orchestra (6) 
B piano (14) orchestra (30) vocal (6) 
C piano (14) vocal (6) orchestra (30) 
D piano (14) orchestra (6) vocal (30) 
 
Dependent variables 
In line with previous studies on choice overload, the main dependent variables of the 
study on hand were the degree of post-choice satisfaction and post-choice regret with 
the chosen piece of music as well as the motivation to make a choice in the first place.  
Post-choice satisfaction and regret 
The dependent variables post-choice satisfaction and post-choice regret were assessed 
immediately after listening to each of the three sound samples. To decrease 
measurement error and to assess construct reliability, post-choice satisfaction and 
regret were both measured based on multiple items. All items called for answers on a 
9-point Likert scale ranging from -4 (lowest rating) to +4 (highest rating) with textual 
anchors on both sides of the scale.  
Post-choice satisfaction was measured based on six items: Participants were 
asked to rate their satisfaction with the chosen piece of music in comparison to the 
other pieces on the screen, in comparison to other pieces of the Deutsche 
Grammophon label, and in comparison to other pieces of classical music in general. 
They were further asked to rate how much they liked the chosen piece of music, how 
much they enjoyed listening to it, and how satisfied they were with their choice.  
Post-choice regret was assessed based on three items asking participants to 
rate how likely they would be to choose the same piece again, if they thought another 
piece would be better, and how much they regretted their choice. As an additional 
measure, participants were also asked to state exactly how many of the options they 
did not choose they now thought were better than the one they actually chose. 
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Choice motivation  
In this experiment preference strength and choice motivation were assessed 
indirectly through people’s willingness to pay for the option of their choice. At the end 
of the experiment, participants were asked to state how much they were willing to pay 
for the orchestra and the vocal CD that they had previously selected. To make this task 
meaningful, they were informed that the three participants willing to pay the most 
would be allowed to buy the respective CD at the price they stated, a procedure 
commonly referred to as a sealed-bid first-price auction or discriminatory auction. To 
give people a sense of the actual market values, they were told that the CDs on display 
on average cost about 20, euros or 20 dollars, respectively. To make sure that 
participants remembered their selections, they were presented with the covers of their 
previously chosen orchestral and vocal CDs.  
The difference in how much participants were willing to pay for an option 
chosen from a small set and an option chosen from a large set indicates how much one 
option is preferred over the other. As the willingness to pay more increases the 
probability of an actual purchase, the measure can also be seen as a proxy for the 
motivation to choose.  
Mediators and moderators  
Perception of the assortment 
As mentioned in Chapter I, another potential mediator of the effect might be the 
perception of a large assortment as less attractive or overly complex or the experience 
of choice from a large assortment as being more difficult or less enjoyable. As for the 
main dependent variables, all items on mediators and moderators were assessed at the 
end of each sound sample and if not stated otherwise, items called for answers on a 9-
point Likert scale ranging from -4 (lowest rating) to +4 (highest rating).  
Perceived choice difficulty was assessed based on four items: Participants 
rated how hard/easy it was for them to make a choice (very easy/very hard), how 
exhausting it was to choose a piece of music (very exhausting/not at all exhausting), 
how much they deliberated about their choice (very little/very much), and to what 
extent they experienced the choice process as frustrating (very frustrating/not at all 
frustrating). To get a more complete picture of the process, participants also rated how 
much they enjoyed making a choice between the pieces of music and how much they 
were trying to select the best piece of music.  
Consideration set size and search process 
The current study set out to measure the size of the consideration set and the degree to 
which decision makers ignore the excess choices based on self-reports and based on 
behavioral measures of the amount of search and the number of options inspected 
prior to choice. Consideration set size was measured by asking participants to state the 
exact number of options they short-listed (“Wie viele CD’s kamen für Sie in die 
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engere Wahl?”/“How many options did you short-list?”). As a behavioral measure of 
the individual search process, the number of CDs that were looked up in detail and the 
decision time was measured by tracking each mouse click on the screen. As this 
tracking was achieved in the background through the experimental software, it did not 
interfere with the decision task and it could not be noticed by the participants.  
Maximizing 
After the choice task on the computer screen, participants filled out a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire that consisted of the personality scales for maximizing and satisficing. 
To validate the maximizing scale, participants also filled out Schwartz et al.’s (2002) 
regret scale, which is supposed to moderately correlate with the maximizing scale. 
Maximizing and regret were measured based on the scales published by Schwartz et 
al. (2002) and their validated German versions, respectively (Greifeneder & Betsch, 
2006).  
As a domain-specific measure of maximizing, participants also rated how 
much they were trying to select the best piece of music. As mentioned above, this item 
was asked after each sound sample alongside the other items.  
Expertise 
At the end of the experiment, prior preferences and domain-specific expertise were 
assessed. Participants were asked to indicate on a Likert scale how often they listen to 
classical orchestra music (never–daily), how often they listen to classical vocal music, 
how knowledgeable they consider themselves with regard to these two styles of music 
(don’t know anything–know a whole lot) and how much they like these two styles 
(don’t like it at all–like it very much).  
As further control variables, participants also rated how motivated they were 
to participate in the study (not motivated at all–very motivated) and how carefully 
they answered the questions (very carefully–not at all carefully). As compensation for 
their participation, participants in Berlin received 8. euros and participants in 
Bloomington received course credit.  
Results 
Participants 
In Berlin, 80 students from local universities participated in the study (20 in each 
condition). Of the participants, 49% were female; the average age was 26 years 
(SD=2.9 years). In Bloomington, 87 undergraduate students from Indiana University 
participated (22 in conditions A, B, and C and 21 in condition D). Of the participants 
in Bloomington, 69% were female and the average age was 20 years (SD=1.6 years). 
Counterbalancing 
There was no statistically significant (α=0.05) difference between the four 
experimental groups (A-D) in either country on any of the three main dependent 
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variables: post-choice satisfaction, post-choice regret, and willingness to pay. 
Therefore, to test for main effects of assortment size within subjects, the data was 
collapsed across the order of music style (orchestra first/vocal first) and the order of 
assortment size (small set first/large set first), separately within each country.  
To allow for a more concise report of results in the following paragraphs, data 
from the Berlin sample will be stated first, followed by data from the Bloomington 
sample, separated by a slash. 
Manipulation check 
Participants in both countries were motivated to participate in the study and all 
reported that they carefully answered the questions.  
Perception of the assortment 
On a scale from -4 (not at all attractive) to +4 (very attractive), participants in both 
countries on average perceived the large set as more attractive than the small set, 
which is in line with previous findings on too much choice. The average attractiveness 
rating was -0.3/0.3 (SD=2.0/2.2) for the small set and 0.8/0.7 (SD=2.0/2.1) for the 
large set. When compared within subjects, 55%/45% of the participants rated the large 
set as more attractive compared to 21%/31% who rated the small set as more 
attractive. In absolute terms, the attractiveness ratings vary around the center of the 
rating scale, which indicates middling attractiveness. 
The complexity of the small assortments was rated as -1.6/-0.7 (SD=1.8/2.1) 
and the complexity of the large assortments as 1.5/0.7 (SD=1.9/2.1). Thus, in both 
countries the two assortments clearly differed with regard to their perceived 
complexity. Yet in absolute terms, especially in the U.S. sample, the large assortment 
was not rated as very complex. In line with this, choosing from the small set was 
perceived as easier (-1.5/-2.1; SD=1.4/1.7) as compared to the choice from the large 
set (-1.0/-1.8; SD=1.6/1.9). Of all participants, 65%/47% rated the choice from the 
small set as easier and 37%/32% rated the choice from the large set as easier. In 
absolute terms, the negative mean scores indicate that both choices were perceived as 
rather easy.  
Consideration set size and search process 
On average, participants looked up 5/5 different CDs (SD=1.6/1.4) or 89%/84%3 in 
the small assortments while in the large assortments they looked up 16/14 different 
CDs (SD=11.2/11.3) or 52%/47%. In total, 74%/68% of the participants looked up 
more options in the large set as compared to the small set and 20%/16% looked up 
more options in the small set. Thus, a higher absolute number of options was looked 
                                                     
3 The differences between absolute numbers and percentages are due to rounding to full 
numbers 
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up in the large condition as compared to the small condition while at the same time the 
relative number of explored options was notably smaller in the large assortment.  
On average, participants’ reported consideration set size was 3/3 (SD=1.0/2.1) 
in the small assortment and 5/8 (SD=4/8.1) in the large assortment. Of all participants, 
80%/71% formed higher consideration sets for the large assortment as compared to the 
small assortment, and 9%/19% formed higher consideration sets for the small 
assortment.  
In the small assortment, it took an average4 of 29/24 seconds from the moment 
the assortment was displayed on the screen until the final choice of one particular 
piece of music (SD=18/17 seconds). In the large set, this search and exploration phase 
took an average of 64/44 seconds per person (SD=54/36 seconds). Of all participants, 
79%/77% took longer to choose from the large set as compared to the small set. When 
choosing from the small assortment, on average, participants spent 5.4/4.7 seconds to 
examine the details of one single option before they went on to the next or terminated 
their search (SD=2.7/3.0 seconds). In the large assortment, the time it took to examine 
one single option was 5.1/4.0 seconds (SD=3.1/3.3 seconds).  
Effect of assortment size on the main dependent variables 
In the following, I will report the effect of assortment size on the main dependent 
variables post-choice satisfaction, post-choice regret and willingness to pay. 
Post-choice satisfaction 
Prior to testing the effect of assortment size on post-choice satisfaction the reliability 
of this main dependent measure needs to be assured. Cronbach’s alpha for the six-item 
post-choice satisfaction scale is 0.98/0.98 for both the small and the large assortment, 
which indicates a good reliability in both countries (Bortz & Döring, 2002). 
On a scale from -4 (very unsatisfied) to +4 (very satisfied), the mean 
satisfaction with options chosen from the large set is 1.1/1.0 (SD=2.4/2.2) and from 
the small set it is 0.5/0.9 (SD=2.4/2.2). Of the 80/87 participants, 35/39 were more 
satisfied with the chosen option from the small set, 41/43 were more satisfied with the 
chosen option from the large set, and the remaining 5 were equally satisfied in both 
conditions. When subtracting the post-choice satisfaction score in the large set from 
the post-choice satisfaction score in the small set within each participant, the mean 
difference across participants is -0.5/-0.1 (SD=3.9/2.9), where a negative value 
indicates a higher satisfaction for options chosen from the large assortment (Figure 7). 
According to Cohen (1977) this translates into an effect size of d=-0.17/-0.05. By 
means of a t-test for paired samples, and an alpha level of 0.05, the null hypothesis of 
                                                     
4 Following the recommendation of Wilcox (1998), mean statistics on decision times are 20% 
trimmed to control for outliers, which means that 10% of the largest as well as 10% of the 
smallest observations are discarded 
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a zero difference can be rejected neither in Berlin, t(79,1)=-1.3; p=0.21, nor in 
Bloomington, t(86,1=-0.3; p=0.74. 
 
 
Figure 7: Individual satisfaction with the chosen option depending on assortment size. 
Data points below the diagonal indicate higher satisfaction when choosing from the 
small set as compared to the large set (=too-much-choice effect). 
 
Post-choice regret 
For the three-item post-choice regret scale, Cronbach’s α=0.79/0.80 for the small 
assortment and 0.86/0.83 for the large assortment. Analogous to the post-choice 
satisfaction measure, this indicates a satisfactory reliability. 
The mean post-choice regret with options chosen from the large set is 0/0.3 
(SD=2.3/2.4) and from the small set it is 0/-0.2 (SD=2.5/2.3). Of all participants, 35/40 
experienced more post-choice regret when choosing from the small assortment as 
compared to the large assortment, 39/42 experienced more regret in the large 
assortment, and 6/5 equally regretted their choice in both conditions. A t-test analog to 
the one applied for post-choice satisfaction did not reveal a significant difference in 
Berlin, t(79,1)=-0.04; p=.97; Cohen’s d=-0.01, or in Bloomington, t(86,1)=0.17; 
p=.87; Cohen’s d=0.04. 
Willingness to pay 
The mean amount participants were willing to pay is 6.3 euros/6.9 dollars 
(SD=€5.5/$4.9) for a CD chosen from the small assortment and 6.7 euros/7.6 dollars 
(SD=€4.5/$5.2) for a CD chosen from the large assortment. The corresponding effect 
size (Cohen’s d) is -0.08/-0.13. Of all participants, 40/40 stated a willingness to pay 
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more in the large-choice condition and 29/28 stated a willingness to pay more in the 
small-choice condition. These data indicates that if anything, people were willing to 
pay more for an option chosen from the large assortment (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8: Amount willing to pay for the selected CD depending on assortment size. 
 
Inter-individual differences 
In summary, when averaging across all participants within each country, no effect of 
assortment size on the three main dependent variables, post-choice satisfaction, post-
choice regret, and willingness to pay, was found. Yet, as the data indicate considerable 
inter-individual differences in these dependent variables, it can be conjectured that an 
effect of too much choice might have occurred at least for some participants. In line 
with this, the three main dependent variables are highly correlated with each other. 
The Pearson correlation between the difference in post-choice regret and the 
difference in post choice satisfaction is r= -.90/-.85. For the difference in post-choice 
regret and the willingness to pay, the correlation is r= -.61/-.60; and for post-choice 
satisfaction and the willingness to pay, the difference is r=.68/.63).  
Together, these correlations indicate that a person who is dissatisfied regrets 
the choice and is willing to pay less—and vice versa. Merging these three measures 
assumes that they reflect the same underlying construct. With regard to their 
intercorrelation, this assumption seems justified as Cronbach’s alpha is 0.87/0.83. 
Even though preliminary, this provides some convergent evidence for the existence of 
the effect for some of the participants. The question that arises is if these individual 
differences can be explained by one of the moderator or mediator variables outlined 
above. If so, this would lead to an important insight into when and why the effect of 
too much choice occurs.  
error bars = SE(mean) 
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Test of potential moderators and mediators 
I set out to test the potential moderators and mediators outlined above, namely, the 
personality traits maximizing and regret, as well as behavioral differences in the 
amount of search, the perception of complexity, the size of the consideration set, the 
perceived attractiveness of the assortment, the perceived difficulty of making a choice, 
the number of options participants thought would be better than the one they chose, 
and the expertise in the domain on hand.  
To test if these factors matter, I split the sample into two separate groups for 
each country. The “overloaded group” consisted of participants who showed signs of 
choice overload on all three dependent variables such that they experienced the choice 
from the small set as more satisfactory and less regrettable and were willing to pay 
more for a CD chosen from the small assortment. The “scarcity group” consisted of 
those participants who showed the reverse pattern on all three dependent variables. 
There were 26/20 participants in the overloaded group and 28/30 participants in the 
scarcity group.  
As an alternative way to split the participants into two groups, I could have 
used the continuous compound score on the three measures of choice overload as 
variable within a random effects model. While in the latter case the statistical power 
would have been higher, due to the more complex statistic, the presentation of the 
results would have been less comprehensible. As the results are similar for both 
statistical methods, I will report the results based on the comparison between the 
overloaded and the scarcity group.  
Propensity to maximize and to regret  
In Berlin, participants in the overloaded group had slightly higher scores on Schwartz 
et al.’s (2002) maximizing scale (4.3 [SD=1.0] vs. 3.8 SD=[1.0] on a scale from 1 to 9) 
and the regret scale (4.5[SD=1.4] vs. 3.9[SD=1.6]). Yet the magnitude of these 
differences was rather small (Cohen’s d=0.5 for maximizing and d=0.4 for regret) and 
on an alpha level of 0.05 the corresponding F-tests were not significant, F(52,1)=3.0; 
p=.09 for maximizing and F(52,1)=2.2; p=.14 for regret. In Bloomington, participants 
in both groups have similar mean scores and variance on the maximization scale (5.2, 
SD=1.1) and with respect to regret, the overloaded group in Bloomington had a 
slightly lower average score (4.7 [SD=1.0] vs. 5.3 [SD=1.0]). Thus, there was no 
consistent difference between the two groups with regard to their general propensity to 
maximize or to regret their choices. 
In Berlin, only 16 (20%) of the participants scored above the middle of the 
maximization scale and thus according to Schwartz et al. (2002) would classify as 
maximizers, while the majority of participants should be classified as satisficers. In the 
Bloomington sample, 51 (59%) of the participants had a maximization score above 5. 
To rule out that the high proliferation of satisficers in Berlin diminished the effect in 
the sample, I directly compared maximizers to satisficers. Yet with regard to the three 
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main dependent variables, there is virtually no difference between the two groups in 
Berlin. Consequently, only 6 of the 16 maximizers were found in the overloaded 
group, which is about what would be expected by chance.  
One reason for why the assessed personality traits can only partly count as 
explanation for the effect might be that their reliability is rather low. Cronbach’s alpha 
for the maximization scale is 0.62/0.70 and for the regret scale it is 0.76/0.62. While 
these low reliabilities make it difficult to interpret the personality construct underlying 
these scales, it should be noted here that these values are slightly higher than the scale 
reliabilities reported by Iyengar et al. (2006) and those reported by Haynes and Olson 
(2007, Study I). 
As outlined above, the tendency to maximize might be domain specific, which 
is why I asked participants after each choice to specify to what extent they were trying 
to select the best piece of music. Yet for this domain-specific measure there is also no 
notable difference between the overloaded group and the scarcity group. There is also 
practically no correlation between the domain-specific tendency to maximize and the 
maximization scale, which further questions the validity of the maximization construct 
in the context on hand. 
Domain-specific expertise 
In both countries, the six items assessing prior preferences and expertise were highly 
intercorrelated, with Cronbach’s α=0.89 for the Bloomington data and α=0.81 for the 
Berlin data. Thus, I collapsed the items into an aggregated score for each participant 
for subsequent analyses. 
Despite the good reliability of the measure, the degree of domain-specific 
expertise was virtually the same between the overloaded and the scarcity groups, 
which suggests that in the current study this factor did not directly influence the effect 
of too much choice. This is in contrast to the findings of Mogilner et al., (2006, Study 
3) who found an effect of too much choice for people with little knowledge and 
experience but not for experienced participants.  
Search, perception of assortment, and expertise as potential moderators 
Also, in Berlin and in Bloomington there were virtually no differences between the 
two groups with regard to the number of options that were looked up prior to choice, 
the perception of complexity, the amount of time spent searching (in seconds) and the 
amount of self-reported deliberation. In the Berlin sample, people in the overloaded 
group experienced the choice from the small assortment as easier (-1.8 vs. -0.9), 
F(52,1)=5.2; p=.03, and the choice from the large assortment as slightly more difficult 
(-0.7 vs. -1.5), F(52,1)=3.5; p=0.07, than the scarcity group. However, I found no such 
differences in the Bloomington sample.  
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In Berlin, but not in Bloomington, the overloaded group formed considerably 
larger consideration sets when choosing from the large assortment as compared to the 
scarcity group (six vs. four options) while for the small assortment there was no such 
difference. This might indicate that for some people in Berlin the effect of too much 
choice was moderated through an appetence conflict as a result of having too many 
attractive options. Narrowing down these options might have been perceived as 
difficult and frustrating, which in turn would affect the satisfaction with the finally 
chosen option. However, the fact that no such relationship exists in the U.S. sample 
suggests that this interpretation should be considered preliminary.  
In both countries, compared to the scarcity group people in the overloaded 
group thought that the number of better options in the rest of the large set was higher 
(8/9 vs. 2/5), F(52,1)=18.4; p<.001 and F(48,1)=4.8; p=.03. In Bloomington, but not 
in Berlin, people in the overloaded group also rated the large assortment as less 
attractive as compared to the scarcity group (0.2 vs. 1.1), F(48,1)=5.3; p=.03. Yet the 
relationship between these latter two variables and the dependent variables might be 
due to the close resemblance of their theoretical underpinnings: The number of better 
yet forgone options clearly is an aspect of regret while the attractiveness of the 
assortment might be influenced by the attractiveness of the chosen option. Thus, while 
these differences reconfirm the dependent variables, they add little to their 
explanation. 
Discussion 
As in my previous experiments, I did not find any effect of assortment size on either 
satisfaction, regret, or willingness to pay. This was despite the use of a within-subject 
design and a well-controlled experimental setup through which even small effects 
would have been detected. The strong correlation between three main dependent 
variables and the inter-individual variance with regard to these variables suggest that 
something like a too-much-choice effect might have occurred for about a quarter of 
the participants. However, this intraindividual variance could not be explained by any 
of the theoretically well-grounded moderators and mediators that I assessed. There are 
several possible explanations for these findings.  
Random error variance 
The reason that most suggests itself is that the differences in the dependent variables 
are simply due to random variation. Independent of assortment size, there certainly is 
variance in how much participants liked the option that they chose due to influences 
such as individual preferences for certain types of sounds, the quality of the recording, 
or different expectations, to name only a few. As I did not control or measure these 
influences they count as error variance. This error variance causes variation in 
people’s satisfaction, regret, and their willingness to pay. In addition, as in any 
experiment, these three main dependent variables themselves are measured with an 
error. Yet, as indicated by the high reliability of the multi-item measures for 
satisfaction and regret, this latter error is probably negligible.  
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Thus, under the null hypothesis that there is no effect of assortment size, 
participants would be classified in an overloaded group and a scarcity group just by 
chance, and as a consequence, there would be no variance left to be explained by 
potential moderators and mediators.  
Satisficing 
An alternative explanation for the lack of findings might be that overall the 
attractiveness of the assortment was rated as mediocre and that even though the choice 
was real, it did not have important consequences. This might have increased the 
chances that people did not care much about the outcome and that they satisficed 
rather than optimized. In line with this, the data on hand indicate that participants 
found it rather easy to make a decision and that they did not perceive the assortment as 
very complex. What speaks against this interpretation is the fact that the perception of 
the assortment and the self-reported decision strategy (i.e. how much subjects said 
they were maximizing vs. satisficing) did not have an influence on the main dependent 
variables. However, the data also indicate that the validity of the maximizing vs. 
satisficing personality measure was poor, which makes it difficult to interpret these 
results. Moreover, there is some evidence that people have little insight into their own 
decision strategies (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and thus asking them might not be an 
adequate measure in principle. I will discuss the relationship between decision 
strategies and assortment size in more detail in the General Discussion in Chapter V.  
Higher-order interactions 
It can be speculated that the effect of too much choice depends on several necessary 
preconditions such that in order for it to occur, decision makers need to have a low 
expertise in a complex and unfamiliar domain and at the same time seek an optimal 
outcome. Yet, due to its highly explorative nature and the decrease in statistical power, 
I refrained from testing multiple causation models and higher-order interactions of that 
kind. Besides, the more preconditions that have to be met in order to elicit the effect of 
too much choice, the lower its generalizability and ultimately also its importance. 
General Discussion 
In a total of six experiments across various domains and contexts with a total of 595 
participants in Germany and the U.S., I found no effect in five studies and only a 
medium effect of too much choice in one study. Summarizing my results, the effect 
does not seem to depend on cultural differences between Germany and the United 
States, nor on a further increase in the number of options in the large set (i.e. from 40 
to 80 in the charity study), an increase in the average attractiveness of the small 
assortment, people’s tendency to maximize their outcome or their perception of 
complexity, the number of options people explore, or their domain-specific expertise.  
Across all my experiments, the only case in which a small effect of choice 
overload occurred was when participants were asked to justify their choices. In this 
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case, the effect could be due to the fact that it is more difficult to justify a choice from 
a large assortment as compared to a small assortment because in the small assortment 
the options are less similar. While the data on the number of characters used to justify 
the choice provided some weak support for this idea, the finding needs to be replicated 
before any firm conclusion can be drawn. Also, as mentioned before, it does not 
explain most of the reported occurrences of the effect. 
In summary, the question remains of when and why the effect of too much 
choice occurs. As outlined in Chapter I, other researchers have found the effect in 
different contexts. With regard to the results of my own research it can be concluded 
that the effect is far less robust than suggested by its proponents. 
As before, there are two possible approaches to joining these divergent 
findings into a coherent theoretical frame. First, it could be that choice overload is 
indeed widespread but that the effect is much smaller than previously thought. In this 
case, the question arises of how probable these divergent results are. Second, it could 
be that moderator or mediator variables that explain the diverging results actually do 
exist and remain to be discovered. In the latter case, the core question is what these 
variables are. These approaches will be followed up in Chapters IV and V, 
respectively.  
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Chapter IV:  
Meta-analysis 
In a series of nine studies in the field and in the laboratory involving choices among 
exotic jams, wine, jelly beans, restaurants, charity organizations, and classical music 
with a total of 1,445 participants, there was only one case in which I found an effect of 
the number of options on choice motivation. This is despite the fact that in each study, 
options were used that the decision makers were largely not familiar with, to rule out 
the influence of strong preferences prior to choice. The only case in which I found an 
effect was under the condition that participants had to give a justification for their 
decision. Even if future research confirms this “justification effect,” it can still be 
concluded that the effect of too much choice is far less robust that previously thought. 
Averaged over all 1,278 participants across the eight studies that I conducted in which 
there was an option not to choose, 49% of all participants make a choice from the 
large set and 48% make a choice from the small set.  
In the two music studies in which participants in the United States and in 
Berlin were forced to make a choice and the main dependent variables were self-
reported satisfaction, regret, and the willingness to pay, the results look similar. If 
anything, the 167 participants in both countries were more satisfied, less regretful, and 
willing to pay more when choosing from a large set as compared to a small set.  
As has been pointed out by the statistician R. A. Fisher, replicability of 
empirical evidence is the foundation of science and the path to cumulative knowledge 
(Fisher, 1971). Along the same lines, Schmidt (1996) argued that any single empirical 
study usually reveals only little information and by itself can rarely resolve a 
controversial issue. As a consequence, the results from many studies need to be 
integrated to obtain reliable measures and to promote scientific progress. As a means 
to this end, in this chapter, I will strive to meta-analytically integrate the divergent 
findings into a more coherent framework.  
Introduction 
To get a broader picture of the true nature of the too-much-choice effect, it is 
advisable to incorporate as much data as possible in a meta-analysis. Toward this goal, 
in the following I will also include the results of the experiments on choice overload 
that I reviewed in Chapter I. Including my own, this makes a total of 26 experiments. 
Together, these studies represent all the published and unpublished experimental data 
on the effect of varying assortment sizes that I could get ahold of by June 2007.  
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Overview of the studies 
The studies can be classified into two categories based on the experimental setup they 
used: In 14 of these experiments, including 8 of my own, participants had the option 
not to make a choice for the time being, to choose a default option, or to change their 
choice later on. In the other 12 studies, including 2 of my own, people were forced to 
make a choice. In the first case, with few exceptions (Chernev, 2003a, 2003b) the 
dependent variable is the percentage of people who made a choice (Table 2). In the 
latter case, the dependent variable is usually the satisfaction with the chosen option, 
but sometimes also the amount of consumption or the propensity to change the 
decision at a later point in time (Table 3). Figure 9 provides a forest plot of all effect 
sizes and their respective standard errors alongside each other. 
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Table 2: Summary of experiments with choice proportions as dependent variable. The asterisks (*) mark my own experiments 
Study name N total 
Assortment size  Choice in % Effect size 
(d) SE (d) small set large set small set large set difference 
Iyengar & Lepper (2000), Jam study 249 6 24  29.8% 2.8% 27.0% 0.77 0.13 
Iyengar & Lepper (2000), Chocolate study 67 6 30  48.0% 12.0% 36.0% 0.88 0.26 
Shah & Wolford (2007) 60 2-10 12-20  60.0% 44.0% 16.0% 0.32 0.20 
Chernev (2003a) 58 4 16  16.0% 84.0% −68.0% −1.44 0.24 
Chernev (2003b), Study 1 88 4 16  82.0% 74.0% 8.0% 0.23 0.22 
Chernev (2003b), Study 2 75 4 16  75.0% 69.0% 6.0% 0.22 0.23 
Jam study Berlin* 504 6 24  33.3% 32.0% 1.3% 0.03 0.09 
Jelly bean study* 66 6 30  63.6% 78.8% −3.0% −0.27 0.24 
Wine study* 280 3 12  34.5% 38.3% −3.8% −0.10 0.12 
Restaurant study* 80 5 30  30.0% 35.0% −5.0% −0.14 0.22 
Charity study I – well known charities* 60 2 30  83.3% 93.3% −10.0% −0.53 0.26 
Charity study I – least known charities* 57 5 40  65.5% 71.4% −5.9% −0.17 0.26 
Charity study II (Bloomington)* 112 5 40 & 79  80.6% 87.0% −6.5% −0.26 0.20 
Charity study III* 119 5 40 & 80  88.1% 72.7% 15.4% 0.57 0.20 
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Table 3: Summary of experiments with satisfaction ratings (a), amount of consumption (b), or propensity to change the decision (c) as dependent variable. The asterisks (*) mark 
my own experiments 
Study name N total 
Assortment size  Mean value Effect size 
(d) SE (d) small set large set small set large set difference 
Haynes & Olson (2007), Study 1 a 69 3 10  7.85 7.20 0.65 0.44 0.25 
Haynes & Olson (2007), Study 2 a 72 5 20  7.17 7.28 -0.11 -0.20 0.23 
Lenton, Fasolo, & Todd (2005) a 96 4 20  5.19 5.36 −0.17 −0.08 0.20 
Reutskaja & Hogarth (2005), Study 1 a 60 10 30  8.50 7.10 1.40 0.68 0.27 
Reutskaja & Hogarth (2005), Study 2 a 60 10 30  7.30 7.70 −0.40 −0.33 0.25 
Kahn & Wansink (2004), Study 1 b 36 6 24  16.60 22.70 −6.10 −0.37 0.33 
Kahn & Wansink (2004), Study 2 b 91 6 24  34.90 50.90 −16.00 −0.46 0.20 
Kahn & Wansink (2004), Study 5 b 138 6 24  43.70 60.90 −17.20 −0.39 0.17 
Lin & Wu (2006) c 82 6 16  2.76 2.83 −0.07 −0.08 0.22 
Mogilner, Rudnick, & Iyengar (2007), Study 3a 121 5 50  4.36 3.89 0.47 0.25 0.18 
Music study (Berlin) *,a 80 6 30  0.51 1.06 −0.55 −0.17 0.16 
Music study (Bloomington) *,a 87 6 30  1.90 2.00 −0.10 −0.05 0.15 
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Figure 9: Forest plot of all effect sizes. The bars indicate standard errors; the 
asterisks (*) denote my own studies 
 
Method 
One way to meta-analytically integrate these results would be simply to count the 
number of studies that did not find a (statistically significant) effect of assortment size. 
If this number exceeds the number of studies that found an effect, one would conclude 
that no relationship exists. As pointed out by Schmidt (1996), this so-called traditional 
voting method leads to wrong conclusions because it dismisses the fact that the 
significance of a study depends on the sample size and that studies might appear to be 
inconsistent with each other due to mere random error.  
To obtain a more precise method of meta-analytic integration, Hunter and 
Schmidt (1990) suggest relying on effect sizes and their respective sampling error 
rather than on statistical significance. According to Hunter and Schmidt, the results of 
several studies are integrated by calculating a weighted average of all single effect 
sizes across studies (D): 
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where w is the weight of each single effect size as calculated in Equation 2-25, di is the 
effect size of a study i, and m is the total number of studies. The 95% confidence 
interval around D is calculated as 
DseD ⋅± 96.1  (4-2) 
where SED is the standard error of D, calculated as 
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To find out how much of the variance in D is due to mere sampling error and 
how much is due to meaningful differences between the studies, one needs to calculate 
a homogeneity analysis based on the Q-statistic as laid out in Formula 2-1. In the 
homogeneity analysis in Chapter II, the variance between studies could not be fully 
accounted for by error variance and as a consequence, searching for moderators and 
mediators seemed justified. However, with the empirical data of 21 additional studies 
on hand, the results of this analysis may look different.  
Selection of studies 
The meta-analysis on hand is only concerned with the main effect of too much choice 
in controlled experimental settings. Interaction effects, such as the effect of need for 
cognition (Lin & Wu, 2006), or the effect of entropy (Kahn & Wansink, 2004) are not 
considered because there is not enough data to separately estimate the effect of those 
interactions in a meta-analysis. 
In general, the meta-analytical integration of results requires that the studies 
be comparable in their design and their hypotheses. The experimental designs of the 
studies that used choice proportions as the dependent variable are rather similar and so 
a meta-analytical integration seems justified. However, in one of Chernev’s (2003b) 
studies, the proportion of people who changed their decision was measured, and in 
another (Chernev, 2003a), it was the proportion of people who choose from the large 
assortment rather than the small. While both dependent variables are somewhat 
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different from those in the other studies that looked at the proportions of people who 
did (not) choose any of the options, in each case the authors argued that on a 
conceptual level their measure reflects people’s motivation to make a choice. Thus, 
the integration of studies seems justified.  
The studies that used a continuous dependent variable are not directly comparable to 
those that measured choice proportions because for the contiunous measures, 
participants were forced to make a selection from a given set. These latter studies are 
also somewhat more heterogeneous in their design. The majority of the studies used 
satisfaction with the chosen option (Haynes & Olson, 2007; Mogilner et al., 2007, 
Experiment 3; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2005; my own music studies), measured with a 
Likert scale. In contrast, Lin and Wu (2006) asked participants about their propensity 
to change their decision later on, which seems at least similar to satisfaction. The 
experiments by Kahn and Wansink (2004) were based on consumption, which 
according to the authors themselves is conceptually different from choice or subjective 
satisfaction. However, as these studies generally tested the effect of assortment size, I 
included them in the meta-analysis initially and then checked in a second step if the 
results change when this set of studies is excluded.  
Coding of studies 
To integrate the studies, effect sizes have to be calculated. Effect size measures such 
as Cohen’s d express the magnitude of an effect in units of standard deviations. For 
studies with proportion of choice, the calculation of standard deviations is 
straightforward because they are a function of the sample size and the proportion, both 
of which are commonly provided by the authors. For studies with a continuous 
measure, such as satisfaction or amount of consumption, a calculation of effect sizes 
requires that standard deviations be explicitly reported in the original study. 
Unfortunately, this is often not the case. In some studies (Haynes & Olson, 2007, 
Study 1; Lenton et al., 2005; Lin & Wu, 2006; Mogilner et al., 2007, Experiment 3), 
this problem can be solved by reverse-engineering standard deviations from test 
statistics such as F- or t-values. In one case (Kahn & Wansink, 2004), however, this is 
not possible because the main effect of assortment size on the dependent variable, the 
amount of consumption, was not tested statistically. As I also could not obtain the 
necessary statistics from the authors, strictly speaking the data cannot be integrated 
into a meta-analysis. Yet because Kahn and Wansink’s studies provid important 
insight, for the present purpose I decided to integrate them regardless by estimating 
the standard deviations, knowing that the resulting effect size is error prone. To reduce 
the error, I estimated that the standard deviation would be equal to the mean 
consumption value. As this is most probably an overestimation, the effect sizes will be 
smaller and thus the weight of the studies in the meta-analysis will be reduced.  
In some experiments (Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2005; Shah & Wolford, 2007), 
the number of options varied across a wide range. To integrate the results of the study 
by Reutskaja & Hogarth, I selected those assortment sizes for which the effect was 
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greatest (10 vs. 30 options). In the study by Shah & Wolford, assortment sizes varied 
between 2 and 20 with increments of 2. To test for the main effect of too much choice, 
I grouped the assortment sizes 2 to 10 into a small assortment and compared it to the 
mean choice proportions for assortment sizes of 12 to 20 options. 
Results 
Studies with choice as dependent variable 
Integrating all 14 studies listed in Table 2 with choice proportions as dependent 
variable, the mean effect size according to equation 4-1 is D=0.07 (SED=0.05) and the 
95% confidence interval ranges from -0.02 to 0.17. As the confidence interval 
includes zero, the mean effect size is not statistically different from zero. The Q-value 
obtained from Equation 2-1 is 100.2. As this is larger than the critical chi-square value 
of 22.4 (α=0.05; df=13), the variability across effect sizes exceeds what would be 
expected based on sampling error. Thus, according to Hedges and Olkin (1985), it can 
be concluded that the different results between the studies are due to the influence of 
moderator variables. 
If the data from Chernev (2003a) with its extreme effect size of d=-1.44 and 
the data from Chernev (2003b) that used a slightly different dependent variable are 
excluded, the mean effect size D is 0.13 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 
0.05 to 0.22. The corresponding Q-value is 57.7, which is still higher than the critical 
chi-square value of 18.3 (df=10).  
Studies with satisfaction as dependent variable 
For all eight studies with satisfaction as dependent measure, excluding the studies by 
Kahn and Wansink (2004) and Lin and Wu (2006), the mean effect size D is  0.02 
(SED=0.07) with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.12 to 0.16. Thus, the data 
on hand is similar to the results obtained for the data on choice as dependent variable 
such that the mean effect is not statistically significantly different from zero. The Q-
value for the studies with satisfaction as dependent variable is 15.2, which is larger 
than the critical value of 14.1 (α=0.05; df=7), which again suggests a further search for 
moderators.  
For all studies with a continuous dependent variable, including the studies by 
Kahn and Wansink and by Lin and Wu, the mean effect size is D=-0.09 (SED=0.06) 
with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.2 to 0.02. The homogeneity statistic 
Q=24.9, which is larger than the critical chi-square value of 19.7 (α=0.05; df=11).  
Publication bias and differences in assortment sizes 
To see whether the mean effect size is driven by a few studies with extreme effect 
sizes and/or extreme weights, I drew a so-called funnel plot in which the weight of 
each study is plotted against its effect size (Figure 10). By looking at Figure 10, it can 
be seen that the effect sizes are distributed relatively equally. There are only two 
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outliers. One is the jam study conducted in Berlin, which has an extreme weight. Yet, 
due to its small effect size, it does not have a large leverage on the mean effect size. 
The other outlier is the study by Chernev (2003a), which has already been dealt with 
in the analysis above. The funnel plot can also be used as to detect potential 
publication or selection biases by checking if the distribution of effect sizes follows 
the shape of a symmetrical inverted funnel. This is because the results of studies with 
a smaller sample size (and thus a larger standard error) should have a higher 
variability. If the plot is asymmetrical, for example, it could be that studies with a 
small sample size that did not find an effect are missing. Yet with the exception of 
Chernev’s study, the studies are somewhat symmetrically distributed, which suggests 
a fairly representative selection of studies.  
To see whether the difference between the small and the large assortment 
influences the effect sizes, I correlated the difference in the assortment sizes (coded as 
large set–small set) with the effect size across studies. The resulting Pearson 
correlation coefficient is r=.10. However, this correlation is mainly due to the study by 
Chernev (2003a) because if this study is excluded, the correlation drops to r=.01. 
Thus, it can be concluded that an increase in the difference between small and large 
set does not increase the effect size (Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 10: Funnel Plot: Distribution of effect sizes relative to study weight 
w=1/SE(d)² 
 
Chernev, 2003a
Jam study Berlin 
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Figure 11: Scatter plot of the correlation between effect size and difference in 
assortment sizes 
 
Discussion 
When summarizing the empirical evidence on the effect of too much choice based on 
the published effect sizes, two things can be concluded: First, the effect is far less 
generalizable than previously thought. Second, the strong effect sizes in some studies 
that found the effect cannot be explained by random variation, which indicates the 
presence of moderator and mediator variables.  
With regard to the first conclusion, Kelly (2006) noted that unsuccessful 
replications leave no clear basis for deciding between the original and the replicate 
study. Based on an analysis of literature databases, he found that unsuccessful 
replications are cited less often than the original work, which suggests that 
contradictory evidence is at times ignored. Also, if studies that find a strong effect 
have a higher probability of being published than studies that find a small effect or no 
effect, the estimation of the true effect size will be biased.  
There is some evidence that studies that are not published in scientific journals 
have smaller effect sizes than studies that appear in journals. In a study by Rosenthal 
and Rubin (1978), the average effect size of 32 dissertations that did not appear in 
journals, expressed in fractions of standard deviations, was 0.35, whereas the average 
effect size of 313 published journal papers on the same topic was 0.56. With regard to 
the effect of choice overload, this suggests that the true effect might also be lower.  
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With regard to the second conclusion, exploring the boundary conditions of 
the too-much-choice effect clearly is an important and necessary step toward the 
understanding of its underlying psychological mechanisms. In the preceding chapters, 
I discussed, evaluated, and eventually tested a number of potential mediators and 
moderators. There the conclusion was that with one exception, none of the variables 
that I considered seemed to facilitate the effect of too much choice. Extending this 
earlier analysis, in the following chapter, I will lay out and critically evaluate 
additional theoretical explanations as well as potential moderators and mediators that 
may help provide a more clear-cut picture of the seemingly inconsistent effect of too 
much choice. Doing so will help to identify the most promising variables to be tested 
in future experiments.  
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Chapter V:  
General Discussion and Conclusion 
One explanation of why the effect of too much choice does not reliably occur might be 
that in the experiments where the effect could not be found, the number of options or 
the difference in number between the conditions was still not large enough. Due to the 
vague definition of what constitutes too much choice, it can never be ruled out that an 
effect would eventually be found with an even higher number of options. Yet this 
explanation is challenged by the fact that other scholars have found the effect with the 
number of options I used and that a doubling in assortment size from 40 to 80 in the 
charity study did not have any effect on the motivation to choose. Also, according to 
the results of the meta-analysis, there is no relationship between the difference in 
assortment sizes and the effect size.  
As a consequence, it seems worthwhile to discuss other potential explanations 
and, perhaps most importantly, some theoretical perspectives that might help clarify 
the too much choice effect. Toward this goal, in the following I will aim to link the 
too-much-choice effect to previous research on decision making. As I will show, the 
effect can be placed within the broader frameworks of information overload, decision 
avoidance, and adaptive decision making, for each of which there is a considerable 
amount of research.  
According to Simon (1990), behavior is shaped by the interaction between the 
human information-processing system on one side and the properties of the 
environment on the other. Starting from this general notion, in the following I will 
identify potential boundary conditions on the side of the decision maker, on the side of 
the environmental structure (incorporating the choice set or assortment), and on the 
interaction between the two. Along the way, I propose a number of hypotheses and 
boundary conditions that can be explored in future research. 
Complementary features as a moderator  
In Chapter I, I discussed the notion of trade-offs and negative attribute correlation as 
an important environmental structure to elicit a better understanding of choice 
overload. In extension to this, scholars in the past have argued that the content of the 
attributes on which options differ also plays an important role in the amount of 
decisional conflict people perceive and also for the emergence of choice overload. 
Feature complementarity 
Based on a series of experiments involving hypothetical choices among different 
consumer products, Chernev (2005) found that when options differed along what he 
called “complementary” features, an increase in assortment size from two to five led 
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to higher choice deferral. On the other hand, when features were 
“noncomplementary,” choice deferral decreased with an increase of the assortment 
size. In Chernev’s terms, features complement each other if a combination of them 
increases the attractiveness of the option. For example, in his experiment, participants 
chose among holiday resorts. In the noncomplementary condition, the resorts differed 
by their location (e.g. Bermuda, Bahamas, Antigua, etc.). In the complementary 
condition, they differed by what they offered to their guests (e.g. fantastic beaches, 
convenient transportation, exceptional service, etc.). In the latter case, an ideal resort 
would offer all features and thus choosing any one of the available options implies that 
certain attractive features have to be forgone. On the other hand, if options differ along 
noncomplementary features, an increase in assortment size increases the probability 
that decision makers will find something that matches their preferences. 
Chernev further conjectured that the more resorts there are that have unique 
and complementary features, the further the deficits of the other options are 
highlighted and the less attractive it becomes to choose any of the options. To test this 
hypothesis, similar to my charity study, Chernev asked participants in his study to give 
a reason for their choice. What he found was that in the condition with complementary 
features, participants were more likely to mention that they missed a certain feature, 
and this tendency was even stronger when choosing among five options as compared 
to choosing between two options.  
Attribute “alignability” 
Chernev’s (2005) results match up with the findings of Zhang and Fitzsimons (1999) 
who found that people were more satisfied with the process of a choice when options 
differed on noncomplementary features (Zhang and Fitzsimons called them “alignable 
differences”) as compared to choices between options that had different 
complementary features (referred to as “nonalignable differences”).  
In Zhang and Fitzsimon’s series of four experiments, participants made 
hypothetical choices among three different types of fictitious microwave popcorn. One 
group of participants chose among popcorns described on complementary features 
such as “not likely to burn,” “easy to swallow,” or “few kernels left unpopped.” The 
other group chose among popcorns described on noncomplementary features such as 
the origin of the corn (Southwest, Midwest, Northwest) or the size of the kernels 
(small, medium, large). Participants who chose from the complementary set were 
subsequently less satisfied with the choice process, such that they were more 
frustrated and said they would be less likely to make a choice. Zhang and Fitzsimons 
argued that this is because it is more difficult to compare the unique, complementary 
features due to the lack of a comparison standard.  
The findings of Zhang and Fitzsimons were subsequently confirmed in an 
experiment that also involved choices among varying numbers of microwave ovens 
(Gourville & Soman, 2005). In this study, participants were given a choice between 
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one single oven of brand A and a varying number of ovens of brand B in a between-
subjects design. The number of B ovens was subject to experimental manipulation and 
differed between 1 and 5. In one condition, the B ovens differed along the alignable or 
noncomplementary attributes such as capacity and price, and in the other condition, 
the B ovens differed with regard to nonalignable or complementary features (e.g. one 
oven had a moisture sensor, the other had programmable menus, etc.). The description 
of the oven from brand A was the same across conditions. Gourville and Soman found 
that when the B ovens were described on complementary features, the choice share of 
oven A increased with the number of B ovens. When B ovens were described on 
noncomplementary features, the choice share of oven A decreased with the number of 
B ovens being offered.  
Critical evaluation of complementary features as moderators 
Taken together, the results of all these studies suggest that trade-offs due to 
differences along nonalignable or complementary attributes are a necessary 
precondition for the effect of too much choice. Yet, in their experiments, Chernev as 
well as Gourville and Soman explored small assortments ranging between two and 
five options. While these researchers claim that their findings can be generalized to 
larger assortment sizes as well, so far there is no direct empirical evidence that 
supports this hypothesis. 
In Iyengar and Lepper’s jam and chocolate studies, an effect was found 
despite the fact that options mainly differed on noncomplementary features such as 
flavor or type of chocolate. Besides, there is no reason to believe that the differences 
in features were of a different quality in the studies that did not find an effect. Also, if 
the presence of complementary features is a sufficient precondition, the too much 
choice effect should be widespread, because many choice sets in the real world are 
characterized by options that have unique advantages.  
Too much choice effect as a special case of information overload 
In earlier chapters I repeatedly pointed out that the research on choice overload is 
remarkably similar to the research on information overload. In the following, I will 
discuss to what extent choice overload is just a special case of information overload 
and how much insight can be gained by looking into that literature. 
As outlined in Chapter I, Miller (1956) found that decision makers have finite 
limits to the amount of information they can assimilate and process during any given 
moment. The information overload paradigm states that if these limits are exceeded, 
decision makers become confused and make poorer decisions.  
Limited channel capacity  
In a series of experiments, Milinski (1990) found that limitations in the amount of 
information that is processed within a certain time are not unique to humans but can 
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also be found among other animals. In his experiments, Milinski found that when 
given a choice between a large swarm of 40 waterfleas and a small one with 2 
waterfleas, hungry sticklebacks preferred the large swarm, whereas less-hungry 
sticklebacks preferred the small swarm. Milinski argued that hunting in the large 
swarm requires more attention and concentration because of the difficulties of tracking 
one of the many similar-looking targets. Because of this, a stickleback that hunts in the 
large swarm probably cannot pay sufficient attention to a suddenly approaching 
predator of its own. Earlier, Milinski (1984) found that frightened sticklebacks 
(hungry or not) preferred the small swarm and sticklebacks that hunted the large 
swarm were less likely to detect an approaching predator. In this experiment, the 
predator was a model of a king-fisher bird that was flown over the fish tank. In an 
analogous experiment on humans, Milinski (1990) gave participants sheets of papers 
with different numbers of white dots. Their task was to punch 20 white dots with a 
needle as fast as possible. The time participants needed to punch 20 dots increased 
with the density of dots on the sheet and this increase was pronounced when 
participants were visually distracted with occasional flashes from a light bulb. 
Building on the notion of limited channel capacity to process information, previous 
research on information overload (Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974a) looked at the 
potential influence of assortment size and assortment structure on confusion, 
satisfaction, and dysfunctional behavior on the part of the decision maker.  
Previous research on information overload 
In an early study on information overload, Jacoby et al. (1974a) and also Jacoby, 
Speller, and Kohn Berning (1974b) compared choices among up to 12 different bogus 
consumer products that were described on a varying number of attributes. Participants 
were instructed to examine and evaluate all available information. Information load 
was operationalized as the number of products multiplied by the number of attributes. 
What they found was that there was an inverted U-shaped relation between 
information load and the “accuracy” of the decision. Accuracy was defined by 
measuring the difference between the chosen option and the option that would have 
been chosen based on the weighted additive combination of all attribute values. In 
their approach, the weights were taken from individual importance ratings that were 
assessed for each attribute prior to the actual choice. Based on this definition, too 
little, but more importantly, also too much information led people to make less 
accurate decisions. 
The findings on information overload by Jacoby and his colleagues (1974a, 1974b) 
were subsequently heavily criticized on theoretical as well as methodological grounds. 
The main criticisms were that the original study did not control for chance factors and 
that the number of products was not sufficiently high (Malhotra, 1984; Malhotra, Jain, 
& Lagakos, 1982). Other critics argued that a weighted additive model may not have 
been an appropriate measure for choice accuracy in the first place (Meyer & Johnson, 
1989). Because of the difficulty in defining a good decision when it comes to 
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preferential choice, Meyer and Johnson instead called for consistency-based measures 
such as the probability of picking a dominant option. In a reanalysis of Jaboby et al.’s 
(1974a) data, Malhotra et al. (1982) completely dismissed Jacoby et al.’s evidence of 
information overload because the original authors did not control for the fact that the 
mere chance of randomly choosing a single “best” option decreases with the number 
of options to choose from. However, in a methodologically more sound study, 
Malhotra (1982) nevertheless confirmed the hypothesis of Jacoby et al. In this study, 
Malhotra increased the maximum number of both options and attributes to 25, 
statistically controlled for chance factors, and also included a self-reported measure on 
subjective choice overload. He nevertheless maintained a weighted additive model as 
normative yardstick to measure choice accuracy. He found that on average, 
dissatisfaction with the act of choosing, confusion, the subjective feeling of being 
overloaded, and the inaccuracy of the choice all increased with more than 15 attributes 
or more than 10 options. Malhotra (1982) also found that number of options and the 
number of attributes both contribute independently to information overload.  
Critical evaluation of information overload as a moderator 
With regard to the too-much-choice effect, the decrease in accuracy of finding the 
presumably best option due to too much information might be reflected in a decreased 
satisfaction with the chosen option. Also, if decision makers are able to anticipate this 
lack of accuracy, it could be that they try to avoid a poor decision in high-information 
situations by not making any choice at all.  
However, in my studies, the amount of information with which the options 
were described did not seem to make a difference. For instance, in the restaurant 
study, each restaurant was described on many different attributes, and in the charity 
study, a considerable amount of information about each organization was provided, 
and neither yielded a too-much-choice effect. Also, the data obtained from my 
experiments indicate that independent of the assortment size, the more options (e.g. 
jam, wine, or music) a participant sampled from an assortment, the higher his or her 
individual likelihood to choose. For example, in the jam study, participants who tasted 
more jam and by this gathered more information were more likely to purchase, which 
indicates that an increase in information led to a higher probability of choosing. 
Furthermore, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found the effect based on choices among 
rather simple options such as jam or chocolate, suggesting that the mere amount of 
information is not sufficient to explain the occurrence of the effect.  
Extensions of the information overload paradigm 
While the early research on information overload focused on the actual number of 
options and attributes, what ultimately matters is how an assortment is perceived by a 
decision maker. Beyond the number of options and attributes, recent studies have 
shown that the perception of information content also depends on many other 
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structural factors such as the (dis)organization of the assortment and the number and 
distribution of attribute levels, which can be expressed as the entropy of an assortment 
(Hoch, Bradlow, & Wansink, 1999; Kahn & Lehmann, 1991; Kahn & Wansink, 2004; 
Lurie, 2002, 2004).  
Entropy 
In a study by van Herpen and Pieters (2002), the mere number of options was a poor 
predictor of participants’ subjective variety perceptions, while measures that tapped 
into structural details of the assortment were good predictors. Each of the 62 
participants in their experiment rated a variety of 12 different assortments of bogus 
products that were characterized by three categorical attributes. The assortments 
differed in size (ranging from 4 to 16), in entropy, and in the degree of association 
between attributes. Entropy is a concept borrowed from information theory (Shannon 
& Weaver, 1949) that in its original usage indicates the number of bits necessary to 
code a given environment. The entropy I within a categorical attribute A can be 
calculated as  
)(log)( 21 jj
m
j ppAI ⋅Σ−= =  (5-1) 
where pj equals the proportion of options with attribute level j, m is the total number of 
attribute levels, and log2 is the logarithm to the base 2. When only a single attribute 
level is present (e.g. all jelly beans are red), pj equals one and the entropy is zero. 
Entropy increases with the number of attribute levels and it is highest if all attribute 
levels occur in equal proportions (e.g. an equal number of red, green, and yellow jelly 
beans). For assortments with more than one attribute, the entropy measure is 
commonly added across all attributes (Fasolo, Hertwig, Huber, & Ludwig, 2006), 
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where Ak is the entropy of the kth attribute and l is the total number of attributes within 
the assortment. 
As already mentioned in Chapter I, besides entropy, van Herpen and Pieters 
also measured the degree of conflicting attributes within the assortment by calculating 
lambda coefficients (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). What they found was that in a linear 
regression on the perception of variance, the attribute dispersion (entropy) and the 
conflict between attributes (lambda) together accounted for 62.5% of the variance in 
people’s perception of variety while the mere number of options only accounted for an 
additional 3.4% of the variance.  
Assortment structure in the real world 
For real-world assortments within grocery stores, Fasolo et al. (2006) found that the 
number of attribute levels strongly correlates with the number of products within an 
assortment, which suggests that each product tends to add a new attribute level. As a 
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consequence, Fasolo et al. also found a strong correlation between the number of 
options and the entropy within the assortment. The largest share of the entropy 
measure across product categories was due to the attributes’ brand and price. Yet for a 
continuous attribute such as price, it is questionable if entropy, which was initially 
used for categorical data, is an appropriate measure. This is because if every option 
has a different value, the entropy is simply a function of the number of options within 
the assortment and the high correlation between entropy and assortment size comes as 
little surprise. For continuous variables, dispersion measures such as variance or 
quartile ranges might be more appropriate.  
Entropy affects choice quality 
With regard to choices, Lurie (2004, Experiment 1) found that low entropy was a good 
predictor of choice quality. In his experiment, participants made a hypothetical choice 
from an assortment of pocket calculators that differed with regard to the number of 
options and with regard to the entropy as measured in equation 5-2. Choice quality 
was operationalized as the probability of choosing a dominant option from a set of 
pocket calculators. Lurie found a main effect of assortment size on the probability of 
choosing a dominant option but this effect diminished if entropy was taken into 
account. These results suggest that information structure, not the number of 
alternatives, is the crucial factor in determining overload.  
In line with this, Lee and Lee (2004) found that the quality of decisions (also 
defined as the probability of choosing a dominant option) depends on entropy and on 
the number of attributes rather than the mere number of options. In their experiment, 
participants chose among different sets of CD players that differed in the number of 
options (18 vs. 27), the number of attributes on which the CD players were described 
(9 vs. 18), and the distribution of the attribute values, measured in terms of entropy 
(high vs. low entropy). Based on a between-subjects design, they found that an 
increase in the number of attributes and also an increase in entropy both decreased 
choice quality, whereas the number of options did not have any effect. Likewise, the 
number of options did not affect participants’ satisfaction with the choice, but 
satisfaction decreased with the number of attributes. In contrast to the previous 
findings, though, entropy did not affect satisfaction.  
To increase the internal validity and to make it easier for participants to pay 
attention to all attributes, the inter-attribute correlations in the experiments by Lurie 
(2004) as well as by Lee and Lee (2004) were set around zero. Thus, a high value of 
an option on one attribute did not reveal anything about the value of that option on 
another attribute. Such a choice environment might not be what people are used to, 
though. In their study on real-world consumer environments, Fasolo et al. (2006) 
found that in grocery stores many attributes are typically negatively correlated such 
that a high value on one attribute implies a low value on another attribute. Thus the 
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generalizability of Lee and Lee’s findings to real-world assortments might be 
impaired.  
Critical evaluation of entropy as a moderator 
An equal increase in the number of options makes it more difficult to find the best 
option (and potentially less motivating and less satisfactory) in the high-entropy case 
as compared to the low-entropy case. Also, if the entropy in an assortment is high, the 
perception of variety might increase faster with an increase in the number of options 
as compared to a situation in which the entropy is low. As a consequence, entropy 
could potentially moderate the effect of too much choice. 
In my experiments, I did not control for the entropy within the assortment, but 
I did control for the perception of variety that is affected by entropy and thus could be 
taken as a proxy. While the perceived variety differed among the experimental 
conditions, in absolute terms the variety was commonly not perceived as extremely 
high. This also holds true for other studies that found the effect (e.g. Iyengar & 
Lepper’s chocolate study, 2000). Still, maybe for choice overload to occur reliably, 
assortments have to be perceived as extraordinarily large and complex; a situation that 
might only occur if a large number of options is paired with high entropy.  
Expedient ordering of the options as a moderator 
From yet another perspective on the influence of assortment structure on choice 
overload, previous research found that the motivation to choose also increases if a 
clear description of the differences between the options is given, seemingly because 
the relevant information for comparisons can be perceived more easily and the effort 
to make a choice is low, and possibly also because it could make justification easier. 
The availability of reasonable categories along which options can be ordered 
and compared becomes more important the more options there are (Anderson, 2006). 
As an example, one can think of online retailers that invest great efforts to offer 
alternative ways to search their assortments along several attributes (e.g. price, ratings, 
or specific features). On the other hand, for a randomized assortment, search clearly 
gets more difficult as the number of options increases.  
Following up on the notion of adaptive decision making, Payne et al. (1992) 
showed that more information changes the direction of search from alternative-wise 
(looking for all of the attribute values for one option before going on to the next 
alternative) to more attribute-wise (comparing all options on a single attribute before 
going on to the next attribute). Following up on that finding, Huffman and Kahn 
(1998) found that the satisfaction with the decision process and the finally chosen 
option did not depend on the amount of information per se but on how this 
information was structured. In their experiments, satisfaction with hypothetical sofas 
and hotels increased if assortments were ordered along their attribute values, 
presumably because this layout made it easier for the consumer to process the 
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information. Likewise, in a study on patient decision making, Carrigan, Gardner, 
Conner, and Maule (2004) found that people’s decisions were closer to the predictions 
of a weighted additive model if information was ordered such that it could be accessed 
selectively according to individual preferences as compared to a condition in which all 
information was presented in a predetermined order.   
In an early study by Russo (1977), shoppers in a grocery store on average 
saved 2% of their spending through purchasing cheaper products when all brands 
within a category were sorted on one list according to their price, as compared to a 
regular grocery store with separate price tags on each item. Russo argued that 
providing the price information in a convenient way would make it easier for shoppers 
to use this information when making a choice.  
Critical evaluation of the ordering as a moderator 
Considering these findings together, if the assortment structure matches with people’s 
preferred search and decision strategy, the choice becomes easier and more satisfying. 
This relationship might be especially pronounced for large assortments. For small 
assortments, decision makers might be less affected by the order because it is easier to 
get an overview. Thus, a mismatch between the assortment structure and the decision 
strategy might be a necessary precondition for the too much choice effect.  
However, in my experiments, the options were not ordered in any sensible 
way, which should have increased the likelihood of finding the effect. For example, in 
the jelly bean and the music study, the options were randomly distributed. In the 
charity study, the options were ordered lexicographically, but the first letter was 
completely uninformative about the mission of the organization.  
Interaction between environment and decision strategies 
In my discussion on information overload and its related concepts I mainly focused on 
structural aspects of assortments that go beyond the mere number of options. These 
aspects included various types of conflict between attributes and options, the number 
of attributes, and the distribution of attribute values (entropy) and how the options are 
ordered. Yet following Simon’s (1990) allegory of a pair of scissors, the structure of 
the environment is only one of the two blades that need to be considered in order to 
understand human decision making. The other blade represents the decision strategies 
used within a given environment and how these strategies might change depending on 
the situation. According to Simon, both aspects are equally important to 
understanding, explaining, and predicting decision making.  
In Chapter I, I mentioned the notion of adaptive decision heuristics such as 
satisficing and how the use of these heuristics can shield people from being 
overloaded with choice. In the following, I will further elaborate on the interaction 
between decision strategies and the effect of too much choice, showing that the 
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understanding of decision strategies is a key to understanding when and why choice 
overload occurs.  
Weighted additive model as normative standard 
The information overload and entropy literature are not completely mute about 
decision strategies, because as outlined above, being “overloaded” is commonly 
defined as a deviation from an allegedly normative standard of a weighted additive 
decision model. For example, in a study on information overload, Keller and Staelin 
(1987) defined decision effectiveness as the degree to which individuals obey a 
weighted additive rule. As stated earlier, such a rule requires that all information be 
weighted by its importance and then integrated in an additive way to obtain an overall 
preference or quality value for each option. Following this procedure, the option with 
the highest value should eventually be selected. Based on this definition, Keller and 
Staelin found that decision effectiveness decreases once the amount of information 
surpasses a certain threshold. 
A weighted additive rule is a prime example of a so-called compensatory 
decision rule, because it implies that one or more positive values on one attribute can 
outweigh one or more bad values on another attribute, and vice versa. As a 
psychological process model of choice, weighting and adding requires a considerable 
amount of time to gather and assess all the relevant attributes and attitudes, and 
computation to combine all this information into an overall judgment of each choice 
alternative.  
Simple heuristics as more appropriate models of choice 
Because of these somewhat unrealistic demands that weighted additive rules make on 
human cognitive abilities, previous research on judgment and decision making has 
seriously questioned them as reasonable models of human decision making in many 
common circumstances (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975).  Instead, the 
research tradition of so-called simple heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) proposes 
decision mechanisms that overcome the problems of weighted additive models and 
other complex decision rules. First, the simple heuristics framework suggests that 
people are often frugal in terms of the information they assess for a choice and second, 
it proposes that instead of aggregating many pieces of information by weighting and 
adding, people make their choicees based on a much simpler yet still effective 
decision rule. The key assumptions of this heuristics approach are that decision 
makers have limited time and computational resources (exhibiting what Simon called 
“bounded rationality”), and that rather than trying to determine “the best” option, they 
search for something that is “good enough” (Schwartz, 2004; Simon, 1955). There is 
considerable evidence that people’s decision-making processes can indeed often be 
characterized as rules of thumb that work reasonably well in many situations (Bröder, 
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2000, 2003; Gigerenzer  & Goldstein, 1996; Payne et al., 1992; Scheibehenne & 
Bröder, 2007; Scheibehenne, Miesler, & Todd, 2007; Svenson 1979; Wright, 1975).  
Adaptive decision making 
For frugal strategies to be effective, the research tradition on simple heuristics further 
assumes that the decision strategies people use are adapted to the environment. As 
already mentioned in chapter I, adaptive shifts of strategy that depend on 
environmental characteristics are a well established finding for which a large body of 
empirical evidence exists (see Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989 for 
a review).  
Despite these findings, it is still a widespread idea that that the accuracy of a 
decision can be judged by comparing it to a weighted additive model. For example, 
Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998) argued that a weighted additive model best reflects 
people’s preferences and therefore defines a normative yardstick against which the 
quality of a decision can be compared. 
Yet, if we think of decision makers as “adaptive” (Payne et al., 1992), then 
deviating from a weighted additive model need not necessarily lead to a decrease in 
decision quality; such decision makers are simply applying a different (arguably more 
adaptive) heuristic. If a weighted additive model is regarded as one possible strategy 
among many, it seems peculiar to define its outcome as the normative standard against 
which the outcomes of other strategies are evaluated. In fact, the research tradition of 
simple heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) provides a number of good reasons why a 
weighted additive model should not be taken as a prime standard for human decision 
making. If the perspective on human decision making is broadened, for example, by 
taking into account search costs, computational limitations, psychological feasibility, 
social constraints, or robustness toward external changes, the normative claim of 
weighted additive strategies quickly loses ground (Gigerenzer et al.). From this 
perspective, whether a strategy is normative or rational should not solely depend on 
“internal” criteria—such as consistency or whether it obeys the rules of formal logic—
but rather also on its success within the environment in which it operates.  
Simple heuristics shield from information overload 
Acknowledging the importance of adaptive changes in decision strategy to 
accommodate changes in the environment, Malhotra (1982) conjectured that “a major 
variable influencing the outcome of overload may be the nature of the decision-
making process” (p. 428) as well as individual cognitive abilities. He goes on to 
acknowledge that individuals adaptively switched their decision strategy to heuristic 
processing when large amounts of information were presented. 
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Along the same lines, Jacoby (1984), the founding father of the information 
overload paradigm, concluded that for most real decisions, decision makers will stop 
far short of overloading themselves by accessing only a limited amount of the 
available information and by applying a simple heuristic such as satisficing or 
elimination-by-aspects. Likewise, Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde (1986) pointed out 
that the notion of information overload, saying that the amount of information impairs 
people’s ability to make a sound choice, conflicts with Simon’s idea of satisficing and 
also with the notion of adaptive decision making. 
The notion of an adaptive use of decision strategies to cope with information 
overload finds empirical support in an early experiment conducted by Hendrick, Mills, 
and Kiesler (1968), who found a nonlinear relationship between the amount of 
available information and the decision time. Their experiment followed a 2×2 
between-subjects design in which undergraduates were given an actual choice between 
two or four ties that were described on either 1 or 15 attributes. From the perspective 
of information overload, the four conditions differed with regard to their information 
content. The time it took participants to decide between the ties was shortest in the 
condition with two ties described on 1 attribute and it peaked for the two conditions in 
which two ties were described on 15 attributes and in which four ties were described 
on 1 attribute. For the high-information condition of four ties described on 15 
conditions, decision time decreased again. Hendrick and his colleagues interpreted this 
result as meaning that if information load exceeds a certain threshold, people “give up 
trying to compare the alternatives” and “the choice may be made impulsively” (p. 
314). With regard to the recent literature on adaptive decision making one could also 
regard these results as early empirical evidence for the use of simple heuristics—what 
the researchers labeled impulsive in fact reflected an adaptive shift toward a fast and 
frugal choice strategy. 
In a more recent study, Lurie (2004, Experiment 2) found that an increase in 
entropy (measured as in equation 5-2) led to a more selective search. In his 
experiment, participants chose among assortments of 16 pocket calculators that were 
all described on eight attributes but that differed in the number and the distribution of 
attribute levels. Participants’ information search patterns were tracked by means of a 
Mouselab setup (Payne et al., 1992). In the high-entropy conditions, people focused 
more on the most important attributes and they acquired less information in total, 
which suggest an adaptive shift toward a more fast and frugal decision rule. 
Noncompensatory strategies as a mediator 
Next, based on the example of a simple noncompensatory heuristic, I will lay out in 
more detail how fast and frugal heuristics may shield decision makers from choice 
overload and thus may function as a powerful explanation of when and why choice 
overload occurs.  
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Definition of noncompensatory decision strategies 
In contrast to a compensatory decision strategy such as the weighted additive rule 
defined previously, a noncompensatory decision rule means that the decision is 
eventually made based on only one aspect or attribute such that the option that is 
highest on that single attribute is chosen. When a noncompensatory strategy is applied, 
an advantage on one attribute cannot compensate for a disadvantage on another 
attribute and no trade-offs are made (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). A prime example of a 
noncompensatory strategy is the so-called lexicographic decision rule in which the 
option that is best on the most important attribute is selected, irrespectively of the 
values of that option on other, less important attributes. Other examples of 
noncompensatory strategies are the satisficing rule (Simon, 1956) and the elimination-
by-aspect rule (Tversky, 1972) outlined in Chapter I.  
Interaction between noncompensatory strategies and environment 
For assortments in which attributes are negatively correlated, simulations show that 
the outcomes of simple noncompensatory decision strategies deviate substantially 
from the outcome of a weighted additive rule that takes into account all the available 
information (Bettman et al., 1993). In extension to this, Fasolo, McClelland, and Todd 
(2007) showed via simulations that two conditions are necessary for a decision to 
become difficult: First, the structure of the choice environment has to be “unfriendly,” 
that is, operationalized as a high number of options that are nondominated and 
described on many attributes. Second, the decision maker has to value multiple 
attributes as equally or similarly important (e.g. aiming to find something that is cheap 
and has high quality). In contrast, if only one condition holds but not the other such 
that the environment is friendly or the decision maker regards only very few attributes 
as important (e.g. aiming to find something that is cheap, but not bothering much 
about quality), the choice will become easy with regard to the amount of information 
that has to be looked up. Fasolo et al. also show that in these latter cases, the outcome 
of the decision will closely resemble the outcome of a weighted additive decision 
strategy that takes into account all available information. Yet, as outlined previously, 
using a weighted additive rule as a normative yardstick is highly controversial.  
Noncompensatory strategies can increase choice probability 
Analogous to Fasolo et al.’s theoretical predictions, Dhar and Nowlis (1999) found 
that individuals were less likely to defer choice if they applied a noncompensatory 
decision strategy. In their experiment, people were given a choice between two 
options (apartments, microwave ovens, or automobiles) that were described on a 
number of nonalignable attributes and thus involved trade-offs. What they found was 
that participants who had to decide under time pressure were less likely to defer the 
choice as compared to a group that was not put under time pressure. For a control 
group that decided among two options that were not conflicting because one was 
better than the other on every attribute, no effect of time pressure was found. Dhar and 
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Nowlis hypothesized that time pressure led participants to shift their decision strategy 
toward a less compensatory strategy in which they evaluated fewer attributes. As a 
consequence, individuals experienced fewer trade-offs and were more likely to 
choose. In a series of follow-up experiments in which Dhar and Nowlis also tracked 
participants’ information search processes, they found converging evidence in favor of 
their hypothesis.  
Critical evaluation of noncompensatory strategies as a mediator 
In Chapter I argued that finding choice overload could be interpreted as finding failure 
to adapt the decision strategy to the current situation. This statement can be rendered 
more precisely now by saying that choice overload will be more likely if decision 
makers try to apply an elaborate and compensatory strategy that requires them to take 
into account the full information available. To the degree that people shift toward a 
noncompensatory strategy, they should be less likely to be overloaded.  
Initial screening as a potential mediator 
Besides the use of noncompensatory decision strategies, there are also other heuristics 
that may moderate the effect of too much choice. One apparently simple heuristic to 
handle excessive assortments is to engage in an initial screening process in which 
options are sequentially eliminated based on a few, yet important aspects. (Davey, 
Olson, and Wallenius, 1994; Grether & Wilde, 1984; Tversky, 1972). For example in 
a study by Huber and Klein (1991), 75% of the participants who had to search for a 
new flat decided not to look at a full list with 100 choices but rather eliminated the 
worst options beforehand by placing strict cutoffs on attributes such as monthly rent or 
quality.  
Likewise, Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) argued that consumers do not 
consider all available options but rather a much smaller set. They reported data from a 
large consumer panel showing that across a large number of product categories, the 
number of brands that consumers consider seriously when making a purchase is 
seldom larger than six, with an median of about four. These data indicate that people 
efficiently narrowed down the number of options to form a manageable consideration 
set that they could then scrutinize in more detail.  
In a similar fashion, the participants in the study by Lenton et al. (2005) 
avoided overly large numbers of potential mates on an Internet dating site, which 
could also be interpreted as an initial screening strategy. Screening out options based 
on very few pieces of information is a successful strategy for narrowing down an 
assortment to a manageable size. Thus, to the degree that people screen out options, 
they should be less affected by the initial size of the assortment.  
Critical evaluation of initial screening as a mediator 
While such an elimination or screening strategy is commonly regarded as an adaptive 
way to handle excessive assortments, ceteris paribus it leads to a situation in which the 
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options in the reduced set become more similar as the initial set gets bigger. At the 
same time it can be shown via simulations and based on real-world examples that as a 
result of a thorough elimination process the attributes of the remaining options are 
likely to be conflicting, even if in the initial, unscreened set the correlations were 
positive (Fasolo et al., 2007). Thus, a presumably adaptive decision strategy might 
lead to an increased choice difficulty in large assortments as compared to small ones. 
As mentioned in Chapter I, Botti and Iyengar (2006) argued that an initial 
screening comes with the risk that the best alternative might be unwittingly 
eliminated, which in turn should lead to dissatisfying outcomes. This is because by 
placing a strict cutoff on one of the attributes, one would eventually eliminate the best 
alternative on the other attribute. In real-world situations this seems to be less of a 
problem, though. At least according to Huber and Klein (1991), decision makers seem 
to be capable of adapting their strategy use accordingly. In their experiment they 
found that participants adopted less severe cutoffs when attributes were negatively 
correlated as compared to a choice from an assortment in which attributes were 
positively correlated.  
Taken together, these results suggest that an initial screening seems to be a 
sensible heuristic to prevent choice overload. On the other hand, the argument that this 
initial screening amplifies trade-offs and thus leads to decision avoidance rests upon 
the assumption that a decision maker aims to maximize rather than to satisfice, an 
aspect that I already discussed and empirically tested as a separate moderator in 
Chapter III. Thus it seems that if anything, several factors have to interact before 
choice overload occurs, which would make it difficult to replicate the effect.  
Hedonic editing and dominance as moderators 
Yet another suggestion for how the too-much-choice effect might be moderated by 
individual decision strategies is based on the idea that people often do not decide 
unless they have identified a dominant option (Montgomery, 1983). As mentioned 
earlier in the present chapter, Gourville and Soman (2005) reported empirical evidence 
that the motivation to choose is higher if options only differ along a single, 
compensatory dimension such as price or size as compared to an assortment in which 
options differ on many different dimensions. With regard to Montgomery’s 
framework according to which people search for a dominant option, in the latter case 
people are less likely to choose because it is more difficult to identify such a dominant 
alternative.  
Given that many assortments in the real world are characterized by negative 
attribute correlations and so a dominant option will usually not exist, Montgomery 
further assumed that such “unfriendly” environments are “edited” by the decision 
maker, for instance, by changing the subjective importance weights for the attributes 
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or neglecting certain pieces of information (see Thaler & Johnson, 1990, for the 
related idea of hedonic editing). From this perspective, a decision maker makes a 
precommitment for one promising option early in the decision process and then 
searches for justification of this preliminary choice. According to Montgomery, 
another way of editing is to apply a noncompensatory decision rule similar to the case 
described by Dhar and Nowlis (1999), as set out in the present chapter above.  
Critical evaluation of finding a dominance structure as a moderator 
Under the assumption that no decision is made unless a dominant option is singled 
out, Montgomery’s framework predicts a too-much-choice effect for environments 
with similar options and negative attribute correlations in combination with a 
compensatory decision strategy because in such situations a dominant option is hard to 
find. The described environmental structure resembles those described by Fasolo et al. 
(2007) as a result of initial screening. Likewise, the idea of finding a dominance 
structure is strikingly similar to the notion of maximizing. Even though Montgomery’s 
theory makes a prediction of when and why the effect of too much choice will occur, 
the data I and others have collected so far do not allow us to test it empirically, mainly 
because precise data on the process according to which people search and decide are 
lacking. 
To test to what extent decision strategies—such as searching for a dominance 
structure—and simple heuristics—such as initial screening or noncompensatory 
weighting of information—moderate the effect of too much choice, the search and 
decision strategies that people employ within a given situation have to be assessed. 
While tracking the search process in the music study was a first step in this direction, 
future studies should collect more detailed process information about individual 
information search and reaction time and possibly should also ask people about their 
decision strategies in a more qualitative approach. While each single method has its 
conceptual limits (e.g. see Nisbett and Wilson, 1977, for the limits of verbal reports 
about cognitive processes), a combination of different methods might eventually lead 
to a better understanding of the interaction between decision strategies and the number 
of options to choose from. 
Common comparison standard as a moderator  
According to Cabanac (1992), comparing and trading off qualitatively different 
attributes relative to each other in a compensatory fashion requires a common value 
system (see also Sanfey, 2004). For example, Cabanac’s theory predicts that when 
trading off usability against design one would have to determine how much usability 
should be forgone for a given increase in design. In other words, for means of relative 
comparison, the decision maker would have to convert the values of more or less 
incommensurable attributes. Yet, such a common denominator may only exist in 
rudimentary form. Therefore, Cabanac assumed that the conversion into a common 
value system is probably somewhat error-prone and the reliability of the option 
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comparison might be decreased. The reasoning is similar to Zhang and Fitzsimon’s 
(1999) line of argumentation outlined above saying that people are less satisfied when 
comparing options with nonalignable features because decision makers are insecure 
about how the features should be traded-off against each other.  
Furthermore, the more options there are, the more similar they become and the 
higher the chance that a blurry comparison standard will change the preference 
rankings. If the goal is to maximize the outcomes and to find the best option this 
blurriness increases the risk of making a suboptimal choice. To avoid this risk, people 
may be more likely to defer the choice. In support of this hypothesis, Dhar (1997) 
found that people were less likely to defer a choice between two music tapes if they 
were instructed to assign a monetary value to each attribute (e.g. number of songs, 
quality of the recordings) as compared to a control group who did not receive specific 
instructions. Dhar argued that once all the attributes are mapped onto an 
unidimensional measure such as money, comparison and trade-offs are much easier, 
which would be in line with the predictions of Cabanac.  
The hypothesis that decision difficulty increases with the similarity between 
options is also supported by the results of an experiment by Böckenholt, Albert, 
Aschenbrenner, and Schmalhofer (1991), who showed that decision makers searched 
for more information about possible vacation locations when options had small 
attribute differences (e.g. in temperature or number of rainy days) as compared to a 
situation in which the differences on those same attributes were large. 
Critical evaluation of a common value system as moderator 
The assumption of a common value system closely resembles the notion of utility as a 
universal currency that decision makers aim to maximize, a concept that has been 
criticized on several grounds (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Gigerenzer, 
2000). In addition, Cabanac’s theory would always predict an effect of too much 
choice when the number of options exceeds a certain degree of similarity. The degree 
of similarity between options differed substantially between the experiments that I 
reviewed and that did not find an effect of too much choice. Therefore, the degree of 
similarity seems not to be sufficient to explain why and when the effect of too much 
choice occurs and when it does not.  
Furthermore, the “conversion” of attribute values into a common value system 
(Cabanac, 1992) is only necessary if a decision maker adopts a compensatory choice 
rule. From the perspective of noncompensatory decision rules such as satisficing or 
elimination-by-aspects, Byron (2005) pointed out that a common denominator is 
unnecessary because the decision maker is expected to choose the first option that 
exceeds his aspiration on each relevant attribute (see also Gigerenzer et al., 1999). For 
example, for a true satisficer, the decision would not depend on the conflict or the 
incommensurability between options on different attributes. In line with this, Simon 
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(1956) pointed out that “we should be skeptical in postulating for humans, or other 
organisms, elaborate mechanisms for choosing among diverse needs” and that 
“common denominators among needs may simply not exist” (p. 137). 
Finally, insofar as Cabanac’s model implies that the similarity between 
options increases choice difficulty, it somewhat contradicts the prediction by Kahn 
and Lehmann (1991), who stated that similarity between options leads to a decrease in 
variety and by this lowers choice difficulty. These discrepancies are hard to resolve 
unless a precise model of the decision-making process is spelled out. As such, the 
results once again stress the importance of widening the perspective by also 
incorporating decision processes and their interactions with environmental structures. 
Search costs as a mediator 
As mentioned above, whether a choice is difficult or demotivating depends on the 
interaction between the assortment structure that the decision maker faces and the 
strategy that he or she applies to make the choice. So far, I have mainly differentiated 
decision strategies by the amount of information they require and how that 
information is combined. In the following, I will focus on yet another important aspect 
of decision strategies, namely, the “costs” that are required to carry out a certain 
strategy. Measures of decision costs set a price tag on the amount of time and effort 
devoted to searching information and also on mental processes such as calculations or 
comparisons. As I will lay out in more detail below, incorporating decision costs 
might explain when and why a too-much-choice effect occurs.  
Information search and costs 
Heuristic models of search as well as Simon’s notion of satisficing explicitly link 
information search to costs. For example it has been shown that if information is 
costly, people are more likely to use a simple heuristic (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2006) 
and they search for less information (Brannon & Gorman, 2002). Payne et al. (1992) 
developed a measure of computational cost, which they called “elementary 
information processing” (EIP) units, that aimed to quantify the cognitive effort 
required to carry out a certain decision strategy. Another attempt to quantify cognitive 
effort goes back to Shugan (1980), who developed a measure for what he called the 
“cost of thinking” that basically reflects the expected number of pair-wise 
comparisons of options and their attributes that a decision strategy requires in a given 
environment in order to reach a choice.  
Optimal search 
As indicated by the results of the music study, the amount of search often increases 
with the number of options. Trading off more search costs against the benefits of 
eventually having a better option seems worthwhile as long as the marginal costs of 
search are smaller than the expected marginal increase in quality. Thus, if choosers 
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continue to search, at some point their costs will exceed the benefits and the net gain 
might be negative.  
In a theoretical analysis of search, Stigler (1961) found that when searching 
within an assortment of consumer goods, the probability of finding an option that is 
cheaper (and thus a better deal) than the already examined options decreases with 
every additional option that is sampled. In his model, Stigler assumed that the decision 
maker sequentially obtains price calls and that he or she can go back at any time to the 
cheapest call encountered so far. Based on these assumptions, the relationship between 
the money saved and the amount of search is monotonically increasing but negatively 
accelerated. In other words, the additional benefits of search get smaller the longer the 
search lasts. From Stigler’s model it follows that the benefits of further search will be 
greater if the distribution of prices widens (such that extreme prices become more 
likely) but that even for very wide distributions, the benefits of further search are 
marginally decreasing. Thus, without any search costs, more search will eventually 
lead to a better outcome and thus more options should always be welcome; even more 
so if the choice set is heterogeneous.  
Because for most cases there is no closed-form function for the relationship 
between search and the expected return, it can only be approximated (Stigler, 1961). 
Figure 12 exemplifies this relationship based on the results of a bootstrap simulation 
run in Matlab 7.0 with 1,000 draws per data point. In this simulation, the distribution 
of prices in the assortment is assumed to be normal with a mean price of zero. 
Different colors represent different standard deviations of price, denoted as sd. 
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Figure 12: Relationship between the number of searched options on the abscissa and 
the outcome of the search on the ordinate, expressed as the amount of money saved 
relative to the mean price within the assortment.  
 
So far, the framework does not incorporate search costs. Under the assumption 
that searching and evaluating an additional option comes with a fixed cost c, the net 
outcome of the search process O would be  
cnnFnO ⋅−= )()(  (8) 
where n is the number of options searched and F(n) is the quality function depicted in 
Figure 12. If costs increase linearly while quality is negatively accelerated with search, 
the net outcome will eventually be negative depending on the search costs and the 
distribution of prices. Figure 13 illustrates this relationship. In the example, again 
price is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 2.0 ,and the different colors represent different search costs. 
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Figure 13: Expected net outcome (amount saved minus search costs) depending on 
varying search costs c and the number of options searched.  
 
Simple heuristics for search 
Given the mathematically complex calculation needed to determine the optimal 
amount of search and the fact that this amount also depends on the quality distribution, 
which in many cases might be unknown to the decision maker, it can hardly be said 
that Stigler’s model of search is a reasonable standard for human decision making in 
real-world situations. To overcome this problem, researchers in the past developed 
simple heuristics that aim to describe actual search behavior also for those cases where 
the exact distribution of options is unknown. When cognitive limitations are taken into 
account, it has been shown analytically as well as experimentally that simple 
heuristics of search can do reasonably well across many environments (Butler & 
Loomes, 1997; Dudey & Todd, 2002; Hey, 1980, 1982; Hutchinson & Halupka, 
2004). One example among many possible search heuristics is the so-called “one 
bounce” rule, according to which decision makers should examine at least two options 
and then stop their search as soon as the last option encountered is worse in quality 
that the best one examined so far (Hey, 1982).  
Psychological costs of search 
Independent of the distribution of options and the actual decision strategy used, 
Stigler’s model and its illustration (Figure 13) exemplify an important aspect with 
regard to choice overload, namely, that if search is costly, too much search will 
eventually result in a net loss. In addition, if the overall post-choice satisfaction with a 
chosen option is a function of the benefits of the chosen option minus the search costs 
invested to find this option, the relationship between satisfaction and the amount of 
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search would in principle resemble the function depicted in Figure 13—that if the 
search costs outweigh the benefits, the satisfaction with the choice will be low 
(Schwartz, 2000). From this perspective, a too-much-choice effect would occur if an 
increase in the number of options boosts the decision costs faster than it increases the 
benefits, for example, by luring people into too much search. 
Do people search too much? 
Yet, in a summary of several empirical studies on search, Dudey and Todd (2002) as 
well as Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, and Muthukrishnan (2003) concluded that in most cases, 
subjects stopped their search earlier than prescribed by the respective theories. Also, in 
a consumer context, Marmorstein, Grewal, and Fishe (1992) stated that the amount of 
prepurchase search undertaken by buyers of durable goods is surprisingly low across 
several empirical studies. In resemblance to Simon’s analogy of a pair of scissors, 
Zwick et al. further argued that whether people search too much or too little relative to 
an optimal policy depends on the structure of the assortment as well as the heuristic 
rule an individual applies—and, one might add, it also depends how one defines an 
optimal search strategy. 
In an empirical study, Zwick et al. (2003) tested the effect of search costs and 
of the total number of options in an assortment on search behavior. In line with my 
results from the music study, Zwick et al. found that people searched more if the 
assortment size increased. They further found that people searched less if search costs 
increased, which is in line with findings from a comparable experiment conducted by 
Brannon and Gorman (2002). Together, these results support the hypothesis of 
humans as adaptive decision makers. Yet even though participants adapted to the 
costs, Zwick et al. found that if search costs were low, most participants tended to 
search too little and according to Zwick et al’s analysis , on average, they could have 
been more successful in their search if they had examined more options. On the other 
hand, when search was costly, most participants could have done better by searching 
less. More importantly, the number of options did not lure participants into searching 
too much or too little. There was an interaction effect solely between the number of 
options and search costs such that participants had the worst search results when there 
were many options and search costs were high.  
Critical evaluation of the search cost hypothesis  
With regard to the too-much-choice effect, it seems that a mere increase in the number 
of options does not necessarily lead people into searching too much. As outlined 
above, participants across many studies tend to search too little rather than too much. 
People’s search strategies seem to adapt to the environmental structure such that they 
search less when the cost of search increases, which should further shield them from 
searching too much. As mentioned in chapter I, scholars have also argued that a large 
set of options actually reduces the time and effort needed to reach a decision, and 
thereby also the search costs (Hutchinson, 2005; Kahn, 1995; Simonson, 1990).  
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Despite this, even if people who are confronted with a large assortment search 
too much and thus suffer from increased costs, they should still make a choice as long 
as the options generate positive outcomes to cover at least some of their losses due to 
search costs. Thus a search cost model cannot easily explain choice omission or a 
decrease in motivation to choose. Despite this shortcoming, in theory the model could 
still explain a decrease in satisfaction with the chosen option.  
However, in previous studies on too much choice, there were no explicit 
search costs and whatever costs occurred must have been nonmonetary, such as time 
spent or cognitive effort invested. Estimating these costs would be purely speculative 
and as a consequence, with the data on hand, the search cost hypothesis cannot be 
fully evaluated. Testing the theory of search costs in real-world environments is 
further complicated by the fact that individuals search for many different reasons. In a 
consumer context, they might just enjoy shopping (Marmorstein et al., 1992). Across 
several contexts, they might value the information acquired in order to gain expertise 
within a given environment or simply try to satisfy their curiosity (Brannon & 
Gorman, 2002). Likewise, the time spent searching might be valued more or less. 
These latter explanations would also match the finding that people sometimes gather 
more information than necessary before making a choice (Bastardi & Shafir, 1998). 
In addition, it is not at all clear that decision makers would indeed incorporate 
search costs in their final satisfaction rating with the chosen option in a way that more 
search leads to lower satisfaction. As mentioned in Chapter I, other psychological 
theories suggest that it might well be the other way round. According to Festinger’s 
(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, people will boost their liking of a chosen 
option if they invested a lot of effort in finding it, in order to justify their decision. 
Likewise, for animals, Kacelnik and Marsh (2002) found that starlings prefer the kind 
of food that had required an increased effort to obtain in the past. Their study 
consisted of two stages. In the first no-choice stage, the birds had to either fly a short 
(4 meter) or a long (16 meter) distance in order to get access to pecking keys that 
differed in color depending on the length of the distance. Pecking the keys resulted in 
identical food rewards. At a second stage, the birds got a free choice between the two 
differently colored keys. At this second stage, most birds pecked the key that was 
associated to the long flying distance. In resemblance to these results, in the music 
study outlined in Chapter III, people who searched more were slightly more satisfied 
with the finally chosen option.  
(Mal) adaptive aspiration level as a moderator 
As noted at several places throughout the dissertation on hand, the notion of satisficing 
assumes that people choose the first option that exceeds their aspiration level. This 
decision strategy implies that no choice would be made if none of the options 
surpasses the threshold. Thus, if people strictly follow a satisficing strategy, whether a 
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choice is made or not would depend on the extent of their aspirations. Following up on 
Stigler’s search model, when search costs are low, better options can be expected if 
the assortment is large, especially if the distribution of options is wide. From the 
perspective of an adaptive decision maker, in such a situation it would be sensible to 
increase the aspiration level. In contrast, if the assortment is small or options are 
similar to each other, the expectations should be lowered. This principle would be in 
line with Simon’s (1955) conclusions. Simon hypothesized that as “the individual, in 
his exploration of alternatives, finds it easy to discover satisfactory alternatives, his 
aspiration level rises; as he finds it difficult to discover satisfactory alternatives, his 
aspiration level falls” (p. 111). As a consequence of this change in aspiration, Simon 
further conjectured, the consideration set narrows if satisfactory alternatives are 
discovered easily, and vice versa.  
As I will outline in more detail below, if decision makers assume that they are 
in an environment with large variance whereas in fact they are choosing from an 
assortment with small variance, the probability that their aspirations will be met will 
decrease with an increase in assortment size and thus a too-much-choice effect would 
occur.  
A thought experiment 
As an example, imagine two parents, Ms. O and Ms. U. Every Saturday, they send 
their children to the market to buy an apple. In the city where Ms. O lives, there are 
two markets: one small market with 6 apple stands and one large market with 30 apple 
stands. Ms. O knows that in his city, the price of the apples varies a lot between the 
stands. The average price of an apple is 1 euro and the standard deviation of the apple 
prices is 20 cent across stands. As Ms. O is very low on money, he only wants to give 
as much money to his children as they will need to buy an apple on 95 of 100 
Saturdays that he sends them to the market. Over the years, he figured out that for the 
small market, it is sufficient to give 95 cents to his children so that they can buy an 
apple 95% of the time6. When he sends his children to the large market, he only needs 
to give them 74 cents.  
In the city where Ms. U lives, there are also two markets with 6 and 30 stands, 
and the average price for an apple is also 1 euro, but with a standard deviation of 5 
cents across stands, so the difference between the prices is much smaller. When Ms. U 
sends her children to the small market, they need 99 cents to return with an apple on 
95% of the days, only slightly more than the children of Ms. O. However, when Ms. U 
sends her children to the large market, they still need 94 cents to buy an apple, much 
more than the children of Ms. O.  
                                                     
6 The values in this thought experiment stem from Monte Carlo simulations based on Stigler’s 
(1961) mathematical functions of search costs, carried out in Matlab 7.0  
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One day, Ms. O and his family move to the city where Ms. U lives. As he did 
before, every Saturday Ms O sends his children to the market. Because he does not 
know about the distribution of the prices, he assumes that they are the same as in his 
old city. But to his surprise, with the money he gives them in the new city his children 
bring home an apple less often, and especially so when returning from the large 
market. From the small market, they return an apple on 63 of 100 days but from the 
large market they almost never—only once in 100—days, bring an apple home.  
Critical evaluation of (mal) adaptive aspiration levels as a moderator 
As the example shows, a mal-adapted aspiration level can lead to a decrease in the 
probability of choice due to an increase in assortment size. Schwartz (2004) 
conjectured that large assortments lead to an increase in expectations. As outlined 
above, in general, increasing the aspiration level (which in the example means 
lowering the price one is willing to pay for an apple) with an increase in the 
assortment size seems a sensible thing to do, yet the magnitude of this increase needs 
to be adapted to the structure of the environment, namely, the variance of the options.  
If people overestimate the variance, for example, by assuming large 
differences between options whereas in fact, all options are more or less the same, 
they will overplay their expectations in the face of an increase in assortment size and 
this would result in an effect of too much choice. Note that if people underestimate the 
variance, this framework would predict a reversed too-much-choice effect. 
However, while the present model of a changing aspiration level makes 
explicit and testable predictions, it is not well suited to explain the results of past 
experiments on too much choice, including my own. That is because it assumes that 
the aspiration level is determined prior to making a choice and that it cannot change 
during the search process. In contrast, most of the experiments outlined above were set 
up to reduce the influence of prior preferences and domain-specific knowledge, which 
makes it unlikely that decision makers had strong aspirations prior to choice.  
Effort invested in choosing as a moderator 
At least in the laboratory studies that I conducted, most participants were highly 
educated university students in their mid 20s. Also, in the Berlin lab as well as in the 
Bloomington lab many other experiments require high cognitive skills. Therefore 
participants may have been expecting a challenging task in the choice experiments and 
were motivated to invest more time and effort. In line with this, independent of the 
assortment size, the majority of participants in all lab experiments eventually chose an 
option. If the too-much-choice effect only occurs for cases in which decision makers 
are unable or unwilling to put enough effort into making a choice, this could be a 
potential moderator.  
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Critical evaluation of effort as a moderator 
The hypothesis outlined above rests on the assumption that participants in experiments 
that show choice overload phenomena were unmotivated. As to my knowledge there is 
no data to support this claim, the assumption remains speculative. Moreover, Malhotra 
(1982) provided evidence that at least information overload can hardly be found in 
studies based on trivial decisions such as selecting rice or peanut butter. From this 
perspective, choice overload would instead be expected for important and far-reaching 
decisions. Clearly, any theory on effort needs to be rendered much more precisely 
before it can be fully evaluated. This is especially important because the concept of 
effort is somewhat related to the concept of choice motivation, which is often used as 
a dependent measure, and thus there is a danger of circular reasoning. 
Individual differences as a moderator 
In the preceding chapters, I discussed several individual differences that might 
moderate the effect of too much choice. Especially in the music experiment that 
followed a within-subject design, I explicitly tested for individual differences in 
domain-specific expertise, cultural differences, search behavior, and the personality 
construct of maximizing versus satisficing. Yet, none of the proposed variables 
explained the variance in the individual propensity to be overloaded with choice. 
Therefore, in the following I will extend the discussion of how individual differences 
might moderate the effect of too much choice.  
Variety seeking 
People seem to have a tendency to seek variety even if it requires them to choose less-
preferred options (Ariely & Levav, 2000; Ratner et al., 1999). As variety seeking often 
leads to choosing something exotic or unique, it has been argued that it is due to 
people’s desire to communicate individuality (Kim & Drolet, 2003). Another 
possibility might be that people take the opportunity to explore their environment in 
order to gain new experiences. In any case, a large assortment offers more 
opportunities for variety seeking and thus may invite decision makers to try something 
new and thereby put up with a decrease in satisfaction. If so, for people who like to 
experience new things and who value variety, a large assortment should be more 
inviting to make a choice, as it promises to reveal something special. 
Ability to deal with cognitive complexity 
Beyond satisficing versus maximizing, the degree to which people are affected by the 
size of an assortment could also depend on their ability to deal with cognitive 
complexity (Bieri, 1966), a measure that reflects how much information someone is 
willing to process prior to making a decision. The construct of differences in cognitive 
complexity is in turn closely linked to the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982) and the intolerance of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949). Other related 
concepts distinguish people based on their propensity to make or to avoid decisions 
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(Beattie et al., 1994; Hanoch et al., 2006) or their tendency to procrastinate (Ferrari, 
Johnson, & McCown, 1995; Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997).  
Depression 
Indecisiveness and the tendency to prolong information search has also been linked to 
depression because depressed decision makers have been found to use less heuristic 
processing and have difficulties committing themselves to a specific decision. For 
example, in a study by Lewicka (1997), depressed participants searched for more 
information about a job candidate before they reached a decision. Because of this 
difference in the search process, depressed participants ended up with more evenly 
spread knowledge about available options. Probably because of this, depressed 
participants also rated the second-best, nonchosen candidate as almost equally 
attractive as the candidate they chose. Nondepressed participants, on the other hand, at 
some point tended to search for confirming evidence about the most promising 
candidate and rated the finally chosen candidate as much more attractive than the 
second-best one. In line with these results, Lyubomirsky and Ross (1999) found that 
chronically unhappy people were more vulnerable to post-decisional dissonance and 
disappointment.  
Critical evaluation of individual differences as a moderator 
With regard to the data that I collected, there is no particular reason why participants 
in studies that revealed an effect of too much choice should differ systematically on 
any of these dimensions from participants in studies where the effect was not found. 
Of course, it can never be ruled out that a certain attitude or personality is a necessary 
precondition of the too-much-choice effect but as long as there is no sound theory 
about the decision processes that lead to the effect of too much choice, the influence of 
individual differences remains speculative.  
A closer look at choice motivation as dependent variable  
The too-much-choice effect describes the situation in which an overly large 
assortment decreases the motivation to make a decision and can eventually lead to no 
choice for the time being. According to Anderson (2003), making no choice in itself is 
not a well-defined dependent variable but rather an umbrella term that embraces 
different phenomena that require different explanations.  
Making no choice can be to the result of a preference for having no change, 
that is the status quo (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1992). Also, 
no choice will be made if the decision maker procrastinates, for instance, in order to 
search for more information (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). In this second case, a choice 
might be made at a later point in time. However, once delayed, many things never get 
done (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). These types of no-choice responses require that 
alternative options be recognized as such, and that the possibility of making a choice 
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is at least considered. In this sense, not choosing can be seen as the result of a more or 
less deliberate decision process that could be consistent with a decision maker’s 
intentions.  
But no choice can also be made if the possibility of choice as well as the 
alternative options are not even considered in the first place. In this case, not to choose 
does not result from a decision process but from the lack thereof. As an example, one 
might think of a person who passes by a tasting booth full of jam without realizing that 
the jam may actually be purchased.  
With regard to past studies on too much choice, including my own, making no 
choice could be interpreted in different ways. In experiments such as my studies on 
restaurants and charity organizations, but also in Iyengar and Lepper’s (2000) 
chocolate study, people were forced to make a choice among several options and 
choosing a default such as money was one option among many. Thus, a deliberate 
decision process can be assumed. The same holds for the music study where the 
amount of search prior to choice indicated participants’ deliberate process of actually 
collecting information and considering several options. In the field studies on jam and 
wine and to some extent also the lab study on jelly beans, a deliberate process and the 
sense of having different options is also likely. Yet it may be that people did not 
consider any option at all and thus did not even enter into a decision-making process 
or that they procrastinated in making their choice. 
As the reasons for no choice could differ significantly depending on the 
situation, a better understanding of choice overload will be gained by clarifying what 
people are actually doing if they do not make a choice. The different ways of making 
no choice also have important implications for cognitive models of the too-much-
choice effect (see also Veinott, Jessup, Todd, & Busemeyer, 2006). To get a better 
understanding of the effect, future studies need to be more explicit in their definition 
of the dependent variable.  
Final conclusion 
In his 2004 book The Paradox of Choice, Barry Schwartz wrote: “As the number of 
choices grows further, the negatives escalate until we become overloaded. At this 
point, choice no longer liberates, but debilitates. It might even be said to tyrannize” (p. 
2). On the other hand, Anderson (2006) as well as Postrel (2005) cherish the 
overabundance of choice as a liberating force that enables individuality and pluralism 
and that leads to more efficient markets. Also, the research on adaptive decision 
making provides strong evidence that people have a wide repertoire of choice 
strategies that they can employ depending on the situation. From this perspective, 
having many options to choose from does not automatically lead to choice overload. 
After all, people adapt to choice; they satisfice and they deliberately limit their choices 
all the time, for instance, by applying a filter, consulting an expert, or reading 
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Consumer Reports. As noted by Schwartz (2004): “A small-town resident who visits 
Manhattan in overwhelmed by all that is going on. A New Yorker, thoroughly adapted 
to the city’s hyperstimulation, is oblivious to it.” This latter perspective on choice 
overload is in line with my empirical findings showing that the effect of too much 
choice is much less robust than previously thought.  
Foreshadowing these challenges in replicating the effect, even though 
Buridan's hypothesis about choice-overloaded animals also seemed convincingly 
universal, it could never be supported on empirical grounds. For example, hungry rats 
that were placed an equal distance between two food patches quickly moved to one 
patch or the other and showed no tendency to hesitate or vacillate (Klebanoff 1939, 
cited in Miller 1944).  
Yet for the effect of choice overload, the odds for future replications are 
somewhat better. At least the meta-analytical integration of several studies outlined in 
Chapter IV shows that the effect of too much choice is real and that there must be 
certain boundary conditions that explain the differences in its occurrence. While 
almost none of the variables that I tested experimentally seemed to matter, there are 
still a number of potential moderators and mediators that remain to be tested that 
might explain the differences.  
From the review of these boundary conditions no finite conclusions on the 
exact nature of these moderators can be drawn. What can be concluded, however, is 
that looking solely at the structure of the environment only provides a distorted view 
of such a complex phenomenon as choice overload. In resemblance to Simon’s (1990) 
notion of the scissors, whatever the explanation looks like, it has to incorporate the 
interaction between the structure of the environment and the properties of the decision 
maker who acts within that environment. 
Toward this goal, future research should proceed by building a more precise 
understanding of the psychological processes and decision mechanisms that people 
use, the environment structures they face, and the interaction between the two (Todd 
& Gigerenzer, 2007). Finally, researchers should be precise regarding their dependent 
variable, be it different forms of making no choice or measures of reduced choice 
satisfaction.  
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